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# USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 3, July-September 1981



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USSR REPORT  
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## THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS AND SOME PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF CHINESE HISTORY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 5-16

[Article by Professor O. B. Borisov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Soviet communists and the Soviet population have invariably been sympathetic to the heroic struggle of the Chinese revolutionaries and the real communists in China. This was the case when the national liberation movement was taking shape in China and during the first years after the establishment of the PRC, when the republic kept in step with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal states.

The Soviet people, who have friendly feelings toward the Chinese people, were deeply troubled and wounded by the immense tragedy experienced by the CCP and the Chinese public as a result of the criminal activity of Mao Zedong and his supporters from the late 1950's until the end of the 1970's.

We sympathize just as much with the Chinese people and with real Chinese communists today, now that the post-Mao leadership has refused to resolutely discard the Maoist heritage and is taking the dangerous road of conspiracy with imperialism and reaction on an antisocialist, anti-Soviet basis.

Soviet Sinologists take a principled and consistent approach to the study of their topic. This approach is based on the decisions of the congresses and plenums of our party and on an objective scientific analysis of all aspects of Chinese reality.

The accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress contains the basic principles governing the comprehensive study of the present situation in the PRC and Beijing's policy. The report contains the important statement that "the PRC's socioeconomic development in the last two decades has been a hard lesson, demonstrating the consequences of the distortion of socialist principles and the essence of socialism in domestic and international politics."<sup>1</sup>

It has been stressed that even some people in China are now calling the current regime the "most brutal form of feudal fascist dictatorship." This is precisely what our party's central committee and the central committees of other fraternal parties have been saying for the last 20 years about the situation in the PRC. This is precisely the topic that Soviet and Marxist internationalist Sinologists

have been studying at the request of their central committees. These requests were accompanied by the prediction that people in China would sooner or later have to acknowledge the truth of the opinions expressed by the CPSU and other fraternal parties in regard to the events taking place in the PRC.

The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the consistency and continuity of our party's policy in relations with China, a policy defined by the 24th and 25th congresses. As we know, this policy combines the renunciation of Beijing's incendiary tactics, the protection of the interests of the Soviet State, the socialist community and the world communist movement and a struggle against Maoist ideology and policy, which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism, with a willingness to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The 26th CPSU Congress also directed attention to the changes taking place in China, noting that their exact significance has not yet been determined and stressing that the main question concerns the degree to which the present PRC leadership will be able to overcome the Maoist heritage. The most important function of Marxist Sinology is to give an objective answer to the question of whether the fundamental premises of Maoism and past events are being reassessed consistently in the PRC and to establish, to the full extent of scientific validity, the exact nature of the changes taking place in China--whether they represent an attempt to avoid crisis by means of progressive development or an attempt by the Chinese leadership to make its hegemonistic and militaristic policy more effective, in line with Beijing's global ambitions and the circumstances of domestic politics.

Recent works by Soviet Sinologists have stressed that an analysis of Beijing's ideological doctrine and its domestic and foreign policy indicates a new stage in the evolution of Chinese policy. The main features of this stage are apparently the following.

Firstly, the pro-imperialist line of the Chinese leadership has led to an open strategic alliance with the leading powers in the capitalist world and to parallel or, in some cases, concerted action by China and the imperialist states in the international arena against the USSR and its friends. A new and dangerous phenomenon, the partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism, is taking shape in world politics, as speakers pointed out at the June (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Broader ties have been established between Beijing and Washington in the military sphere, including plans to supply the PRC with modern weapons, and cooperation is being organized in the sphere of intelligence activity. American imperialism obviously wants (and this was quite clearly reaffirmed during U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig's recent visit in Beijing) to turn China into the main striking force in U.S. plans for world dominion, plans which are aimed primarily against the USSR.

Secondly, Beijing is openly striving to enlarge the framework of the "broadest possible international front" for struggle against the USSR and create a "structure of collective opposition" to the Soviet Union by including not only the capitalist and developing states, but also the most diverse nationalist and opportunistic elements in the revolutionary and democratic movements. The "differentiated" approach to the socialist countries is being intensified.



Thirdly, steps have been taken to reinforce the material base of Chinese hegemonism, partly by building up the PRC's military potential with the aid of the imperialists.

Fourthly, Maoism is being revitalized and modified to provide ideological and theoretical justification for Beijing's alliance with imperialists and various types of opportunists, nationalists and pseudocommunists and to make Maoism more flexible and appealing. However, its bases--"Sinized Marxism," hegemonism and anti-Sovietism--have remained inviolable.

The conclusions and judgments of the 26th CPSU Congress assign Marxist Sinologists the task of making further improvements in the quality of all political and ideological work connected with China and the thorough study of ongoing processes. Retaining the initiative in the ideological struggle, we must continue to expose Beijing's policy line and describe the severe consequences of the distortion of socialist principles, as exemplified in China's domestic and international policy. It is important to clearly reveal the anti-Marxist, anti-people essence of the Maoist ideological heritage, which is endangering the socialist gains of the working public in the PRC, and prove the accuracy of the opinions expressed by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties in regard to events in the PRC and the policy of Maoism, beginning with the "Great Leap Forward" and the period of "Cultural Revolution."

We must continue to analyze changes in Chinese domestic policy on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and provide accurate class descriptions of these changes. We must assess ongoing processes in the PRC without bias, but without illusions either, primarily from the standpoint of whether the Chinese leadership has had to depart from the fundamentals of Maoism or is simply pretending to do so for the more successful pursuit of its antisocialist, anti-Soviet policy.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress obligate Soviet communists and academics to continue waging a constant struggle against the alliance of Chinese hegemonism with imperialism, against Beijing's attempts to create international friction and against its hostile behavior toward the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international revolutionary movement, to reveal the dangerous nature of China's partnership with the imperialist countries and to prove that Beijing's policy poses a threat to world peace.

The accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee clearly proves that the CPSU is pursuing, in V. I. Lenin's words, a thoroughly principled policy<sup>2</sup> in the international arena, even with regard to the Chinese question. This policy rests on fundamental premises and conclusions. Our party does not sacrifice its principles for the sake of immediate benefits and is not swayed by isolated events or changes in the political situation; with a view to the specific situation, it invariably conducts a general line which is substantiated in theory and has been tested in practice.

The conclusions and judgments of the 26th CPSU Congress in regard to aspects of our state's domestic and foreign policy are of timeless historic significance. A colossal amount of work lies ahead in all areas of international politics for the attainment of the objectives set by the congress in the interests of stronger peace and security. We will have to struggle to frustrate the plans of the imperialists and their accomplices in Beijing to stop the process of detente and push the world into the chaos of war.



There is no doubt that the people of our country, working with the people of the socialist countries and progressive forces throughout the world, will successfully complete all of this work and all party assignments. They will not have to "start from zero." A great deal of research of various types has already been conducted.

Soviet Sinology has displayed its scientific and political maturity. The characteristic features of all Soviet Marxist-Leninist Sinology, incorporating the best traditions of Russian democratic Sinology, are clearly manifested in the works of Soviet Sinologists.

The first of these features is thorough internationalism, definite respect for the Chinese people and the Chinese working class and a sincere desire to fully reveal their role as subjects of history and the makers of their own fate.

The second is the consistent adherence to party principles, signifying a profoundly scientific approach to the object of research.

The third is a comprehensive approach to the study of Chinese affairs based on Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the requirements of practice. A new theory of the history of the CCP and the Chinese revolution, free of Maoist misinterpretations, has been developed and is being perfected collectively. This theory is based on ideas gained from the thorough study of CCP and Komintern documents. The theory essentially states that the specific conditions of the origins and development of the CCP have led to a clash between two tendencies throughout the party's history and political life since the mid-1920's: The Marxist-Leninist, internationalist tendency and the petty bourgeois, nationalist tendency.

Our Sinologists have revealed the distinctive features of the Chinese revolution and its deep-seated interconnection with world revolutionary movements, especially the Great October Socialist Revolution. They have concluded that the development of the accurate Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution was indissolubly connected with the tremendous ideological and theoretical assistance the CCP received from the Komintern and our party. As long as the CCP leadership adhered to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, applied it skillfully to the specific conditions of China and took the collective revolutionary experience of the international communist movement into account, the revolutionary process in China and the very development of the party were based on a healthy foundation and led to significant victories. This was the reason for the victorious conclusion of the Chinese revolution and the establishment of the PRC in 1949.

This also applies to the period after 1949. As long as the CCP adhered to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, took the experience of real socialism as a guide and cooperated closely with the socialist countries, the centuries-old backwardness and the influence of feudalism and imperialism were overcome successfully in China, the foundations were laid for a socialist order, industrialization was carried out, rural life was gradually reconstructed and underdevelopment was overcome in the spheres of culture, education, science and technology. When the CCP weakened its international ties, its role as the leader of the revolution and the vanguard of the working class in the construction of socialism was undermined. Petty bourgeois, nationalist forces began to prevail within the party and distorted its goals, strategy and tactics.

These conclusions are of fundamental methodological importance in the study of CCP history in general and of individual stages of this history.

The history of the CCP, the Chinese revolution and the international communist movement has been studied much more energetically in China in recent years. A look at some of the studies of CCP history published in China indicates that they have been written from an unscientific Maoist anti-Soviet vantage point. This means that Soviet Sinologists must refute new and more subtle Maoist lies about the history of the international communist movement and the history of the CCP. Several books about the international workers movement have been published in China in recent years. In 1978 and 1980, in particular, "The History of the International Communist Movement" was published in two volumes, covering the period from the birth of Marxism to the establishment of the PRC in 1949. An attempt is openly made in this book to deny the significance of international factors in the development of the Chinese revolution and to denigrate the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union, the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties. The book presents a purely Maoist interpretation of the Chinese revolution.

The Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum passed a special resolution on some aspects of CCP history during the period after the founding of the PRC. Although it criticized some of Mao's errors, especially the "Cultural Revolution," the resolution reaffirmed the falsified Maoist version of the history of the CCP and the Chinese revolution. The document adopted at the CCP Central Committee Plenum is now the focus of an ideological and political struggle in China. In general, the Maoist theory of the history of the Chinese revolution and the history of the CCP from the early 1920's to 1949 has remained unchanged. The central aspect of this theory is the famous decree "On Some Questions of CCP History," written by Mao Zedong and adopted in April 1945 just before the Seventh CCP Congress. The Maoists have particularly misrepresented the last stage of the Chinese revolution, from 1946 to 1949. Beijing historians are spreading the false rumor that the CPSU and I. V. Stalin himself supposedly tried to "prohibit the Chinese revolution" and prevent it.

The comprehensive and thorough study of the last stage of the Chinese revolution and the substantiation of the tremendous assistance the Soviet Union rendered in establishing the prerequisites for the triumph of the Chinese revolution, especially with regard to the role played by the Manchurian military revolutionary base, are of great scientific and political significance in the struggle against Maoist lies and in the reconstruction of the historical facts.

The subsequent development of the PRC has also been crudely misinterpreted. Although today's Maoists acknowledge the indisputable fact that the period of socialist construction in China, from 1949 to 1956, was a successful one, they are implying that the accuracy of the CCP party line and the success of socialist reforms in China prior to 1956 were not directly related to the pursuit of a correct, internationalist foreign policy or to the colossal selfless help the PRC received from the Soviet Union and the socialist community states. They are trying to say that China's progress during this period was supposedly attained in spite of the guidance of the Soviet Union and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The Beijing leaders are trying to misrepresent the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress, held in 1956, and to portray their current, rightist-pragmatic, pro-imperialist policy as a continuation of the policy line of the Eighth CCP Congress. This statement is obviously untrue. After all, it was precisely at the Eighth Congress that speakers stressed that socialism could not triumph in China without cooperation with the Soviet Union and other revolutionary forces. Today's Maoists are trying to conceal the fact that it was precisely Mao Zedong who revised the decisions of the Eighth Congress and that Deng Xiaoping was one of the most energetic supporters of Mao's struggle against the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress and against internationalist forces in China.

The Beijing "historians" have misinterpreted the intra-party struggle within the CCP during the PRC's lifetime. Although they admit that Mao Zedong made an entire series of major ultra-leftist errors after 1957, particularly his exaggeration of the role of class struggle and his extension of the class struggle thesis to the party, the representatives of Deng Xiaoping's group are trying to conceal or ignore Mao's anti-party, anti-Soviet actions in which Deng Xiaoping was directly involved. For example, this group has resolutely opposed any vindication of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, the prominent CCP activists who are still being described slanderously as "anti-party elements." The reason is that Deng Xiaoping was one of the organizers of the persecution of Gao Gang and it was on the strength of this that he was elected to the Politburo and then became the general secretary of the party central committee.

In an attempt to conceal the interconnection between Mao Zedong's domestic and foreign policy lines in the 1960's and 1970's, today's Maoists are saying that certain errors were made in the sphere of domestic policy, including the "Cultural Revolution," which they describe as a "serious mistake and a genuine tragedy." At the same time, they maintain that the foreign policy, with anti-Sovietism as its focus, was supposedly "absolutely correct." The betrayal of the class interests of the Chinese working public in the international arena and the struggle against the first socialist country are portrayed as a "highlight" of Mao Zedong's career.

The exposure of the essence of Maoist anti-Sovietism and of the Maoists' betrayal of the ideals of communism and the ideals of the Chinese revolution is also among the serious and crucial responsibilities of Marxist Sinologists. Maoism is an ideological miscarriage of the petty bourgeois, ultra-revolutionary forces which were fellow-travelers of the working class and the Chinese revolution and tried to establish a position for themselves within this revolution by promoting their own nationalist ideology and forcing this ideology on the working class and the communist party. The success of these forces in the attainment of their goal was a tragedy for the Chinese revolution and a tragedy for the CCP.

The Chinese working class was greatly demoralized by the nationalist ideology and was unable to perform the historic function of the proletariat, which V. I. Lenin once described as "the reeducation and reindoctrination of all of the elements it has inherited from the old society in the form of people of petty bourgeois origins. But this means that the proletariat must reeducate these people so that it can influence them but not be influenced by them." V. I. Lenin also said that



the proletariat must wholeheartedly resist all attempts by petty bourgeois ideologists to "impose their own 'theories' and their own outlook--in other words, their own limitations, on the workers party."<sup>3</sup>

The experience of the Chinese Communist Party demonstrates the monstrous forms that can be taken by tendencies engendered by petty bourgeois biases if no resolute struggle is waged for the purity of proletarian ideology.

Of course, the distortion of proletarian ideology, the temporary supremacy of the petty bourgeois ideology and the departure from the Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist construction in China were not inevitable or irreversible. This is attested to by the PRC's experience during its first decade of existence. The working class and its communist vanguard are able to successfully withstand the pressure of petty bourgeois forces, influence non-proletarian strata and lead them. But this does not happen automatically. It requires that the entire policy of the communist vanguard be of a precisely proletarian nature and it requires exceptionally persistent and patient work to indoctrinate the broad revolutionary masses.

There is no question that the construction of socialism in the PRC was and is an exceptionally complex and difficult task. Lenin's statement that "it is easy for a backward country to begin this process because its adversary is in decay and its bourgeoisie is unorganized, but for the continuation of the process it will have to be hundreds of thousands of times more circumspect, cautious and enduring"<sup>4</sup> applies more to China than to Russia. In essence, Mao Zedong put Lenin's statement in question, but the poverty, ignorance and destitution of most of the Chinese laboring public were defined as "a great advantage" by the Maoists because they would supposedly allow for the quicker accomplishment of the revolution.

In spite of the colossal objective and subjective difficulties involved in the construction of socialism in China, there was and is the possibility of this kind of construction.

When we summarize the history of the CCP's development, we must determine the main reason for China's departure from socialist construction and its move toward confrontation with the socialist world and alliance with imperialist and reactionary forces. In view of the fact that causes are closely related to responsibility in politics, it would seem that the main cause can be determined primarily from an analysis of the subjective factor, of the seizure of CCP leadership by nationalist forces which betrayed the cause of socialism and took the position of social chauvinism, great-power hegemonism and anti-Sovietism.

The tragedy of China was not a fatal inevitability and another move in the direction of socialism could take place in the future.

As speakers stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, China cannot take the road of healthy development without overcoming its Maoist heritage. The policy of the present Beijing leadership, which is aimed at the escalation of international tension and at alliance with imperialism, does not promise China anything good. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "this certainly will not put China back on the road of healthy development. The imperialists will not be friendly toward socialism."

The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed that the Soviet Union has never wanted confrontation with the PRC, does not want it now and is still willing to build a good-neighbor relationship with China. Our constructive proposals aimed at the normalization of relations with the PRC are still open, just as our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people have never changed.<sup>5</sup>

Beijing's anti-Sovietism, however, is becoming even more pronounced. At the initiative of the PRC leadership, the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1950, is no longer in effect. The PRC Government has shelved the second round of talks on international issues, which was supposed to take place in Beijing. It has not displayed any interest in the resumption of the border regulation talks. The Beijing leadership has issued an ultimatum to the USSR, demanding that these talks be preceded by the cessation of Soviet support of Vietnam and the withdrawal of Soviet military units from Afghanistan and Mongolia, where they have been stationed at the request of the governments of these countries. The Beijing leadership is insisting that the Soviet Union unilaterally withdraw its troops from the Soviet-Chinese border and acknowledge the "disputed" (in other words, Chinese) status of a number of Soviet regions.

Furthermore, the Chinese leadership is essentially demanding that the USSR renounce its principled foreign policy line in general, declaring that, otherwise, "Sino-Soviet relations will not change even in the next 10 or 20 years" (Deng Xiaoping, November 1980). Of course, the Soviet Union will never agree to these demands or stop supporting its friends and allies.

As for the Chinese people, "we are firmly convinced that their real interests would be served by a policy of peace, and only by a policy of peace and normal relations with other states."<sup>6</sup>

This statement from the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress defines the methodological approach to the forecasting of China's future development and lists the decisive factors on which the possibility of China's return to the healthy, socialist course of development will depend. Other statements in 26th Congress documents set forth new arguments to prove that Maoism is destined to fail as an ideological and political system. The reasons are the following:

Changes in the status and objective interests of the broad working masses, which are conflicting more and more with the militaristic, hegemonistic goals of Maoism;

The increasing activity of proletarian elements in the CCP;

The influence of the positive experience in the construction of a socialist foundation in China during the first decade of the PRC's existence, accomplished in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; the tendency of the prestige and influence of this experience to grow as the policy of anti-Sovietism and alliance with aggressive imperialist circles pushes China farther and farther into the trap of militarism and hegemonism, ruining the life of the working people and unavoidably evoking their increasing dissatisfaction with the difficulties of their life and with China's new status as imperialism's junior partner;



The intense effect of the positive experience in socialist construction in the countries of the socialist community and of the successes of the world communist and national liberation movements on socioeconomic, political and ideological processes in today's China;

The victories of the socialist community countries and forces for peace in the struggle against imperialism for relations based on trust among all countries.

Unfortunately, anti-Soviet emotions are still being stirred up in the Chinese press. In 1980 more than 3,400 articles (including over 100 anti-Soviet statements by members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo) containing fierce attacks on Soviet domestic and foreign policy were printed in RENMIN RIBAO alone.

Beijing reacted to the decisions and ideas of the 26th CPSU Congress with spiteful slander. In response to the official Soviet proposal that confidence-building measures in the Far East be negotiated by all interested countries, the Chinese press slanderously called the proposal "sheer propaganda" and an attempt to "dupe the Western countries" in order to arouse mistrust of the Soviet Union in the United States, Japan and other states.

Chinese propaganda is still making up stories to support its claims to Soviet territory. A reference work published in Beijing in 1980, "A Brief Survey of the Countries of the World," repeats the false claim that 1.5 million square meters of land within the Soviet Union was supposedly "seized" from China. Textbooks imply that Soviet people are living on land "seized from China." For example, a high school history textbook says that "from the legal standpoint, the basin of the Heilongjiang (Amur) River and the Ussuri River zone, including Kuyedao (Sakhalin) Island, are Chinese territories."

Socialist ideals are being severely discredited and the socialist gains of the Chinese working people are being undermined and deformed by the present domination of China by rightwing nationalist and hegemonistic forces, headed by Deng Xiaoping, by the many years of false anti-Soviet propaganda and by the destructive effects of the Maoist experiments in the construction of barracks "socialism" and the terror of the period of "Cultural Revolution," which the Maoists portray as a socialist movement. China's alliance with imperialism is attaching China to the capitalist system and is seriously inhibiting the country's progress toward more healthy development. China can only return to the course of healthy, socialist development after it has overcome Maoism and its consequences. This will necessitate the renunciation of the policy of alliance with imperialism and, above all, a move toward friendship and equal cooperation with all countries of the socialist community.

Therefore, reality itself obligates the Marxist Sinologists of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community to write a solid Marxist-Leninist work about the history of the CCP. It will require considerable effort from many social scientists, especially those from the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It would be wrong, however, to believe that only historians should be involved in writing the history of the CCP. This is a colossal field for scholars engaged in the study of the economic, social problems, political traditions, culture and foreign policy of the PRC.

An example has been set for us by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, who always endeavored to examine all the facts, determine their internal relationship and the main tendencies of their development and make scientific predictions on this basis.

The study of CCP history will help to provide an accurate and thorough understanding of today's CCP, its organizational, political and ideological basis, its personal policy and its strategy in general. This kind of research will provide historical substantiation for the prediction of this party's future development. The work that lies ahead will be of tremendous scientific and political significance.

Marxist historians in the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries have done much to expose Maoism and reveal the colossal injuries it inflicted on China and the Chinese working people. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress have set Marxist Sinologists in the Soviet Union the important and crucial task of analyzing the current situation in the PRC and the CCP and of continuing to develop and clarify the scientific, Marxist-Leninist theory of CCP history. This work will be of great international significance both as a means of actively opposing Maoist intrigues within the international communist movement and as a means of supporting healthy forces in China.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 10.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 15, p 368.
3. Ibid., Vol 19, p 107.
4. Ibid., Vol 36, p 252.
5. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," p 11.
6. Ibid.

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IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GREAT-HAN CHAUVINISM (COMMEMORATING THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FAR EAST INSTITUTE OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 'PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA')

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[Text] By the end of the 1950's the peace and security of the East Asian countries were being reliably safeguarded by the fraternal community of socialist countries: the USSR, the PRC, the DPRK, the MPR and the DRV. The treaties and agreements they had concluded guaranteed mutual assistance and support, and in the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship and Alliance the treaty obligations were even expressed more specifically: "Concerted effort to prevent the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and the repetition of aggression by Japan or any other state uniting in any way with Japan for the purpose of aggression." These military and political ally obligations were supplemented by the colossal economic, scientific and technical assistance the Soviet Union gave the socialist countries, which ensured their rapid socioeconomic development.

The communist parties of these countries participated in the two Moscow communist and workers party conferences (in November 1957 and November 1960), at which time a collective assessment of the current era was made and the political and ideological principles governing the construction of socialism in the countries of the world socialist system and relations between peoples and countries of the world were determined.

The declaration of the 1960 Moscow conference, in which all of the objectives of the communist parties were set forth, said that "the chief distinctive feature of our time is that the world socialist system is becoming the deciding factor in the development of human society;

"The communist and workers parties are tirelessly instilling the working public with the spirit of socialist internationalism and intolerance for all signs of nationalism and chauvinism;

"The time has come to put an end to the imperialist aggressors' attempts to start a world war. A world war can be prevented through the concerted efforts of the world socialist camp, the international working class, the national liberation movement in all countries opposing war and all peace-loving forces;

"The communist and workers parties of the socialist countries will continue their consistent pursuit of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures and will do everything within their power to spare people the horrors and disasters of a new war."

At the end of the 1950's the CCP leadership, especially CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, began to violate these unanimously adopted principles. After liquidating the socialist general line of the CCP for the transition period (1949-1967) in 1958, Mao Zedong announced a "special course," intended to turn China into a strong militaristic state capable of carrying out the great-Han plan of establishing China's hegemony in the world. At the 1960 Moscow conference, the Chinese delegation (with Deng Xiaoping as its deputy head) was already objecting to the draft declaration, arguing against the statements about the possibility of avoiding war, about the peaceful coexistence of states with differing social structures and about other matters. However, when these objections were not supported by any other delegation (with the exception of the Albanian one), the Chinese delegation withdrew them at the final session of the conference and the CCP thereby rejoined the communist parties in their common stand.

Later events proved that the CCP leadership had only formally consented to sign the communist party document and was actually preparing for a total departure from the common international stand and a move to covert and overt struggle against Marxism-Leninism and the socialist community.

By 1955, when the First Five-Year Plan for national economic development was being successfully carried out and the foundations of socialism were being laid in the PRC with the aid of the USSR and other socialist countries, Mao Zedong was already attacking the socialist general line of the CCP. He did not want to openly oppose the socialist course of development but tried to discredit it by declaring that the national economic plans that had been adopted stipulated "miserable rates of development" (a growth rate of 12-15 percent for the industrial product and of 3-4 percent for agriculture). In confidential statements Mao accused the Soviet Union of allegedly recommending low rates and thereby dooming China to prolonged underdevelopment.

Mao realized that the construction of socialism with the aid of the socialist countries and the pursuit of a common foreign policy with the other socialist countries based on the principles of socialist internationalism would refute his own bourgeois nationalist doctrine of "new democracy" and would strengthen the party position of internationalist communists, with whom he fought an unremitting struggle during the years of the terrorist "zheng-feng" campaign (1942-1944). Mao's primary goal was leadership of the world communist movement and dissociation from the CPSU, which was making every effort to promote the socialist general line of the CCP. Mao planned to divert the country from the socialist course to the nationalist, great-Han course. His first move in the sphere of actual political behavior was an attempt to undermine the planned socialist management of the national economy, discredit the technical and economic assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries and drive the advisers and specialists from these countries out of China.



The "Great Leap Forward" campaign was intended precisely to attain these political objectives. Mao replaced the planned development of the national economy, based on the objective laws of socialism, with the militarization of the economy and public life and the transformation of the country into a "unified military camp." Despite the catastrophic consequences of the Great Leap Forward, Mao did not renounce his theory of development "by leaps and bounds" on the basis of the belief that "politics is the commanding force" and blamed "rotten" party leaders for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Mao implied that the guiding force in society was the army, not the party, and that all material and human resources must be used in the creation of a powerful militaristic state capable of carrying out the great-Han plan of turning China into the world's supreme state. He said that Maoism--the ideal of great-Han expansionism, based on the moral and military superiority of the Chinese, should be the only ideology of the Chinese people.

After stifling the opposition in the CCP, headed by Peng Dehuai, Mao Zedong was able to monopolize the party leadership and paralyze the activities of the CCP Central Committee, the collective party leadership, after the Tenth CCP Central Committee Plenum (September 1962). No Central Committee plenums were convened for 4 years (the 11th Plenum was held in August 1966).

After he had ideologically and organizationally disarmed the CCP, Mao Zedong launched an overt attack on the international communist movement. In March 1963 a statement was published on behalf of the CCP Central Committee in regard to the general line of the international communist movement, denying all of the basic principles that had been worked out collectively by the communist and workers parties at the Moscow conferences in 1957 and 1960.

In this statement, consisting of 25 points, Mao Zedong's group denied the decisive role of the world socialist system in the development of the contemporary world community, displayed contempt for the struggle of the working class and tried to set the national liberation movement apart from the socialist system and the international working class. By assigning primary significance to the national liberation movements of the Asian, African and Latin American people as the "chief storm center of the world revolution," this group was trying to isolate these countries from the world socialist system and the international proletariat. In other words, it was undermining the basis of the alliance uniting three revolutionary forces: the world socialist system, the international working class and the national liberation movement.

Donning the garb of "arch-revolutionaries," Mao Zedong and his followers called the conclusions of the communist parties regarding the possibility of preventing world war and maintaining peaceful coexistence by states with differing social orders through an alliance uniting the three revolutionary forces, examples of "revisionism" and "rightist opportunism." By arbitrarily quoting remarks made by the founders of Marxism at a time far removed from the October Socialist Revolution, not to mention the establishment of the world socialist system, they tried to conceal their antisocialist, great-Han plans behind the prestige of Marxist-Leninist theory and "concern" about oppressed peoples.

The CCP, headed by Mao Zedong, began actively subversive activity within the communist movement, cultivating extremist groups and parties, resorting to provocation and inciting border conflicts with neighboring states. At the February (1964)



CPSU Central Committee Plenum, M. A. Suslov analyzed the antisocialist, schismatic policy line of the CCP, pursued under the guidance of Mao Zedong during the first half of the 1960's, saying: "Therefore, the leaders of the CCP have opposed the communist movement in all basic aspects of strategy and tactics. Their policy line is a line in which petty bourgeois ultra-revolutionary aims are combined with nationalist, great-power ambitions."<sup>1</sup>

Both in the international arena and within China, where Mao Zedong made the abrogation of all treaties and agreements with the USSR the first step in his attempts to put an end to the socialist general line of the CCP and to brutalize and suppress opposition forces within the party and supporters of cooperation with the Soviet Union, Mao's campaign for the firm establishment of great-Han hegemonism was begun under the banner of anti-Sovietism and the unification of all reactionary forces against the Soviet Union as the main force in the socialist world.

Although the CPSU has exposed the antisocialist essence of Maoism and has waged an uncompromising ideological struggle against it, it has always wanted to normalize relations with the CCP and has taken steps to overcome disagreements because it has never lost the hope that the ranks of the Chinese communists include staunch supporters of scientific socialism who might return the PRC to the socialist path of development. When L. I. Brezhnev presented the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 23d CPSU Congress, he said: "Our party and the Soviet people have a sincere wish for friendship with people's China and its communist party.... You know that there was a meeting in Moscow with a CCP Central Committee delegation in November 1964. Our delegation then spoke with the CCP leadership in Beijing a little later. The CPSU Central Committee asked the Chinese comrades for a new summit meeting in Moscow or Beijing. We still believe that this kind of meeting would be useful and we are willing to meet again with the CCP leadership at any time to take another look at our disagreements so that we can find ways of overcoming them in line with the principles of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>2</sup>

The CCP leadership not only failed to respond to the CPSU Central Committee's appeals for talks, but actually launched an even more spiteful anti-Soviet campaign. After isolating the Chinese people from the outside world and concealing the truth about the views of our party and the Soviet people from them, the Chinese leadership unscrupulously slandered Lenin's motherland, saying that "the Soviet Union has degenerated into a capitalist country" and so forth. Realizing that their anti-Soviet arguments were unconvincing, the Maoists supplemented them with propaganda about "threats from the USSR." All of these campaigns were accompanied by merciless terror, arrests and executions of people who supported friendship with the USSR and people who had studied in the Soviet Union.

In the beginning of 1966 the so-called "Cultural Revolution" was launched under the personal supervision of Mao Zedong. During the course of this campaign, millions of people were repressed, the CCP was destroyed, constitutional institutions were dispersed and a military fascist dictatorship, as even the Chinese now define it, was established in the country, with Mao Zedong, the idolized "Great Helmsman," at its head. It appeared that China was about to lose all of its revolutionary gains and degenerate completely into a military fascist state. In the foreign arena, the Maoists no longer limited themselves to an ideological

struggle against scientific communism. They joined reactionaries of all varieties in a political struggle against the socialist community countries. Border conflicts with neighboring countries and the provocation of a "major" war between the leading states, the USSR and the United States, became the chief components of the Maoist leadership's foreign policy strategy. False history textbooks and maps were published in massive editions in Beijing to corroborate the Maoists' invalid claims. Concealing their own insidious intentions, the Maoists continued to call themselves "orthodox Marxists" fighting against "Soviet revisionism" in an attempt to deceive the world public. They made skillful use of earlier opinions about the Marxist character of Mao Zedong's works, which were published in a Russian-language edition in the early 1950's in Moscow, because the general public did not know that Mao's original works had been edited. Mao's edited comments were even used in Soviet analyses of his role. With unconcealed delight, imperialism's apologists made use of the distorted versions of Maoist propaganda to discredit socialism. Studies of Maoist anti-Sovietism by bourgeois Sinologists took two directions. They either stated that the Soviet Union had "exported" revolution to China, that the Chinese people were incapable of overstepping the bounds of their traditional conservatism and could not accept socialist ideas and that Mao Zedong's remarks against the Soviet Union reflected the Chinese people's negative reaction to the alien ideology of socialism, or suggested that Mao Zedong's adventurism and terrorist campaigns were the result of an inherent flaw in socialism and that the failure of Mao Zedong's experiments testified that socialism was incompatible with the traditional Chinese society.

It is not difficult to see that both of these currents were pursuing the same goal, antisocialism, and that, by their essence, they were not hostile to Maoism, socialism's spiteful adversary. They had a common platform and, in the final analysis, a common target--the Soviet Union and the socialist community countries.

By the middle of the 1960's the military bureaucratic dictatorship was firmly established in the PRC, and the great-Han ambitions of Mao Zedong and his associates constituted the basis of its foreign policy. They wanted to build up China's military and economic potential by militarizing the country and guaranteeing world dominion for China as a result of a nuclear war, which would primarily involve the confrontation and devastation of the world's leading powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Maoists' intense antisocialist struggle, their subversive activity and their attempts to start a world war set communist parties the task of resolutely opposing Mao Zedong's policy line, which was hostile to communism and posed a threat to the cause of peace and the security of nations. The CPSU naturally took much of the responsibility in the common struggle of the communist parties against Maoism. The exposure of the theory and practice of the Maoist leadership required considerable effort and the extensive participation of the public and Soviet science. One of the many measures taken in this area was the decision to establish the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, with the study of contemporary China as one of its main functions.

The decision to establish the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences in September 1966. The services of Orientologists from other academy institutes (the Institute of the

Economics of the Socialist Countries, the Oriental Studies Institute and others) were enlisted, as well as the services of Orientologists working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and other departments. The total number of IDV [Far East Institute] researchers had reached 44 by the beginning of 1967, including 3 doctors of sciences and 15 candidates of sciences. The institute was assigned a broad range of functions, including the function of studying current events in the Far East, especially contemporary Chinese problems in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy, economics, history, ideology and culture.

The institute was founded at the time when China stopped publishing official data about the PRC national economy, Soviet-Chinese scientific contacts were curtailed and Beijing propaganda was spreading deliberately distorted information about conditions in the PRC. This required our Sinologists to have a thorough knowledge of the entire preceding period of China's development and the ability to conduct analyses based on isolated and fragmented bits of information and the extensive use of foreign sources. During this difficult initial stage, the institute was authorized to invite expert Sinologists who had worked in China for many years, knew the Chinese language well and were familiar with the conditions of life in China, to work at the institute as senior researchers and supervisors of scientific subdivisions. This played an important role in the development of research work.

The IDV now has 202 research associates, including 17 doctors of sciences and 104 candidates.

The institute's research activity in the last 15 years (1966-1981) can be divided into three fairly specific periods.

During the first period (1966-1971), the reactionary essence of Maoism and the Maoists' increasing belligerence and hostility toward socialism, especially the Soviet Union, were revealed. At the 24th CPSU Congress (March 1971), L. I. Brezhnev had this to say about the years since the 23rd Congress in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee: "As we know, the Chinese leaders," L. I. Brezhnev said, "have announced their own ideological and political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism, on the main aspects of international life and the world communist movement.... They have launched an intensive and hostile propaganda campaign against our party and country, have made claims to Soviet territory and have even gone so far as to provoke armed incidents on the border in the spring and summer of 1969. Our party has resolutely opposed attempts to distort Marxist-Leninist doctrine and break up the international communist movement and the ranks of fighters against imperialism. Maintaining their reserve and refusing to give in to provocation, the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have done everything within their power to achieve the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China."<sup>3</sup> After mentioning some of the specific positive steps taken by the two sides in 1969 (the Soviet-Chinese trade agreement and steps in the sphere of commodity turnover), L. I. Brezhnev said: "We are willing to take further steps in the same direction."<sup>4</sup> At the same time, L. I. Brezhnev directed attention to Beijing's continuous anti-Soviet behavior and pointed out the fact that the Ninth CCP Congress had recorded this hostility toward the Soviet Union in its decisions. "We," L. I. Brezhnev concluded, "will not sacrifice the national interests of the Soviet State. The CPSU will continue its tireless efforts to unite the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis."<sup>5</sup>



The conclusions and related objectives set forth in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress reflected the policy of our party at that time, and the new Far East Institute took this policy as a guide. The exposure of the Maoist slander of our party and the defense of the Leninist foreign policy always conducted by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government in relations with China were the institute's primary function. In 1967 a group of researchers, consisting of O. Borisov, B. Koloskov, R. Mirovitskaya, M. Sladkovskiy and A. Yakovlev, wrote one of the institute's first books, "Leninskaya politika SSSR v otnoshenii Kitaya" [The Leninist Policy of the USSR in Relations with China], which was published in 1968. The authors elucidated the main stages of Soviet-Chinese relations with the aid of documents and indisputable facts. The work contained excerpts from Chinese documents and statements by CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, commending the Soviet Union's behavior toward China and its fraternal assistance of the Chinese people during all stages of the Chinese revolution and in socialist construction during the first decade of the PRC's existence.

The great-Han ambitions of the Maoist leadership, reflected in unsubstantiated claims to the territory of neighboring states, were also directed against the Soviet Union. The groundlessness of the Chinese claims was obvious not only to the Soviet people, but even to all honest and sensible Chinese. It is a well-known fact that the Chinese side did not make any territorial claims when the Soviet Union concluded treaties with the Kuomintang Government and with the government of the PRC, and the "border question" concerned only the clarification of the boundary line. Nevertheless, the Mao Zedong leadership turned the matter of territorial claims into the main issue in Soviet-Chinese relations and distorted the facts in order to confuse world public opinion. In connection with this, the Far East Institute edited archival documents about Russia's relations with China from the 17th century on, and began to compile a complete history of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations. The first volume of the multi-volume edition of documents was published in 1969 and the second volume was ready for publication in 1971.

The Maoists portrayed the anti-Marxist theory and antisocialist practices of the Mao Zedong leadership as "Sinized Marxism," under the cover of ultra-leftist slogans and references to statements made by the founders of Marxism-Leninism before the October Revolution. In the beginning of the 1960's conditions were easier for Maoist propaganda because the world public was not fully aware of the essence of Maoism and did not know that the four-volume edition of selected works by Mao Zedong, published in Moscow in the beginning of the 1950's, differed considerably from Mao's original works and that the text was edited by Soviet and Chinese scholars at the request of the CCP Central Committee. An analysis of Maoist propaganda convinced our scholars that the Maoists had returned to the unedited original works of Mao Zedong and that they were trying to pass off the bourgeois nationalist doctrine of "new democracy," set forth by Mao Zedong in 1940, as Marxism.

To establish the facts, the institute published a collective work (by G. Astaf'yev, V. Glunin, V. Krivtsov, R. Rakhimov, N. Senin, M. Sladkovskiy, A. Titov and others) in 1969: "Antimarksistskaya sushchnost' vzglyadov i politiki Mao Tszeduna" [The Anti-Marxist Essence of Mao Zedong's Views and Politics]. The main corrections made by Soviet and Chinese scholars in Mao's original works were explained in this

monograph. Whereas Mao originally said that the future "new democratic state" would be based on an alliance of all of the main classes in the Chinese society, meaning the exploiters and the exploited, the edited text contained the following stipulation: "Under the leadership of the working class." In other words, the leading role of the working class was affirmed.<sup>6</sup> In this monograph, Mao Zedong's views and policy are thoroughly criticized and their anti-Marxist essence is exposed in the chapters entitled "The Anti-Marxist Essence of Mao Zedong's Special Course," "Pseudodialectics--The Methodological Basis of the Special Course of Mao Zedong and His Group," "Extreme Subjectivism and Voluntarism--The Characteristic Features of Maoism," "The Great-Power Chauvinism of Mao Zedong and His Group in the Question of Nationality" and others.

The contemporary history of China in its entirety, and not just the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, was falsified and deliberately distorted. Mao's role was exaggerated by means of his depiction as the organizer of the party, his policy was defined as the "only correct" one, and only negative references, or no references at all, were made to the actual organizers and prominent leaders of the CCP: Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian and others. Major historical events were distorted and the role of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia was denigrated. Bourgeois Sinology has made extensive use of the Maoist lies. It maintains that the victory of the Chinese revolution was due to the "export of revolution" from the USSR and views Mao Zedong's departure from socialism as an attempt to return China to its traditional course of development, reflecting a negative reaction to the "alien" current of socialism. In 1971 a group of IDV researchers, consisting of V. Glunin, A. Grigor'yev and K. Kukushkin (with G. Astaf'yev, N. Nikiforov and M. Sladkovskiy making up the editorial board), completed a work on the contemporary history of China, which was published in 1972. The authors cogently revealed the groundlessness of the Maoist alterations of Chinese history and proved that the victory of the Chinese people's revolution was an objectively natural process under the guidance of the CCP and with the international assistance of the USSR and international communist movement. The authors of this work describe the catastrophic effects of the "Great Leap Forward" and the terroristic "Cultural Revolution."

During the second period (1972-1976), the Mao Zedong leadership of the PRC continued to move closer to imperialist and reactionary forces. It pioneered the creation of a united front of all reactionary forces in the world against the USSR and the socialist community countries. The 1970's began with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States. The Maoists discarded all slogans that were hostile to American imperialism, saying that it was "on the defensive," and therefore could not be dangerous, and declaring the Soviet Union China's "No 1 enemy."

Maoism's obviously hostile behavior toward socialism was described in full in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress. When L. I. Brezhnev presented this report, he said: "Of course, the question of relations with China is a separate and special topic. The policy of China's present leaders is openly directed against the majority of socialist states. Furthermore, it is in complete agreement with the position of the most extreme reactionary forces throughout the world, from militarists and enemies of detente in the Western countries to the racists in southern Africa and the fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only completely inconsistent with socialist principles and ideals but has essentially become imperialism's main reserve in its struggle against socialism."



"All peace-loving people are greatly endangered by Beijing's feverish attempts to undermine detente, prevent disarmament, sow mistrust and enmity among states and start a world war for its own benefit. Beijing's policy is radically contrary to the interests of all people. We will oppose this incendiary policy and protect the interests of the Soviet State, the socialist community and the world communist movement. It is no longer enough to simply say that Maoist policy and ideology are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They are absolutely hostile to it."

During the years between the 24th and 25th congresses of our party, the intensification of the Maoists' antisocialist provocation in the international arena, the war hysteria they stirred up within the country and their efforts to convince the Chinese people of the inevitability of a war with the Soviet Union made it necessary for our side to intensify its opposition to the hostile Maoist policy line. In connection with this, the institute also acquired greater responsibility.

The study of the Chinese economy was the weak spot in Soviet and world Sinology. Prior to 1960 government bodies in the PRC published fairly detailed data about the state of the economy. They were assumed to be true and were not analyzed by scientists. After the cessation of Chinese publications, scientists had to work out a special set of methods for the estimation of quantities from isolated and fragmented bits of information.

In the beginning of the 1970's the institute began to compile and publish four collective works on the Chinese economy: "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii stroi i ekonomicheskaya politika KNR" [The Socioeconomic Order and Economic Policy of the PRC], "Promyshlennost' KNR" [Industry in the PRC], "Sel'skoye khozyaystvo KNR" [Agriculture in the PRC] and "Transport, trgovlya, finansy" [Transportation, Trade and Finance], covering the period from 1949 through 1975.

Studies showed that China's departure from the socialist general line and the militarization of the country had lowered the national income growth rate to around half of its previous level (from 8.9 percent for the First Five-Year Plan to 4.8 percent in 1959-1974); the growth rate of industrial production fell to around a third of its previous level (from 18 percent to 6.4 percent). The state of agriculture was even worse. The 12 Year Plan for economic development (1956-1967) envisaged the cultivation of new lands (around 30 million hectares), but the quantity of plowland actually decreased from 112 million hectares to 99 million between 1956 and 1976 while the population rose from 600 million to 900 million. During this 20-year period, now called the "two lost decades" in the Chinese press, the Chinese people's supply of food and industry's supply of raw materials constantly decreased. The people were impoverished. The main reason was the decline in labor productivity as a result of the workers' lack of material interest in the results of their work.

The collapse of the people's democratic societal superstructure, established on the basis of the Constitution of 1954, and its replacement with a military bureaucratic system gave rise to pronounced antagonism in the relations between the collectivized means of production and the military bureaucratic superstructure, which had made militarization, and not the elevation of the public standard of living, the goal of production. Contradictions between the base and the superstructure intensified the social crisis within the country, engendered by permanent political instability.

The anti-Soviet great-Han foreign policy of the Chinese leadership was exposed in monographs, brochures and journalistic articles, including the two-volume monograph "Vneshnyaya politika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya KNR" [The Foreign Policy and International Relations of the PRC] (Vol I--1949-1963; Vol II--1963-1973), edited by G. V. Astaf'yev and A. M. Dubinskiy.

The foreign policy of the PRC was also the subject of the major works by Doctor of Historical Sciences M. S. Kapitsa: "KNR: dva desyatiletiya--dve politiki" [The PRC: Two Decades--Two Policies] (1969), "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies] (1979) and others.

Doctor of Historical Sciences O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov took an active part in the study of Soviet-Chinese relations. Their monograph "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya" [Soviet-Chinese Relations] was published in three editions in Russian and several foreign languages.

The institute was also responsible for the compilation of "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy narodov Rossii s Kitayem" [The History of the Trade and Economic Relations Between the People of Russia and China] (Covering the Period up to 1917), published in 1974, and "Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy SSSR s Kitayem (1917-1974)" [The History of the Trade and Economic Relations Between the USSR and China (1917-1974)], published in 1977. The authors of these works described the centuries-old commercial contacts between the two neighboring countries, which were the reason for their stable friendly relationship, and proved the historical and legal validity of the existing Soviet-Chinese border.

As for the antisocialist essence of Maoism, by 1969 Mao Zedong must have realized that his hope of establishing Maoism as the policy of the international communist movement was groundless. At the Moscow conference of communist and workers parties in June 1969, Maoism was rejected as an ideology alien to Marxism-Leninism.

"Maoism," Rodolfo Ghioldi, head of the delegation from the Communist Party of Argentina, said, "is not a variety of Marxism-Leninism, but an anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist current which, in addition to this, acts against the unity of anti-imperialist forces, against world communist unity and against the socialist gains of the heroic Chinese people."<sup>7</sup>

Although the Maoists could not gain any ground among the Marxist-Leninist parties, they found deep "sympathy" and support in world reactionary circles and among imperialism's apologists. Prominent American bourgeois Sinologist Stewart Schram distorted the history of the Chinese revolution and Soviet-Chinese relations in a book on Mao Zedong, called Mao Zedong an "orthodox Marxist" and called himself "one of Mao's loyal disciples."<sup>8</sup> Bourgeois Sinologists used the views of the "orthodox" Mao to discredit scientific socialism.

On the basis of a detailed analysis of historical documents, the works and statements of Mao Zedong, his career and his political behavior, institute researchers published a fundamental work entitled "Ideyno-politicheskaya sushchnost' Maoizma" [The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism] in 1977. The authors were S. Voyevodin, L. Gudoshnikov, Ye. Konovalov, Ye. Kovalev, V. Krivtsov, I. Naumov, N. Senin, V. Sidikhmenov, M. Sladkovskiy, M. Titarenko, V. Feoktistov and A. Yakovlev. They demonstrate the scientific invalidity of including the "Thought" of Mao as part of Marxist science--dialectical and historical materialism and political

economy. They discuss the eclectic nature of his thinking, which included elements of anarchism and voluntarism, his pragmatic approach, which changed depending on the current political situation, and his method of using various concepts, revolutionary slogans and the prestige of Marxism-Leninism. The monograph was published in foreign language editions and gained recognition within the scientific community.

The third period (1977-1981) was marked by the following features. At the end of 1976 the clashes within the CCP leadership became more pronounced. Mao's death (on 9 September 1976) broke the "great hoop" which symbolized the "monolithic unity" of the Maoists. By that time the country was in a state of severe and complete national economic crisis, exacerbated by the massive earthquake (on 28 July 1976) near Tangshan-Fenan, which inflicted great damage on the metallurgical, coal, electric power engineering, cement and other industries and transportation. The death of the idolized "Helmsman" was followed by unrest in the country. Criticism began to be voiced and demands were made for better national economic management and the introduction of financial incentives, or, in other words, all of the demands which Mao Zedong and his followers had called "bourgeois" while labeling their supporters "capitalist roaders."

A power struggle began within the CCP leadership. The ceremonies at the funeral rally indicated that the prevailing force was Jiang Qing and her closest associates, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, who had been Mao Zedong's closest comrades and the executors of his wishes during the last decade of his life.

At the beginning of October Beijing was overtaken by a political storm. Jiang Qing and her three accomplices were arrested and labeled the "gang of four." The downfall of the "gang" evoked hope for the future in China, for the relaxation of military bureaucratic rules, for the improvement of the difficult living conditions of the working people and for the revitalization of the economy; in other words, the hope for the renunciation of Mao Zedong's discredited policy line.

However, the new CCP leadership, headed by Hua Guofeng, who came from the same district as Mao Zedong and who rose to a position of authority during the "Cultural Revolution," had no intention of discarding Mao Zedong's great-Han policy. What is more, the following remark, allegedly made by Mao Zedong during the last days of his life, was widely publicized in the country to enhance Hua Guofeng's prestige: "Hua Guofeng has taken control; I am relieved." At the same time, Hua Guofeng could no longer manipulate power and people as freely as before. The people did not know him and he did not have the necessary authority with the "ganbu" either. The situation in the country also called for certain changes in the regime and the renunciation of some of Mao's ultra-leftist beliefs. The solution to this contradictory situation, in which Mao's heirs had to renounce their inheritance, was found. The new leadership decided to put all of the blame for the crisis within the country on the "gang of four" and to retain the basic goals of Mao Zedong's strategic line: intensive militarization within the country, the establishment of great-Han hegemonism in foreign affairs, and a struggle against forces inhibiting the attainment of great-Han objectives, especially the USSR and the socialist community countries.



The need to alleviate the economic crisis and keep the material standard of living from falling any lower required the new leadership to deny Mao's beliefs which had been discredited and were obviously impeding the development of the country. The measures for economic recovery announced by the new leadership included the use of financial incentives and advanced foreign experience. It was acknowledged that economic problems had to be solved first, and the idea that "politics is the commanding force" was forgotten. Despite the fact that it was precisely these renounced beliefs that were the chief elements of Mao's ultra-leftist, ultra-revolutionary way of thinking, based primarily on his "Yanan experience," their authorship and their popularization were ascribed to the "gang of four." These maneuvers had some impact but they also caused Hua Guofeng to suffer a political defeat and strengthen the position of Deng Xiaoping. Mao's "infallibility" was refuted in the Chinese society. Mao's previous line was widely criticized. Questions were raised about the terroristic "Cultural Revolution" and about the guilt of those who were responsible for mass murders and the devastation of the constitutional people's government. The "Cultural Revolution" was tried in the public court, and this naturally affected many leaders: Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing and others.

It was in this complex and unstable atmosphere that the 11th CCP Congress took place in August 1977. In the accountability report of the CCP Central Committee, presented by Hua Guofeng, and in the congress resolution, Hua Guofeng and his closest associates were able to not only reaffirm Mao's authority, but also to proclaim him "the greatest Marxist of our time." Hua Guofeng also praised the "Cultural Revolution" and followed Mao's example in calling Liu Shaoqi one of the enemies of the CCP. Citing Mao's remarks about the aim of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" to destroy "persons in the party who are taking a capitalist road," Hua listed Liu Shaoqi among the "inveterate capitalist roaders" who had been destroyed during the course of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."

The 11th Congress adopted the broad-scale economic program of the "four modernizations," which was supposed to make China one of the world's leading countries by the end of the century. The decisions of the 11th CCP Congress on foreign policy simply repeated Mao Zedong's views. They stressed the "defensive nature" of American imperialism, thereby justifying Chinese-American rapprochement. They stated that "the Soviet Union is hungry for expansion," is "on the defensive" and, consequently, represents a "great threat."

The economic program proposed by the 11th CCP Congress and ratified by the first session of the Fifth NPC (February-March 1978) was based on the anticipated extensive use of foreign capital and advanced foreign equipment and technology. Hua Guofeng, the "wise leader" (as he was described at the congress by Deng Xiaoping) who advanced to a position of authority during the "Cultural Revolution," and Deng Xiaoping, who had returned to the higher echelons of power, ran a race for credit and loans from Western Europe and the United States. When they were requesting loans, Hua in Western Europe and Deng in the United States swore to their new allies that they were absolutely determined to wage an uncompromising struggle against the Soviet Union, assured NATO and the Carter Administration of their solidarity and expressed their willingness to join them in a "cold" or, if necessary, a "hot" war against the USSR. In order to make his display of affection for the Yankee way of life more convincing, Deng Xiaoping even took a walk along Broadway wearing a cowboy hat.



When Hua and Deng spoke with their Western partners, anti-Sovietism served as a unique means of payment for credit and the guarantee of a coordinated political platform. The "monolithic unity" of the CCP leadership in domestic matters, declared at the congress, took on a different appearance. Billions of dollars in foreign loans were earmarked not for the development of vitally necessary economic centers, including agriculture, but for military purposes; in other words, for precisely what depleted the economy and led to severe crisis. Disagreements over economic issues arose within the CCP leadership. Hua Guofeng's praise of the "Cultural Revolution" and the repetition of the charges against Liu Shaoqi at the congress were criticized. In December 1978 the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (11th Convocation) was held. Subsequent events indicated that the decisions of the 11th Congress had actually been repudiated. Liu Shaoqi was posthumously vindicated and called "an outstanding proletarian activist."

Despite the decisions of the 11th Congress, the "Cultural Revolution" was sternly condemned, the public demanded that the persons responsible for the mass repression be punished, and even Mao Zedong was directly accused. This criticism was supported by some of the Chinese leaders who had been repressed during the years of the "Cultural Revolution." At the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, a disciplinary investigation commission was formed to consider questions of rehabilitation. The commission was headed by Chen Yun and its members included persons who had suffered during the years of the "Cultural Revolution": Hu Yaobang, Huang Kecheng and others. Therefore, the "Cultural Revolution" was even condemned within the CCP Central Committee. At the same time, in order to protect Mao Zedong against accusations of terrorism, the Third Plenum declared that the party and people should "thoroughly comprehend the great services of Comrade Mao Zedong."

The Chinese leadership tried to compensate for Mao's declining prestige in connection with the posthumous rehabilitation of Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi and many others who had been persecuted on the personal orders of Mao by stressing the main aspect of Mao Zedong's strategy: the great-Han policy line in the international arena. After Deng Xiaoping had established personal contacts with top U.S. leaders and had pushed Hua Guofeng into a secondary position, he began to build ally relations with the United States by supporting American imperialism's global anticommunist strategy.

Subsequent events gave the world sufficient proof that Beijing was conspiring with the United States. This conspiracy was affirmed by the U.S.-approved Chinese invasion of the SRV and by their joint assistance of gangs of reactionaries who had been driven out of Afghanistan and their complicity in many other ventures. Carried away by their anti-Sovietism, the Chinese leaders are forcing their people to serve American imperialism as a shock brigade and to follow its lead. The continuous efforts to escalate international tension and to eventually start a war are absorbing huge quantities of China's material resources, and the scarcity of these resources is impeding economic stabilization and the compilation of a program for socioeconomic development. The present PRC leadership has been able, in spite of opposition, to keep the country within the framework of the great-Han strategy and to intensify its antisocialist line in international affairs.

When L. I. Brezhnev assessed recent events in China at the 26th CPSU Congress, he said: "The socioeconomic development of the PRC in the last two decades has been a hard lesson, teaching how the distortion of socialist principles and the essence of socialism affects domestic and international policy."

"Even today's Chinese leaders are calling the regime in their country of the period of so-called Cultural Revolution 'the most brutal feudal fascist dictatorship.' There is no need for us to add anything to this description.

"Changes are now taking place in Chinese domestic policy. Time will tell us their actual significance. It will show the degree to which the present Chinese leadership can overcome the Maoist heritage. Unfortunately, it is too soon to speak of any changes for the better in Beijing's foreign policy. It is still aimed at the escalation of international tension and an alliance with imperialist policy. This certainly cannot put China back on the road of healthy development. The imperialists will not be friendly toward socialism.

"The willingness of the United States, Japan and several NATO countries to broaden military and political contacts with China conceals the simple hope of using its hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their own imperialist interests. This is a hazardous game!

"As for the Chinese people, we are firmly convinced that their genuine interests will be served by the policy of peace, and only by the policy of peace and normal relations with other states."<sup>9</sup>

Guided by the decisions of our party, the institute has continued its research activity to expose Maoist lies, criticize their antisocialist theory and practices and analyze the basic problems of present-day China.

The History of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese Relations: As the conspiracy with the imperialist states acquired broader dimensions, the Chinese leadership launched mass anti-Soviet, anti-Russian campaigns in 1977 and 1978 and substantiated its slanderous lies by flooding the book market of China and the Western countries with literature which flagrantly distorted the entire history of our people's relations with China. Maoist historians tried to convince the Chinese people of the Russians' "eternal hostility" toward the Chinese, that not England, but Russia was responsible for the colonial enslavement of China, etc. Institute researchers exposed the Maoist lies on the pages of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA: "The Ideological Bankruptcy of the Beijing Pseudohistorians" (1978, No 4), "The Falsification of World History" (1979, No 3) and other articles. This was accompanied by intense work on a two-volume history of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations (with Vol I covering the period up to 1970 and Vol II covering the period from 1970 to 1981), which was ready for publication by the beginning of 1981. In a monograph published in 1980, "Kitay i Angliya" [China and England], institute researchers conducted a scientific analysis of the history of English aggression in China and thereby exposed the Maoist vindication of England.

The Soviet Union's role in the establishment of the Manchurian revolutionary base was described in a monograph by O. Borisov, published in 1977.

Contemporary Chinese History: During the last 5 years Maoist historians continued to distort the contemporary history of their country, exaggerating Mao's role and denigrating the role of the USSR in the victory of the Chinese revolution. In connection with this, in the last 5 years a group of IDV Sinologists developed the short "Novyeshaya istoriya Kitaya" [The Contemporary History of China], published

in 1972, by compiling a three-volume "Novyeshaya istoriya Kitaya." The work was completed by the end of 1980 under the supervision of Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Glunin (Vol I), Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Nikiforov (Vol II) and Candidate of Historical Sciences K. Kukushkin (Vol III). Our views and opinions of the basic stages of Chinese history, policy and international relations are set forth in this work, certain events and the role played by the CCP and the Soviet Union in laying the foundations for socialism are thoroughly elucidated, and the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC during the last "two lost decades" is also analyzed.

In 1980 the institute published a collective work, co-authored by writers from socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia): "KNR. Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk" [The PRC. A Brief Historical Survey], commemorating the 30th anniversary of the PRC.

China and the Third World: In the last 5 years the CCP leadership pursued a more active expansionist policy toward the developing countries, especially the countries of South East and South Asia. Mao Zedong's "three worlds" theory was brought out in the open. This theory refutes the Marxist, class principle for the assessment of present-day international forces, ignores the antagonism between the two main opposing forces, socialism and imperialism, and divides the world according to political characteristics and, to some degree, according to geographic and racial features. According to the Maoists, the first world consists of the United States and the USSR, the two superpowers, the "main reactionary forces." Furthermore, they maintain that U.S. imperialism is on the defensive and that, therefore, the countries of the "two worlds" must actually form an alliance to fight only against the Soviet Union. This is the principal message of the Maoist "three worlds" theory.

Beijing's actual behavior toward the developing countries is essentially an attempt to isolate them from the USSR and the states of the socialist community. Although the PRC is preventing contacts between the socialist countries and the developing states, which are primarily interested in economic contacts, it is not capable of satisfying the economic needs of these states. In this way, the Maoists have actually cleared the road to the Third World for the imperialist states.

Beijing's insidious and quite manipulative treatment of the Third World countries called for a thorough analysis of Maoist theory and practice and the exposure of the Maoists' actual hegemonistic plans for the developing countries. By the end of 1980 a group of IDV researchers had completed a two-volume monograph entitled "Kitay i razvivayushchiyesya strany v 70-ve gody" [China and the Developing Countries in the 1970's], which will be published in 1982 (with V. A. Krivtsov, G. V. Astaf'yev, A. M. Dubinskiy, V. A. Baryshnikov and I. A. Rogachev making up the editorial board).

This was also the subject of a scientific conference organized by the institute in April 1980. It was attended by Sinologists from the socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia and Poland) and the reports presented at the conference served as the basis for a collective monograph published in 1981: "Gegemonistskaya politika Kitaya--ugroza narodam Azii, Afriki, Latinskoy Ameriki" [China's Hegemonistic Policy--A Threat to the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America].



The Theory of the "Single Chinese Nationality"--The Substantiation of Great-Han Hegemonism: At the 11th CCP Congress Hua Guofeng accused the "gang of four" of falsifying China's history by exaggerating the role of "empresses" and denigrating the role of "prime ministers" and demanded the correction of history and the glorification of China.

After the congress a campaign was launched in China to publicize the theory of the "single Chinese nationality."<sup>10</sup> According to this theory, the Hans (Chinese) represented the trunk of the ethnic tree, and all other people inhabiting China within the boundaries of the ancient Han and T'ang dynasties (consequently, including Mongolians, Koreans, Vietnamese and some Indochinese people) were only branches of the tree, or the single Chinese nationality. On the basis of this theory, Maoist historians said that the "Han tree" included the ancient Huns and the ethnic groups of Genghis Khan's Mongolian empire and drew the conclusion that the Chinese, as the heirs of the Huns and Genghis Khan, had certain rights to territories conquered by these ancient rulers.

The theory of the "single Chinese nationality" is a theory of great-Han hegemonism, and it is precisely this theory that was used to "explain" why Deng Xiaoping and his associates "had the right to teach a lesson to Vietnam"--"a branch of the Chinese tree"--in spring 1979. The institute organized scientific conferences with speakers from the Mongolian People's Republic and the SRV (in Moscow and Ulaanbaatar), where participants revealed the absolute lack of scientific grounds for these "theories," which contradict official histories of China, including the work published in the PRC by prominent historian Fan Wenlan and the "Essays on Chinese History" edited by Shang Youe. The proceedings of these conferences were used as the basis for publications,<sup>11</sup> articles dealing with this subject matter were printed in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA<sup>12</sup> and a monograph by Doctor of Historical Sciences L. S. Perelomov, "Konfutsianstvo i legizm v politicheskoy istorii Kitaya" [Confucianism and Legalism in China's Political History] was also published.

Cooperation with the West: Maoism's alliance with world imperialist and reactionary circles is directed against world socialism and represents a direct challenge to the world communist movement. To counteract this current of hostility toward Marxism-Leninism, the institute has worked with Sinologist centers in the socialist countries on collective studies of Chinese affairs and joint statements at scientific conferences and in the press. An agreement was concluded on joint scientific conferences on current events in China for the purpose of revealing not only the anti-Marxist essence of Maoism but also the catastrophic effects of Maoist policy and practice on the Chinese people's revolutionary gains.

The following scientific conferences of Sinologists from the USSR and the socialist countries were held in 1977-1981:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Topic of Conference</u>	<u>Date</u>
USSR	Aspects of contemporary Chinese history	April 1977
Hungary	China after Mao's death	January 1978
Mongolia	Maoism and the question of nationality	May-June 1979
Czechoslovakia	The role and place of the PRC in imperialism's global strategy	November 1980
USSR	The experience and lessons of CCP history (commemorating the 60th anniversary of the CCP)	April 1981



Sinologists from the Far East Institute and Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences are members of the European Association of Sinologists and attend the international congresses of this organization, held every 2 years. At the congresses in 1976 (France), 1978 (Italy) and 1980 (Switzerland), Soviet Sinologists and Sinologists from the European socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) presented reports on Chinese current events and exposed the antisocialist essence of Maoism, which is contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people.

The scientific and political journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, the organ of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has been published quarterly since 1972. The journal is published in four languages: in Russian, in English and Japanese since 1973, and in Spanish since 1979. The journal contains articles by foreign scholars and politicians and the heads of the Far Eastern CPSU kray and oblast committees and the communist party central committees of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. In the 10 years of the journal's existence, its pages have been taken up by more than 4,000 articles on current events in China and Japan, the successes of socialist construction in the MVR, SRV and DPRK, the relations of the USSR and the socialist countries with China, the exposure of Beijing's great-Han line and the state of the Chinese economy and domestic political situation. Soviet and foreign writers expose the schismatic activity of the Maoists, which is hostile to socialism, in articles for the journal. The journal has helped the IDV establish contacts with foreign science centers and all major Oriental studies institutes and libraries in the socialist countries and the West.

The struggle against Maoism's hostility toward scientific socialism and the exposure of Beijing's policy line, which is endangering the cause of peace and the revolutionary gains of the Chinese people, and the bankruptcy of Mao Zedong's political aims, which led China into a severe socioeconomic crisis, are still an important responsibility. The present PRC leadership is still hanging on to Maoism and trying to perpetuate it.

The Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum in June of this year passed a "Resolution on Some Questions of CCP History Since the Time of the Founding of the PRC," which assesses the role of Mao Zedong and his "Thought" in the history of Maoism. The authors of this resolution could not ignore the irrefutable facts of the catastrophic consequences of the "Great Leap Forward," the tragedy of the terroristic campaigns of the "Cultural Revolution" and the collapse of party and public organizations in the last 20 years of Mao's life, under the conditions of his personality cult and unrestrained and arbitrary rule. The authors had to give up any attempt to heap the blame for the "Cultural Revolution" and other crimes on the "gang of four." They admitted that "the main responsibility for a serious ultra-leftist error of the magnitude and duration of the Cultural Revolution must be assigned to Comrade Mao Zedong."<sup>13</sup> However, the crimes Mao committed during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" and in the next decade are described only as "errors" by the authors. They maintain that "his services to the Chinese revolution largely prevailed over his transgressions." In other words, they criticize Mao's behavior only in the last period of his life, although they do admit that this period covers 20 years. By concealing and distorting the facts, they are trying to convince the public that Mao's behavior during all the other years of his political career was correct.

In fact, however, the terror and violence to which Mao resorted during the last 20 years he was in power were not isolated episodes or "errors." They reflected a characteristic style and method of leadership, apparent during all stages of his career. The authors praise Mao's Yanan "feats," which entered history under the title of "zhengfeng," but it is certainly no secret that this terroristic campaign against Chinese internationalist communists was essentially the first "cultural revolution" in CCP history. It is no coincidence that the authors do not criticize the "zhengfeng," and even praise it, if only because some of the present CCP leaders assisted Mao in this campaign, helping the "Helmsman" force leading officials to sign "confessions" (renunciations of their "Moscow views") and killing those who refused to sign the Maoist "confessions."<sup>14</sup>

The history of the CCP also contains other bloody actions by Mao Zedong: the so-called "Futian events" of late 1931, when Mao Zedong tried to establish his leadership in the CCP organizations of the soviet regions of Jiangxi Province by murdering almost 90 percent of the party aktiv.<sup>15</sup> Is it conceivable that these "episodes," in combination with Mao's "errors," do not indicate that terrorism, violence and authoritarianism were characteristic of Mao's entire political biography?

The authors assert that the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is a "precious spiritual treasure," "based on party ideals," and are trying to define it as a "scientific system." Even the first reading of the resolution clearly testifies that the authors are resorting to the direct falsification of history, giving Mao Zedong the credit for some Marxist premises against which Mao actually fought a constant battle. The authors have put many of the correct decisions from the "General CCP Line for the Transition Period (1949-1967)" and from statements by Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders at the Eighth CCP Congress (August 1956) into Mao's mouth to suggest that the "Helmsman" held balanced and consistently Marxist views.

But after all, the Chinese communists and the public know that the criticism of ultra-leftist deviations (the expectation of building socialism "in one fine morning") in the accountability report of the CCP Central Committee to the Eighth Congress was directed precisely against Mao and against his rehearsal of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1956, and that the exclusion of all mention of the "Thought of Mao" at the Eighth Congress and the criticism of the cult of personality also applied to Mao and to the period prior to the "two lost decades."

The authors are correct in one respect: It is true that they are orthodox followers of Mao, the executors of his great-Han strategic line which can only harm China. They are not only continuing the convergence with U.S. imperialist circles and world reactionary forces, begun in the 1970's under Mao's leadership, but are intensifying it and turning it into a military alliance with imperialism. Displaying loyalty to Mao's ideals, the authors praise the current foreign policy of the PRC, the purpose of which is the creation, in conjunction with imperialism, of a united front against the Soviet Union. They call this policy line, which is hostile to socialism and criminal with regard to the Chinese people, the "height of Marxism." The authors have remained Mao's loyal disciples. Like Mao, they view the Chinese people as a sheet of "blank paper," on which "the latest and most beautiful words can be written."

And they are writing. They are portraying lies as truth, Maoism as Marxism, etc. But are the Chinese people really so naive, passive and feeble that the Maoists can continue using them as the instrument for carrying out their plans? Is it not likely that the Chinese people will want to make their own history? As L. I. Brezhnev said, "changes are now taking place in Chinese domestic policy. Time will tell us their actual significance. It will show the degree to which the present Chinese leadership can overcome the Maoist heritage."

Soviet Sinologists must continue performing the crucial function of persevering in the thorough and comprehensive study of China, discovering the real purpose, carefully hidden from the Chinese people, of the present CCP leadership's foreign and domestic policy and analyzing actual conditions in China and the objective tendencies which will eventually decide the fate of the country.

We are certain that time will not corroborate the expectations of the "Resolution's" authors regarding the perpetuation of Maoism. Genuine, scientific communism will triumph in China.

#### FOOTNOTES

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3. "XXIV s'yezd KPSS. Stenograficheskiy otchet" [The 24th CPSU Congress. Transcript of Proceedings], Vol I, Moscow, 1971, p 34.
4. Ibid.
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6. "Antimarksistskaya sushchnost' vzglyadov i politiki Mao Tszeduna," Moscow, 1969, p 8.
7. "Mezhdunarodnoye soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy" [International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties], Moscow, 1969, p 434.
8. "Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History" (D. Wilson, B. Schwartz, S. Schram et al), London-New York-Melbourne, 1977.
9. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, pp 10-11.
10. An extended conference was held in Beijing from 20 to 28 March 1978 to discuss problems in the study of the history of the non-Han inhabitants of China (see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 2).

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12. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 2.
13. "The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Some Aspects of CCP History Since the Time of the Founding of the PRC" (NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY report of 1 July 1981).
14. Wang Ming, "The Half-Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong," Moscow, 1975.
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CSO: 1805/1



PRC FOREIGN POLICY IN FAR EAST INSTITUTE RESEARCH

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 36-53

[Article by A. G. Yakovlev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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ENTERING THE FOURTH DECADE...(NOTES ON PRC FOREIGN POLICY)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 54-74

[Article by Professor M. S. Ukraintsev]

[Text] The beginning of the PRC's fourth decade was marked by Beijing's further convergence with the imperialist powers. By playing up to the United States, Japan and the Western European countries, the Chinese leadership is striving, on the one hand, to convince them to renounce international detente, escalate the arms race and move toward confrontation with the USSR and, on the other hand, to enlist their assistance in the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." To please imperialism, the Chinese leadership is joining it more frequently in its actions against the socialist community, the liberation revolutions and the states with a socialist orientation.

The imperialist powers are indulging Beijing's whims because Beijing has already become one of the imperialists' main channels of anti-Soviet policy and propaganda and a weapon in their struggle against the socialist community and the national liberation revolutions.

It is on this basis that imperialism and Chinese hegemonism are taking joint or parallel actions in the international arena, actions directed against peace, socialism and the liberation revolutions.

Describing the foreign policy of the Beijing leadership, the 26th CPSU Congress noted that "it is still aimed at the escalation of international tension and an alliance with imperialism. This certainly cannot put China back on the road of healthy development. The imperialists will not be friendly toward socialism.

"The willingness of the United States, Japan and several NATO countries to establish broader military and political contacts with China conceals the simple hope of using its hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community in their own imperialist interests. This is a hazardous game!

"As for the Chinese people, we are firmly convinced that their real interests would be served by the policy of peace, and only by the policy of peace and normal relations with other states."<sup>1</sup>

## The Policy of Escalating International Tension

Some people in the West are now saying that China's inclusion in the international community has forced Beijing to make its policy more "flexible" and "restrained." The statements and behavior of Chinese leaders, however, testify to the opposite.

Just as in the past, the Beijing leaders are criticizing detente, taking malicious delight in the escalation of international tension, advocating an arms race and confrontation, provoking conflicts and screaming hysterically about the inevitability of world war.

When former Premier Hua Guofeng of the State Council and his entourage visited France, the FRG, England and Italy in October and November 1979, the Chinese visitors spoke of the futility of detente, of the "Soviet threat," of the USSR's intention to cut Western Europe off from sources of oil and of the need to unite the countries of Western Europe, the United States and Canada and reinforce NATO against the Soviet Union.

Fully aware of the value of perseverance, the Chinese leaders have constantly advised Western Europe to push for a confrontation with the USSR. They have taken every opportunity to denigrate Soviet initiative regarding the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, which were set forth by the Soviet Government in November 1979, and applauded the NATO Council decision on the placement of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> The people in Paris and other Western European capitals, however, have denied the inevitability of war, rejected the idea of confrontation with the socialist countries and supported the continuation of detente. The president of France resolutely reaffirmed this position when he went to China in October 1980. Even London announced that England would continue seeking possible areas of cooperation between Western and Eastern Europe for the purpose of better relations and that England wants good relations with China and with the USSR.

The Chinese rulers have made a special effort to prevent the development of Soviet-American relations. They maintain that the "broad international front" against the USSR should be headed by the United States and that this "front" cannot be effective without the United States. They applauded the U.S. sanctions against the USSR (which failed, as we know), advised the Western European countries and Japan "to cooperate more closely with the United States in their own interests and to join the United States in repulsing the USSR's strategic advance to the south,"<sup>3</sup> and called upon the imperialist powers to exert "strong pressure" on the USSR, "strike at it,"<sup>4</sup> and "break its head open."<sup>5</sup> Officials in Beijing were delighted by Washington's refusal to ratify the SALT II treaty and applauded the American Administration's move away from detente and toward the escalation of international tension. The Chinese rulers have frankly admitted what they want from the Reagan Administration: The most important issue for the United States, they say, is struggle against the USSR.<sup>6</sup>

The Chinese leaders expected the Madrid meeting of representatives of 33 European states, the United States and Canada to be a failure and they celebrated this anticipated failure in advance. "Detente is dead,"<sup>7</sup> they rejoiced in Beijing. When this conference became a serious political forum through the persistent

efforts of the socialist states and many Western European countries and when the possibility of the adoption of important documents arose, all of this eventually meant a serious defeat for Beijing.

Asia is also being offered chaos and constant confrontation by the Chinese rulers. In March 1981 Beijing even set forth a unique doctrine, called the "structure of collective opposition." The "historical age of confrontation" between the United States and the countries of East Asia has supposedly ended. Now the USSR is allegedly striving to "drive out" the United States, "isolate" Japan, "encircle" China and "establish control" over Southeast Asia. Citing China's rapprochement with the United States, Japan, some ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand as an example, Beijing is announcing the existence of a "new structure" of international relations, in which the Soviet Union is being opposed by all of these other countries. According to Beijing, the United States and the East Asian countries have no other choice but to take stronger collective action against the USSR. In East Asia, the Beijing oracles assert, "upheavals and wars are inevitable."<sup>8</sup>

The Chinese rulers responded with hostility to the proposals set forth by the 26th CPSU Congress to consolidate peace and international security and rejected the idea of employing confidence-building measures in the Far East.<sup>9</sup>

There has been no change in the PRC position on disarmament either. Chinese spokesmen never tire of repeating that the "superpowers" should be the first to commence disarmament by reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons, and that other countries will then join them in reducing their weapons in a reasonable ratio. In other words, let the rest disarm while China arms itself!

At the spring 1980 session of the UN Disarmament Commission, the PRC delegation joined representatives of imperialist states in refusing to take part in consultations to prepare for talks on specific ways of limiting the nuclear arms race, and even declined to participate in the commission's general discussion of this matter. It frankly stated that Beijing has no intention of stopping its nuclear tests and will not take part in any talks. The PRC delegation at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly took a similar stand. During the course of this session, China conducted another nuclear test in the atmosphere, threatening vast regions of the globe with radioactive pollution. The Chinese representatives at the session refused to vote on the draft resolution on "Nuclear Weapons of All Types."

The representatives of the PRC on the Disarmament Commission made the demagogic demand that the use of nuclear weapons against all non-nuclear states be absolutely prohibited, despite the fact that foreign nuclear weapons are located on the territory of a number of these states, and that some of them have not given up the "nuclear choice." The Chinese representatives simultaneously tried to cast doubts on the well-known Soviet announcement (May 1978) that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against states which refrain from producing and acquiring nuclear weapons and do not have them within their territory (it is indicative that Beijing has said absolutely nothing about the position taken in this matter by the United States, England and France, which have not made the same kind of far-reaching commitments as the USSR). At the 35th Session of the UN General



Assembly, the PRC delegation "voted with its feet" (that is, left the auditorium) on the draft resolution prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons within the territory of states which do not now possess such weapons (opposed by the United States and supported by the USSR).

The PRC's position in regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons is also indicative. On 19 June 1980 the acting head of the PRC delegation in the Disarmament Commission, You Peiwen, submitted a document to the commission chairman, "The Chinese Delegation's Proposals on the Basic Content of the Convention to Prohibit Chemical Weapons," the only purpose of which, on a closer examination, turned out to be the creation of additional obstacles to prevent the banning of these weapons.<sup>10</sup> In particular, the document proposed that the future convention prohibit the use of chemical weapons and extend the system of international control to this area. It was as if Beijing had not noticed that the socialist community countries had already proposed a draft convention in 1972 to prohibit the development, production and accumulation of chemical weapons and to destroy all stockpiles of these weapons, aimed at an effective solution to this problem in the interests of all participating states.

Along with the Western powers, the Chinese delegation refused to discuss another important aspect of disarmament at Disarmament Commission sessions in 1980: the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. By doing this, it essentially objected to the elimination of the danger of creating new weapons of this type. At the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly, the PRC delegation did not vote on the draft resolution on new types of weapons of mass destruction. Representatives of the PRC also avoided the discussion of the ban on radiological weapons both within the Disarmament Commission and at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Finally, the Chinese delegation in the United Nations did not vote on the Soviet draft resolution "On Some Immediate Measures to Reduce the Danger of War" or on the Soviet-proposed resolution "On the Historic Responsibility of States to Protect the Earth's Environment for Present and Future Generations." The following fact is also indicative. Even former U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie verbally acknowledged the need for "weapon control" in a statement at the session on 22 September 1980, but the PRC representative, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, completely ignored the topic of disarmament in his speech on 24 September.

All of this reaffirms the fact that Beijing is trying to prevent all international agreements that might impede the militarization of China and strengthen international security.

#### China and the Socialist Countries

Beijing is still expressing hostility toward the members of the socialist community by slandering the Warsaw Pact organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in its appeals for the reinforcement of NATO and the EEC and for the expansion of these imperialist alliances. Lies about the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and about the nature of relations between socialist countries can often be found in statements by Chinese officials in the pages of the PRC press. Chinese propaganda is still suggesting that there are border problems in Europe and that the

"German problem" has "never been settled." All of this is objectively directed against the interests and security of all of the socialist countries in Europe.

Beijing's treatment of the USSR became increasingly hostile as the PRC evolved into the sounding board and instrument of imperialist policy. Although the PRC Government consented to talks with the USSR for tactical reasons, the course of the talks testified that the Chinese leaders viewed them as a means of exerting pressure on the USSR and as a means of extortion in relations with their present imperialist partners.

Striving to give the talks a businesslike nature, the Soviet Government delegation submitted a draft Declaration on the Principles of Interrelations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China to the Chinese delegation at the first plenary session on 17 October 1979. The need to define the principles of Soviet-Chinese relations arose when the cancellation of the 1950 treaty eliminated an important element of the political and legal basis of relations between the two countries.

The declaration was drafted by the Soviet side with a view to the universally recognized principles of international law, the basic provisions of the UN Charter, public declarations by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China regarding the willingness to normalize bilateral relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and the results of the bilateral correspondence preceding the Soviet-Chinese talks. The draft records the desire of the two sides to build and develop relations with one another based on the observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence, including the principles of complete equality, mutual respect for state sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, non-intervention in one another's domestic affairs, the non-use of force or threats of force, and mutual advantage. The draft also records the pledges of the sides to refrain from the use of force and threats of force, to not claim any special rights or hegemony and to oppose any claims whatsoever to hegemony in world affairs. The draft envisages measures to maintain an atmosphere of mutual respect and trust in bilateral relations and the appropriate system of mutual consultations. The draft makes a general statement about the willingness of the two sides to promote broader and deeper trade, economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other relations between the two countries.

There is no question that the stipulation of these principles would simplify the settlement of all of the accumulated Soviet-Chinese disputes, and that many of these questions would cease to arise as relations improved.

The Chinese delegation made the stipulation of these principles conditional upon the Soviet Union's preliminary consent to settle "unresolved problems" and "eliminate obstacles." It issued an ultimatum, demanding the unconditional acceptance of these terms by the Soviet Union, declaring that, otherwise, all discussions of non-aggression guarantees, of peaceful coexistence and, consequently, of the normalization of relations "will be out of the question."

Making references to the Soviet "military threat" to China "from the north and south," the PRC delegation tried to substantiate its demands in the "Proposals on the Improvement of Relations Between the PRC and the USSR," which envisage

the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces in regions bordering on China, the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed within the Mongolian People's Republic, the cessation of Soviet support "in any form whatsoever" of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the settlement of border disputes by means of the acknowledgment of so-called "disputed regions" on Soviet territory along the Soviet-Chinese border, which would signify recognition of China's illegal territorial claims.

The Soviet delegation proved the groundlessness of China's demands. It announced that the USSR was taking only necessary measures of a defensive nature and that there were no grounds for references to any kind of "concentration" of Soviet troops in the Far East, constituting a "threat" to China. Citing evidence to prove that there are more troops on the Chinese side of the border than on ours, the Soviet delegation asked several times what kind of commitments China was prepared to take on in this connection. The question was never answered.

The Soviet side also resisted China's attempts to interfere in Soviet relations with Mongolia and Vietnam, stressing that our country's cooperation with other sovereign states is of a peaceful nature, is not directed against China or any other country, is consistent with the UN Charter and cannot be the subject of Soviet-Chinese talks.

The Soviet side also pointed out the fact that the talks on border questions between the USSR and PRC had still not produced any results precisely because the Chinese side is persisting in its territorial claims under the guise of "disputed regions."

The next round of the talks was supposed to take place in Beijing and the Soviet Government delegation was prepared for it. On 20 January 1980, however, a representative of the Press Department of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced, in reference to the events in Afghanistan, that "this is not a suitable time for the second round of Chinese-Soviet talks."<sup>11</sup> By making this move, the Chinese rulers again proved that all of their statements about their willingness to work toward the normalization and improvement of relations with the Soviet Union were insincere. By attempting to exert pressure on the USSR and force it to stop helping the Afghan people, the Beijing leadership was essentially following the orders of the U.S. Administration, which had embarked upon the dangerous course of escalating international tension.

As international tension increased and the plans for the "four modernizations" began to fail, Chinese propaganda intensified its slanderous campaign against the USSR, calling for the creation of an anti-Soviet international front. Articles distorting the facts of Soviet history were published in Beijing just before the 26TH CPSU Congress.<sup>12</sup>

What do the Chinese leaders think about the prospects of relations with the USSR? Deng Xiaoping answered this question by saying that the Soviet Union must renounce its policy, which Beijing finds "hegemonistic." Otherwise, Chinese-Soviet relations might remain unchanged for the next 10 or 20 years.<sup>13</sup>



The Soviet Union, however, reaffirmed its constructive and reasonable position at the 26th CPSU Congress: "It is not our fault that Soviet-Chinese relations have reached an impasse. The Soviet Union does not want, and has never wanted, confrontation with the People's Republic of China. We are adhering to the policy line defined at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and we would like to build good-neighbor relations with China. Our hope of normal relations with China has remained unchanged, just as there has been no change in our feelings of respect and friendship for the Chinese people."<sup>14</sup>

The escalation of international tension is also reflected in imperialism's more vigorous attempts to shatter the community of socialist states and divert certain countries from the socialist path to the blind alleys of revisionism and the restoration of capitalism. The Chinese rulers are taking an increasingly active part in the attacks on socialism by various counterrevolutionaries: imperialism, Zionism, the reactionary clergy and dissidents. "Unfortunately, the present foreign policy of the Chinese leaders is also adding grist to the mill of the cold war advocates," remarked First Secretary Janos Kadar of the Central Committee<sup>15</sup> of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress.

Beijing, which has been unable to put its own affairs in order for more than two decades now, possesses an amazing ability to interfere in the affairs of the socialist countries, engage in espionage, create difficulties and even wage undeclared wars against some countries.

Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia and Cuba are experiencing the strongest pressure from Beijing. Beijing views these countries as hostile states and the Chinese hegemonists are prepared to use any and all weapons in the struggle against them.

Describing the behavior of imperialism and the Beijing expansionists, Secretary General Le Duan of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party said in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress that, "in an attempt to regain lost influence, they are forming closer alliances each day and are conspiring to launch a counterattack against revolutionary forces."<sup>16</sup> China daily makes armed invasions of border regions in the SRV (more than 2,500 raids on populated points and border posts in 1980), in March 1980 the Chinese Government cut off talks with Vietnam and ignored several Vietnamese requests for the continuation of the talks, traitors who leave Vietnam are sheltered in Beijing, and psychological warfare is being conducted against the SRV.

Beijing has pressured Laos, has trained armed gangs and sent them into this country and has encouraged remaining reactionary forces to fight against the people's democratic government. At the 26th CPSU Congress, Prime Minister Kayson Phomvihan of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, said: "In the last 5 years we have been opposed by a sinister counterrevolutionary alliance of imperialism, Beijing great-power hegemonism and international reaction, which have stooped to any and all methods of intimidating us and harming our country."<sup>17</sup>

The Beijing rulers have continued their military preparations on the Mongolian border and their construction of roads and military facilities. There has been hostile propaganda about the MPR, especially on the radio. The Chinese side is demanding the repayment of over 50 million dollars it once spent on the construction of some industrial facilities and residential buildings, although many of

the facilities and buildings were never completed, as a result of which Mongolia suffered considerable losses.

There are around 6,000 huaqiao in the MPR, and they are being employed for subversive activity in this country. Many of them are conducting anti-Mongolian propaganda and spreading false rumors. Investigations in recent years have indicated that many huaqiao are illegally accumulating excessive quantities of rare and precious metals for the purpose of sending them across the border or for speculation purposes. There have even been cases involving the production of opium and other narcotics and speculation in narcotics. The most serious evidence of Beijing's antisocialist subversive activity is the fact that some huaqiao are members of the Chinese special services.<sup>18</sup>

The Mongolian people and their people's revolutionary party have resolutely resisted Beijing's advances and are confidently transforming their country and building socialism. "The continuation of Beijing's reactionary Maoist line will pose a real threat to the cause of peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world," Yu. Tsedenbal said in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress. "This is why the struggle against imperialism and reaction and for socialism and the progress of our party is indissolubly connected with the struggle against the reactionary Maoism and great-power hegemonism of the Chinese leaders."<sup>19</sup>

Chinese propaganda constantly slanders Cuba, heaps abuse on it, portrays its support of the national liberation revolutions as a service performed for "social imperialism" and advises Washington to treat the island of freedom harshly. Beijing has even tried to intervene in the affairs of the movement for non-alignment and to undermine the positions of progressive states by asserting that Cuba and Vietnam do not meet the requirements for membership in this movement and should be excluded from it.

Taking the differentiated approach, Beijing is striving for special relations with the DPRK, Romania and Yugoslavia. The heads of these governments visited China in 1980 and 1981. Premier Hua Guofeng of the PRC State Council attended the funeral of President J. B. Tito and visited Romania immediately afterward, in May 1980. These countries have party contacts with China and exchange military delegations with it. The sides have expressed similar or identical views on many issues. There are also significant differences of opinion, however, between these countries and China. People in Pyongyang realize that the Chinese leadership has taken an ambiguous stand on the withdrawal of troops from South Korea and that Beijing and Washington have reached a mutual understanding in this area. The DPRK, Romania and Yugoslavia have not accepted Beijing's slanderous attacks on Soviet policy. Romania and Yugoslavia are firmly in favor of the continuation of detente and the prevention of a nuclear world war. There has been increasing disillusionment in Pyongyang, Bucharest and Belgrade in connection with the PRC's inability to honor its economic commitments and its reduction of trade and economic contacts.

In view of its present economic difficulties and its uncertain prospects, Beijing would like to reduce its shipments of coal and oil to the DPRK. There have been serious disagreements over prices and means of payment. When Premier Li Den-ok of the Administrative Council visited the PRC in January 1981, the two sides were only able to agree on a plan for economic cooperation for 1 year.

When Prime Minister I. Verdet of the Socialist Republic of Romania was in China, the Romanian side requested the expansion of trade, complaining that the trade protocol was underfulfilled in many respects in 1980, but the Chinese side did not want to conclude a long-range agreement. The Romanian side has realized the futility of the joint development of iron ore and coking coal deposits in China, oil prospecting and the production of tractors and airplanes. Romania proposed that debts be liquidated with industrial equipment and machine-building products, but the Chinese side refused, saying that this equipment does not conform to world standards. China also refused to buy Romanian oil rigs.

The state of Chinese-Yugoslav economic relations is even worse. The commodity exchange plan was fulfilled by only 50 percent in 1980, trade volume was equivalent to less than 150 million dollars and China accounted for only 0.4 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade. When President V. Djuranovic of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council went to China in November 1980, both sides admitted that their assessment of the prospects of trade and economic ties had been too optimistic. No long-range agreement was signed.

Beijing's policy toward Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the CSSR is still aimed at weakening their friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, pushing them into autarchy and neutrality and ultimately disintegrating the socialist community or at least weakening it.

Although Beijing is pursuing a hostile policy toward the Warsaw Pact organization and CEMA, is "assessing" events in the socialist countries in its own way and is sympathizing with the "division" of Germany, it has declared its willingness to stop arguing, expand economic, scientific and technical ties, organize collaboration in the form of production cooperatives, commence cultural and sports exchanges, etc. The fraternal countries, however, have directed China's attention to the fact that all of these conciliatory maneuvers have been accompanied by opposition to detente, apologies for war and increased hostile activity by the Chinese leadership against the USSR and a number of other socialist countries. As Chairman Todor Zhivkov of the Bulgarian State Council, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, remarked in his speech at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the present Chinese leadership has been particularly zealous in its anti-Soviet and antisocialist activity. Burning with impatience for a world counterrevolutionary front against the USSR and the socialist countries, these leaders are applauding all actions and all words against detente."<sup>20</sup> Under these conditions, Beijing's proposals regarding the improvement of relations with the socialist countries are meaningless.

The Chinese rulers' provocative behavior in connection with the events in Poland indicates the goals Beijing is pursuing and the real value of its appeals for better relations. Chinese propaganda is implying that the events in Poland are the inevitable consequences of the construction of socialism and the cooperation of the socialist states.<sup>21</sup> It has expressed its sympathy for counterrevolutionary elements and has asked imperialism to take a "resolute, unanimous stand."<sup>22</sup> The Chinese rulers would be pleased if Poland were not a socialist country and a reliable member of the Warsaw Pact, but a country seized by chaos and governed by counterrevolutionaries. This reflects Beijing's actual feelings about the socialist states. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had to issue several serious statements to the PRC Embassy about Beijing's anti-Polish propaganda.



Besides this, experience has shown that many Chinese proposals are mere demagoguery. A few years ago, China promised the socialist countries large trade orders, but in 1979 it announced that its future trade with them would be considerably reduced and then proceeded to carry out this intention. For example, China cancelled the traditional Hungarian shipments of machine tools, trucks, cable, oxygen tanks, etc. The attempts of some socialist countries to learn what the proposed production cooperatives would entail also proved that the Chinese side was not actually prepared to establish joint enterprises, especially now that Beijing has had to stop the work on many industrial and other facilities being built with the aid of Japan and the Western powers.

China's relations with Albania, which have reached an impasse in general, are in a class by themselves. The former friends of Mao's group in Tirana are pointedly criticizing the present system in the PRC and its pro-imperialist policy. The Chinese side also mentions the "unfavorable situation" in Albania from time to time.<sup>23</sup> In 1980 the Chinese rulers requested Albania to sign a protocol on commodity exchange, but the Albanians refused because they do not agree with the harsh terms stipulated by the Chinese side.

Beijing's policy toward the socialist countries is now part of imperialism's, particularly its American branch, counteroffensive against world socialism and the communist and national liberation movement.

#### The Intensification of Conflicts with the Developing Countries

China's impatience to carry out its hegemonistic plans and the process of its convergence with imperialism have intensified conflicts with the developing countries. There is nothing left of the previous policy of an ally of people fighting for liberation and stronger independence.

After suffering a defeat in Kampuchea, the Chinese rulers inspired and armed the gangs of Pol Pot and Son Sann, tried to turn Thailand into a base for constant raids on Kampuchea and Laos and to involve the ASEAN countries in the struggle against the Indochinese states, and urged the United States to intervene. Even N. Sihanouk was taken out of mothballs in January 1981 to play a part in the provocative intrigues.

Many top PRC officials, including the new premier of the PRC State Council, Zhao Ziyang, visited Burma and the ASEAN countries of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines in 1981. The heads of the Burmese, Thai and Singapore governments were in China in 1980.

Beijing encouraged political cooperation within the ASEAN framework, the elaboration of a common stand on basic international issues and the organization of military cooperation among the ASEAN countries. Burma was discouraged from converging with Vietnam and other Indochinese states.

The PRC paid special attention to its relations with Thailand, urging its leadership to take a firm stand hostile to Vietnam. According to Beijing's plans, this country should become the bridgehead of many years of warfare against Kampuchea by various types of gangs. The United States should supply these gangs



with weapons while China continues exerting military pressure on Vietnam and Laos and directing the prolonged military conflict in Southeast Asia. Several provocative appeals were issued to Bangkok, advising it to remain "firm" in relations with the Indochinese countries and promising support in the event of a "Vietnamese invasion."

The ASEAN countries reacted in different ways to Beijing's attempts to create a long-lived seat of tension in Southeast Asia. Ruling circles in Thailand gave in to the pressure and reconciled themselves to the presence of bandit gangs in Thailand for raids on Kampuchea. The Singapore rulers have stridently demanded intervention in Kampuchea's affairs and in the question of "internal settlement," although it is no secret that Kampuchea has its own government. Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines displayed more restraint. They are more aware than the Thai and Singapore rulers of what Beijing actually wants, they see the danger of Thailand's involvement in a war and they are objecting to the Chinese line of military pressure on Vietnam and Kampuchea.

China's relations with the Southeast Asian countries were complicated by Beijing's continuous support of Maoist antigovernment forces in Southeast Asia. In Burma, these forces periodically stage large-scale bloody conflicts. The Southeast Asian countries are becoming more insistent that China stop helping Maoist groups in this region. It has become apparent that the United States and, to some degree, Japan, are disturbed by China's feverish activity in this region, especially in Thailand, and this is also affecting the relations between the ASEAN countries and China.

China is still pursuing an unfriendly policy in relations with India, sometimes employing diplomatic camouflage as a screen.

The Chinese leaders were obviously upset when the Indian National Congress returned to power and a government headed by Indira Gandhi was formed. RENMIN RIBAO described the victory of the INC and Indira Gandhi as an unexpected development,<sup>24</sup> and 3 days later the newspaper criticized the prime minister for saying that the limited contingent of Soviet troops had been sent to Afghanistan to assist that country and "attacking the United States and China."<sup>25</sup> When PRC leaders spoke with U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown in January 1980, they advised Washington to "pay no attention" to India because Pakistan, and not India, is supposedly the main stabilizing factor in South Asia. They demanded that the United States give maximum assistance to Pakistan and promised that they would also supply it with additional weapons.

In a French radio broadcast of 10 January 1980, Indira Gandhi expressed worries about the actions of the PRC and the United States in South Asia. She said that the Sino-American alliance would "endanger" India and the entire region. "China poses a threat to India" because it has expansionist ambitions, which have already caused India to suffer. Later I. Gandhi remarked that the danger was moving closer to India's borders in connection with the arming of Pakistan by the United States, China and Saudi Arabia. But the shipments of weapons to Pakistan are also endangering its people and are complicating the normalization of Indian-Pakistani relations.<sup>26</sup>

Beijing's announcement that "the border between China and India has never been officially delineated" evoked an outburst of indignation in India. According to Beijing, there is a "traditional boundary" but India supposedly crossed this boundary in the east in the 1950's and "occupied Chinese territory covering an area of 90,000 square kilometers."<sup>27</sup> The head of the Indian Government said that "although we support Beijing in the United Nations, it has treated us with extreme hostility. China is still making claims to Indian territory."<sup>28</sup>

When PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua met with Indira Gandhi in Salisbury in April 1980, he first set forth Beijing's entire set of anti-Soviet theses and then assured her of China's "friendly feelings" for India and suggested that all past misunderstandings be forgotten. The border question he said, should not prevent the normalization of relations; it could be discussed--not solved, but simply discussed--after the two sides had reached a certain level of mutual understanding.<sup>29</sup>

In principle, the Indian side advised that new conditions be set for the improvement of relations, stressing that this would not require verbal assurances, but specific actions. Furthermore, the improvement of bilateral relations could not be accomplished at the expense of India's relations with other countries.

Beijing used these assurances of its desire for better relations with India to pacify the public and to gain a freer hand to turn Pakistan into a shock force of the Chinese hegemonists and American imperialists in Southwest Asia.

The actual value of these assurances was demonstrated by the events in India's northeastern provinces, which took place after Beijing had signaled its desire to normalize relations.

Nationalist disturbances and unrest in the states of Assam, Tripura and Manipur and the continuous separatist demonstrations in some other regions disrupted the normal course of life throughout the nation's northeast. According to official data cited at a session of parliament, 510 people were killed in Assam within 9 months. In Tripura, according to UNI and PTI reports, more than 300 people were killed, several thousand were wounded and around 50,000 were left homeless within just a few days.

Indian press reports, based strictly on the facts, spoke frankly about a Sino-American conspiracy against India's independence. The ASIA INTERNATIONAL PRESS AGENCY reported that U.S. representatives at meetings of American and Chinese "expert organizers of subversive activity" recommended that Beijing broaden its sphere of activity by including the states of Nagaland, Tripura and Assam within it. Both Beijing, which has been directing the separatist movements in this region for more than two decades, and Washington hope to separate the northeast regions from the rest of India and establish one or several puppet states there.

Beijing does not intend to stop its attempts to seize Indian territory. In June 1980 Deng Xiaoping told an Indian journalist that the territorial question could be settled in a "package deal": China would recognize the MacMahon Line if India would agree to the PRC's ownership of the territory it has occupied in the Aksai Chin region.<sup>30</sup> Another Chinese official, Wang Bingnan, immediately

that Beijing has documents and historical evidence confirming China's ownership of the territory south of the MacMahon Line. In other words, India was offered Indian territory in exchange for...Indian territory. This cynical offer evoked protests in India. Even Beijing could not pretend for long to be the conciliatory side.

India's recognition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea enraged the leaders of the PRC. The Chinese press called this a "stupid" move,<sup>31</sup> and Huang Hua "punished" India by canceling a trip that he himself had stubbornly requested for a long time. By spring 1981, however, the Chinese rulers tried to undermine Soviet-Indian cooperation by reaffirming their willingness to improve relations with India. At the end of June 1981 Huang Hua went to India. However, the Chinese minister of foreign affairs' portfolio did not include any renunciation of China's claims to Indian territory, any recognition of Sikkim's status as part of India or any guarantees of the cessation of anti-Indian activity in neighboring states.

The friction resulting from the events in Afghanistan at the beginning of 1980 was used by Beijing to attach Pakistan more closely to China. The Beijing leaders persistently asked H. Brown to increase U.S. military aid to Pakistan and to arrange for joint actions for the purpose of turning Pakistan into a Chinese-American bridgehead. In January 1980 the notorious Brzezinski arrived in Pakistan, followed a few days later by Huang Hua. The Chinese minister urged the Pakistani rulers to launch an intense fight against revolutionary Afghanistan, promising them new shipments of weapons and instructors. He made every effort to intimidate the Pakistani Government by asserting that the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops was supposedly endangering Afghanistan's independence and assured Zia-ul-Haq that the PRC and United States would "not abandon Pakistan" at this difficult time. A network of camps was set up in Pakistan, where Chinese instructors trained and armed gangs sent into Afghanistan. Shipments of weapons were sent to Pakistan over the Karakorum highway.

Zia-ul-Haq's visit to the PRC in May 1980 marked the beginning of the further convergence of Beijing and Islamabad on an adventuristic basis. Hua Guofeng and other Chinese leaders advised Pakistan to take a "firm approach" to the USSR and intensify its aggression against Afghanistan. The position of the Pakistani military regime with regard to Afghanistan was called "clear and fair." Zia-ul-Haq complained about the DRA's increased attempts to repulse intervention and suppress counterrevolution and objected to the USSR's decisive actions to defend the revolutionary gains and independence of the DRA. He asked for more tanks and airplanes, and the Chinese rulers promised to continue supporting Pakistan in its "resistance of foreign aggression." Upon his return, Zia-ul-Haq said that his trip had been "extraordinarily beneficial" and that "mutual understanding in all areas" had been firmly established.

In June 1981 Premier Zhao Ziyang of the PRC State Council went to Pakistan. The main purpose of his mission was to push Pakistan into a lengthy undeclared war against the DRA and prevent talks between Islamabad and Kabul.

The Afghan people could see that Pakistan intended to continue serving as a base for imperialist and hegemonist aggression against the DRA. India viewed the prospect of larger shipments of weapons to Pakistan as a threat to its security.



People in the Chinese capital saw the Afghan events as a convenient occasion for the provocation of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The Beijing leaders expanded their sphere of mutual understanding with the American Administration and, with a view to its current policy line, made every effort to compound the tension between the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community on one side and the West on the other, never giving up their old hope of a U.S.-USSR conflict. The Afghan events were the main topic of the January 1980 talks between the Chinese leaders and then U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, at which time their "common strategic goals" were underscored.

The Chinese leadership has made an intense effort to portray the events in Afghanistan as a "threat to peace" in Asia and the rest of the world and to depict them as something just short of the main source of tension in international relations and a result of Soviet policy. When Egyptian Vice President H. Moubarek was in Beijing in January 1980, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council made a speech in which he went so far as to allege that the USSR intends to "make its way south, to the Indian Ocean, in order to seize control over sea lanes and oil deposits."

As NEW REPUBLIC reported at the end of June 1980, with references to American intelligence sources, around 1,000 so-called "Afghan rebels"--actually armed bandits--were trained in the methods of diversionary operations on PRC territory. Beijing chose Pakistani regions bordering on the DRA as the main basis for the training of rebels and terrorists. There are 20 special camps and 50 support centers in this zone, where the bandits undergo training under the supervision of Chinese and American "advisers."<sup>32</sup> The Chinese "advisers" are even operating within Afghanistan, and hundreds of "specialists" have been sent from Beijing to Pakistan, where they are actively training bandit groups. China, the magazine stressed, is the main supplier of weapons for the counterrevolutionaries. Beijing and Washington took on the entire cost of maintaining the counterrevolutionary rabble from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Chinese side offered financial aid to "Afghan refugees" in Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> Entire formations of thousands and even tens of thousands of rebels and bandits, armed with modern weapons and trained in terrorist methods, were moved to Afghan territory. At least 15,000 mercenaries underwent special training just in 1979.<sup>34</sup> The weapons Beijing sent the gangs included surface-to-air missiles, mortars, recoilless rifles and large quantities of small arms.

Striving to maximize the friction over Afghanistan, the Chinese rulers have objected to any idea of political regulation based on the complete cessation of intervention. They have even objected to the DRA Government program, made public on 14 May 1980, for the normalization of relations with Pakistan and Iran and the complete cessation of intervention from the territory of these countries, as well as the Soviet Government's June 1980 announcement of the partial withdrawal of Soviet military units from Afghanistan. When U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig visited China in June 1981, Beijing officials on all levels insisted that the Afghan question should only be settled by force and that expanded intervention against the DRA will be necessary.

The Soviet assistance frustrated the plans of the American imperialists and Beijing hegemonists to undermine the independence and freedom of the DRA. At a press conference for Afghan and foreign journalists in Kabul at the end of



January 1980, Chairman Babrak Karmal of the DRA Revolutionary Council, secretary general of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party, said: "One of the important results of the present new stage of the April revolution has been the frustration of the plans carried out against independent Afghanistan by the U.S. imperialists in conjunction with Beijing and the Sadat and Begin regimes."<sup>35</sup>

The development of Beijing's position regarding the revolution in Iran has been indicative of its policy, which has grown increasingly servile to American imperialism. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders are pretending to sympathize with the Iranian revolution and with the efforts to protect the independence and security of this country. On the other, they have tried to help imperialism justify the Carter Administration's adventuristic behavior in relations with Iran and to redirect the Iranian people's indignation into the channel of struggle against the USSR.

Disregarding the facts, RENMIN RIBAO speaks of China's "fraternal relations" with Iran from time to time. At the same time, Beijing did not voice any objections to the concentration of American naval ships in the Persian Gulf or the U.S. threats against Iran and overtly aggressive actions. The Chinese representative "voted with his feet" when a vote was taken in the UN Security Council on the draft resolution on American sanctions against Iran on 1 January 1980. This draft failed to pass only because the USSR vetoed it. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of statements by Beijing officials, alleging that the USSR is to blame for the Iranian-American conflict, that the threat to Iran comes from its "northern neighbor" and that the Iranian people should be wary of the USSR.

Displaying touching concern for the interests of American imperialism, Beijing scolded the Western countries for "not wanting to harm their own relations with Iran too much."<sup>36</sup> When the American diversion against Iran was being universally condemned on 27 April 1980, the press department of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, expressing regret over the incident.<sup>37</sup> Reports in the Chinese press included an article entitled "England, Canada, Holland, Australia and Other Countries Are Impressed by U.S. Actions to Save the Hostages."<sup>38</sup>

In light of all this, Teheran radio had every reason to announce that "China has become one of the strategic links in the plan to attain the criminal goals of American imperialism."<sup>39</sup>

Beijing's position on the events in the Middle East has been hypocritical. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership maintains that the Egyptian-Israeli bargain is not based on Sadat's conciliatory line, but on "concessions" by Israel, which agreed to the "new proposals" of the United States that allegedly ended the deadlock in the negotiations.<sup>40</sup> In December 1979 the Chinese delegation at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly did not support the resolution on the situation in the Middle East, which condemned all partial agreements and separate negotiations inconsistent with the principles of justice and the comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. At the same time, in order to reduce Arab indignation with this position, Hua Guofeng spoke of the Palestinians' right to return to their native land and establish a state at the NPC session on

18 June 1979. After Egyptian Vice President H. Moubarek visited the PRC in January 1980, he said that "the Chinese Government agreed to continue military and economic cooperation with Egypt, but it does not want this cooperation to be publicized because this is a ticklish matter and it could affect China's relations with other countries."<sup>41</sup> The PLO insisted that China officially censure the Egyptian-Israeli bargain, but Beijing refused. The leaders of the Palestinian movement noted that relations with China could be better if Beijing were willing to "take a different approach to Sadat's policy."<sup>42</sup>

After the relative decline in Chinese activity on the African continent, when the Chinese leadership realized that the African countries knew that Beijing was the servant of American imperialism, it tried to intensify contacts with the African states in 1980. Just as in the past, PRC policy in Africa has taken three inter-related directions: struggle to broaden and strengthen the PRC's influence on this continent, the assistance of the West in its policy in Africa, and anti-Sovietism. The African leaders have been told that the source of many of their problems is "Soviet expansion" and that the actions of the United States and other Western powers in Africa are "part of the common struggle against expansion."

Beijing views the conservatives in Zaire, Sudan and Somalia as its main partners. They are being given some assistance, including military aid. The Chinese rulers approve of the efforts of some African states to help the United States build up its military strength in the Persian Gulf. Beijing is still assisting the reactionary groups fighting against the government of Angola and helping Somali raiders in their aggression against Ethiopia. Even relations with Zimbabwe, which were established in April 1980, when the country won its independence, are showing signs of cracking as a result of the attempts to dictate policy to Zimbabwe and Beijing's assistance of antigovernment forces in Angola, which is complicating the Namibian people's liberation struggle. The Zimbabwe rulers have restricted press and radio reports on China, Zimbabwe dissociated itself from the PRC position in regard to Vietnam, Prime Minister R. Mugabe's trip to China in May 1981 did not lead to the conclusion of any serious agreements, and China has been unable to give the young republic any kind of significant assistance. Finally, although the Chinese leaders have formally expressed their support of SWAPO in Namibia, even there they are striving to please imperialism by supporting the attempts to solve the Namibian problem according to the Rhodesian model. "The West is quite appreciative of the Beijing leaders' efforts in Africa," a Nigerian magazine stated with complete justification. "The national liberation struggle in Africa is arousing fear and anger in the West and its allies. The Beijing leaders have become the ally of the United States. Their joint subversive actions are endangering stability in many parts of the world and are posing a serious threat to peace in Africa and other world regions."<sup>43</sup>

The central aspect of Beijing policy in Latin America is still opposition to expanded relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, especially Cuba. This opposition is conducted jointly with the United States. The Chinese rulers call Latin America a "smoking volcano" and a "powder keg ready to explode" and say that the situation there is distinguished by "unrest." And all of this, it turns out, is not the result of exploitation by American monopolies, but of Soviet-U.S. competition.<sup>44</sup>

Beijing's relations with the Pinochet regime in Chile are still extremely close. The Chinese leaders have reacted with extreme suspicion, however, to the victory of the patriots in Nicaragua. It is not surprising that the State Council of Nicaragua decided not to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC in summer 1980 in view of its peace-endangering policy. Playing up to the Reagan Administration, the Chinese leadership had an openly hostile reaction to the people's rebellion in El Salvador. Although Beijing had much to say about "infiltration," "subversive activity" and "intervention" by the USSR and Cuba, it completely approved of U.S. intervention in this country.<sup>45</sup>

#### In the Role of A Junior Partner

The PRC's political, economic, scientific and technical cooperation and military contacts with some imperialist states were broadened at the turn of the decade.

Beijing views the United States as its main military and political partner, and the Chinese leadership has repeatedly said that Chinese-American relations are dictated by "global strategic needs."<sup>46</sup> In turn, the Carter Administration stressed China's importance to U.S. strategic interests. In January 1980, then U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown went to China and made a number of statements. Brown and his Chinese conversation partners, who included Deng Xiaoping and Geng Biao, noted their "common strategic interests" and the possibility of "intersupplementary actions in the area of defense as well as the diplomatic sphere." While he was in China, Brown promised U.S. assistance in the modernization of the defense industry. The Carter Administration authorized the sale of dual-purpose equipment to China, as well as auxiliary military equipment and technology: two communications satellites, technical air defense radar installations, military transport helicopters, large military transport planes, jet engine testing devices, radar equipment, computers, etc. (however, as the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported on 3 March 1981, financial difficulties have been such that not one transaction has been completed as yet). The possibility of weapons sales to China was suggested. "China," prominent American correspondent J. Kraft acknowledged, "has become the United States' main strategic ally against the USSR."<sup>47</sup>

Beijing and Washington exchange information on international issues, including intelligence data, conduct regular consultations and coordinate their positions. Beijing and Washington have taken joint or parallel actions against the socialist community, the countries of Indochina, Afghanistan, the DPRK, Iran, Angola and Ethiopia, and the Chinese leaders support American imperialism's efforts to escalate international tension and the arms race. They have also counseled the Western European countries not to disagree with the United States on international issues because these disagreements are "utilized by the Soviet Union."<sup>48</sup>

The United States ranks second, after Japan, among China's trade partners. China has been granted special status within the framework of the American export control act, establishing favorable conditions for the sale of the latest technology and equipment to China. The 1980 trade volume amounted to 4.6 billion dollars. However, economic contacts between the two countries are still limited. One reason is the high cost of industrial equipment and the high interest on U.S. credit. Another reason is that American firms are biding their time until they can judge the stability of the situation in the PRC and the reliability of China as a partner.



In view of the relatively small volume of U.S. economic ties with the PRC, the United States suffered less injury when inflation, limited currency reserves, a shortage of electricity and a poorly developed infrastructure overstrained the Chinese economy under the burden of stepped-up plans and the government had to reduce capital construction by 45 percent, stop the construction of around 300 industrial facilities, including some being built with the aid of foreign firms, and canceled many contracts for equipment deliveries. American firms learned from this to be more cautious in the future. "Many Americans and other foreign businessmen who tried to establish commercial contacts with China for the last 2 years are now quietly curtailing this activity," an American newspaper reported. "Business prospects are not optimistic."<sup>49</sup>

The Carter Administration's policy toward China aroused serious objections in the United States. "We must realize," American diplomat M. Toone remarked in a BUSINESS WEEK article at the beginning of April 1980, "that one day the Chinese will treat us with the same kind of hostility that the Russians are experiencing now.... It would be stupid to assume that the Chinese plan to be our friends in the distant future." "The United States will not benefit directly from China's quicker or more vigorous progression toward the status of a large nuclear power," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR noted. "In other words, there is no direct advantage in helping China to develop its nuclear potential."<sup>50</sup> "The time has come to take a discerning look at our relations with China instead of giving them artificial momentum because of our present problems in relations with the Soviet Union," the WASHINGTON POST commented.<sup>51</sup> "We are identifying ourselves too closely with Chinese military policy.... Involvement in China's anti-Soviet military policy will be of no benefit to U.S. long-range objectives," Professor D. Lampton warned.<sup>52</sup>

During the 1980 campaign, people in Reagan's camp warned that the United States had paid too high a price for the establishment of relations with China by severing political relations with Taiwan, that Taiwan's interests should be given more consideration, that the Carter Administration had taken on so many commitments that it would be impossible to fulfill all of them, and that U.S. resources are not unlimited and cannot be used for substantial economic aid to China. They also remarked that China was taking advantage of its rapprochement with the United States to strengthen its influence in Thailand and some other Southeast Asian countries. When Beijing issued loud protests and the PRC press printed angry articles, the people in Reagan's camp reasoned that the PRC needed the United States more than America needed China and that Beijing would therefore not take any real action. In spite of the protests of the PRC Embassy, many representatives of Taiwan were invited to Reagan's inauguration ceremony.

After Reagan entered the White House, the new administration tried to pacify Beijing but clearly indicated that it would be guided in its affairs primarily by U.S. interests. To calm down the Chinese leadership, Washington sent former President G. Ford to Beijing in March 1981. In June A. Haig arrived in China. The Americans assured the PRC rulers that the United States would pursue its previous policy in relations with the PRC and the two sides agreed to "coordinate strategy," exert more pressure on Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan and lift the restrictions on the sale of American "dual-purpose" equipment and military technology to China. Disagreements over relations with Taiwan, however, were not



settled. The Reagan Administration firmly announced that it would adhere to the Act on Relations with Taiwan, because it regarded this as a compulsory law.

Whereas Beijing regards the United States as its main military and political partner, Japan is China's main economic partner. The relations between these two countries developed with unprecedented speed.

In an attempt to please the Japanese, the Beijing leaders have stressed their intention to "learn" from them and build the Chinese economy with Japanese equipment and credit. Deng Xiaoping had much to say about this when he was in Tokyo. When Hua Guofeng went to Japan in May 1980, the importance of broad commercial and economic exchanges between the two countries was again stressed, as well as the importance, particularly in light of the serious raw material and energy problems, of broader cooperation between the two countries in these areas, including the joint working of oil and coal deposits on a long-range and permanent basis in accordance with an agreement between concerned organizations in both countries.

During Hua Guofeng's stay in Japan, an agreement was signed on scientific and technical cooperation between Japan and China. They pledged to promote further scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries within the framework of this agreement.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the expansion and development of cultural exchanges between the two countries. In particular, they commended the fulfillment of the student exchange program and the prospects of the Japanese language study program, implemented in China in summer 1980.

Beijing and Tokyo resolved to organize meetings, whenever necessary, between representatives of the two countries on the level of cabinet ministers on the Japanese side and members of the State Council on the Chinese side, alternating between both capitals, for the discussion of a broad range of issues, especially those pertaining to bilateral relations.

On the surface, everything appears to be going well. But this is only on the surface. Japan's YOMIURI stated that people in the Chinese capital must realize that even "economic cooperation" has its limits in connection with the differences between the two systems. TOKYO SHIMBUN expressed the opinion that "the Soviet Union will be more suspicious of Japan in the future and it is therefore possible that Japan's 'comprehensive and peaceful' diplomacy could be adulterated."<sup>53</sup> The validity of these apprehensions was demonstrated by Hua Guofeng's actions in Tokyo in June 1980, at which time he attended the funeral of M. Ohira. Along with Washington administration spokesmen, Hua made an effort to involve Japan in the Chinese-American campaign to escalate international tension.

Serious snags have also been encountered in the economic cooperation between China and Japan. It is true that the Japanese monopolies have stayed ahead of their Western European and American competitors and that the volume of Chinese-Japanese trade totaled 9.4 billion dollars in 1980. Some 40 large Japanese firms are represented in Beijing and 33 Japanese banks are maintaining relations with China. However, since Japan took on more commitments regarding economic aid (the construction of metallurgical, machine-building and petrochemical plants, electric

power stations and two heavy-water reactors, oil prospecting and drilling in the Bohai Gulf, the development of nonferrous metal and coal mines, etc.), it suffered more from the reduction of capital construction in China and the cessation of many projects. The Chinese side canceled contracts on the construction of a metallurgical plant (the second section) in Baoshan, petrochemical plants in Nanking and Shenyang, a chemical plant in Beijing and a refrigerator compressor plant.

The decision of the Chinese rulers was a heavy blow for many Japanese firms, which lost around 300 billion yen. "The Chinese boom in Japan before and after 1978 was the result of false assumptions about the rapid modernization of China," a Japanese newspaper noted. "The time has come to take a more objective and realistic view of China's prospects."<sup>54</sup> Talks that were unpleasant for both sides were held. The Japanese Government demanded compensation for the losses suffered by Japanese firms. The Chinese side tried to calm down the Japanese by promising to consider the matter of compensation.

Under these conditions, warnings against excessive "friendship" with Beijing have become louder in Japan. "All possible measures must be taken in advance to prevent China from becoming a military and economic threat." This was the main conclusion drawn in a report published by Japan's International Research Institute, "Japanese Policy in Relations with China in the 1980's."

The contents of this report clearly indicate that the recent "Chinese boom" in Japan has disappeared without a trace and that time has come for a sober and discerning assessment of the real military and economic threat posed by China and for significant changes in Japanese-Chinese relations.

The Chinese rulers have obviously failed in their attempts to escalate tension in Europe and help the American Administration involve Western Europe in sanctions against the USSR. Many Chinese emissaries visited Western Europe, including ministers and the premier and vice premier of the State Council. Beijing was visited by the president of France (October 1980), the president of Italy (September 1980), the prime minister of the Netherlands (October 1980) and leaders of some other countries. The Western European countries have disagreed with the Chinese view of world affairs and have announced that they do not believe in the inevitability of war and that they are in favor of the continuation of detente and the implementation of measures to curb the arms race. Not one Western European country joined the American economic boycott of the USSR. Giscard d'Estaing, then the president of France, expressed the hope that the growth of China's role in the world would be accompanied by the growth of its responsibility for the cause of peace and restraint. Not long afterward, in a televised interview on 29 January 1981, Giscard d'Estaing said that it would not look good to use relations with China to exert pressure on the USSR. When F. Mitterand, leader of the French Socialist Party, visited China in February 1981, he spoke against the anti-Soviet alliance of the United States, China and Western Europe and stressed his party's belief in the need for constant dialogue with the USSR to preserve peace in Europe. The FRG Government has kept its distance in relations with Beijing. Government circles in Bonn have noted that Beijing would like to bring about a confrontation between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, but these hopes are unlikely to materialize.

The euphoria over the possibility of profiting from the modernization of the Chinese economy has also dissipated. In 1979 China's trade volume with the Common Market countries, especially the FRG, increased, but this was followed by a sharp decrease in 1980. At the beginning of 1981 the Chinese side canceled a project, planned by West German firms, for the construction of a cold-rolling mill at a cost of 500 million marks for the metallurgical combine in Shanghai, a Mannesman-demag project (440 million marks) and three other industrial projects (800 million marks). France offered to build China two nuclear power stations at a cost of 2 billion dollars, but there has been no progress in this area. The Chinese rulers also canceled contracts with a number of firms in other Western European countries.

The state of shock in the Western business community would be difficult to describe. But after all, there is nothing amazing about all of this: Beijing has sprung another surprise, and the unpredictability of the Chinese rulers' behavior ceased to be amazing long ago. "There are some European companies which have already spent millions of dollars on projects for China but have not signed a single contract yet," a French newspaper reported in this connection.<sup>55</sup> "Western business' 'honeymoon' in China is over," the English press acknowledged. "Many businessmen feel cheated."<sup>56</sup>

The experience of the PRC's socioeconomic development in the last two decades or so has been a hard lesson, teaching the effects of the distortion of socialism and its essence on domestic and international policy.

Nationalism, the severance of ties with the socialist community, adventurism and irresponsibility have led Beijing into an alliance with imperialism and reactionary extremism. Imperialism is not only urging the Chinese leaders to start fighting the USSR and the socialist community, but views them as a "fifth column" to be used for subversive activity in the world revolutionary movement.

Beijing has taken a completely destructive position on the main issue of the present day: the preservation of peace. The PRC's apologies for war, objections to measures aimed at detente and disarmament, territorial ambitions and armed attacks on neighboring states have all made Beijing a dangerous source of war. The real interests of the Chinese people, however, would be served by a policy of peace and normal relations with other states.

"Although the Soviet Union has consistently opposed Beijing's expansionist ambitions and the aggressive essence of its policy, permeated with pathological anti-Sovietism, it also recognizes the need for normal Soviet-Chinese intergovernmental relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is willing to meet the Chinese half-way in this matter."<sup>57</sup>

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CSO: 1805/1

TAKING THE TRIED AND TESTED ROAD TO THE COMPLETE TRIUMPH OF SOCIALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 75-87

[Article by Ye. P. Bavrín]

[Not translated by JPRS]

THE LATEST ATTEMPT TO CANONIZE MAOISM (THE DECISIONS OF THE SIXTH CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 88-99

[Report on Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum in Beijing in July 1981]

[Not translated by JPRS]

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO LINES IN THE CCP LEADERSHIP DURING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN (1937-1939)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 100-111

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CHINA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ASEAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 112-121

[Article by M. A. Andreyev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## FROM THE HISTORY OF RUSSO-JAPANESE AND SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 122-135

[Article by L. N. Kutakov, doctor of historical sciences, and S. I. Verbitskiy, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The Soviet people have always been interested in the period of Russian history connected with the discovery, exploration and development of the Kuril Islands--an integral part of the territory of the USSR.

The Kuril Islands encircle the Sea of Okhotsk, stretching in an unbroken chain from the southern tip of Kamchatka to the island of Hokkaido. They conceal the approaches to the coastline of the Russian Far East.

The common name for all the islands, the "Kurils," was given to them by Russian explorers because of their constantly smoking volcanos. Even Japanese authors admit the Russian origin of the name.<sup>1</sup> The Kurils consist of over 30 more or less sizeable islands and numerous smaller ones.

The Russians first visited the Kuril Islands in the first half of the 17th century. There is evidence that Russian kochi (clipper ships) sailed to the shores of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands in the second half of the 16th century, while there is no evidence that foreign travelers visited these locations at that time.<sup>2</sup> The discovery of the Kuril Islands by Russians in the 1640's is even mentioned in Japanese historical literature. Choken Matsunaga, a 19th century Japanese author who summarized all that had previously been written by other Japanese historians about the Russian visitors to the Kurils and Sakhalin in his book "Sakhalin and Kamchatka," says that "in 1643 the Russians came to Kamchatka and discovered" the Kuril Islands.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, the author is referring to the information about the Kuril Islands received by Russian explorer Yuriy (Yuuru in Japanese) Seliverstov from Mikhail Stadukhin's group in 1649.<sup>4</sup> The inhabitants of the Kuril Islands told Stadukhin that he was not the first Russian on their land.<sup>5</sup> These data began to be entered on Russian maps. This is attested to, in particular, by the inscription on the "Maps of All Siberia," collected in Tobol'sk on the orders of Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich in 1667. The inscription states: "From that rock at midday (Kamchatka--authors) to the mouth of the Amur River there are eight rivers, and across from the mouths of those rivers there is a stone pillar, rising out of the sea." This refers to Alaid Island, later called Atlasov, one of the Kuril Islands, which the Russians discovered when they visited this region in the middle of the



17th century. This is corroborated by the 1687 Dutch map of N. Wietson, where Alaid Island--the "stone pillar"--is called "Stolpka memcoy."<sup>6</sup>

In 1692 all of the Kuril Islands were entered on a map based on Russian sources by Russian Ambassador Ides, who was sent to China by Peter I.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, there is no question that Russian sea-farers must be given the credit for the discovery of the Kuril Islands.

In 1695 Cossack Luka Morozko traveled from Anadyr' to Kamchatka. He returned to Anadyr' with information about Kamchatka and the Kurils and passed this information on to an official, Vladimir Atlasov.<sup>8</sup> In 1697 Atlasov traveled along the western shoreline of Kamchatka south of the mouth of the Golygina River (then called the Ninchugu River) on the 52°10' northern latitude. Atlasov reported that there were inhabited islands beyond the southern tip of Kamchatka. The information Atlasov sent to Tobol'sk about Kamchatka and the Kurils served as the basis for a map compiled by S. U. Remezov in the beginning of the 18th century. This map, called the "Chart of the New Kamchadal' Lands and Seas," is one of the earliest maps of the Chukotsk Peninsula, Kamchatka and the Kurils.<sup>9</sup> One of the notations on the map reads: "the lake and island Kuril lands."

Although European maps of the mid-17th century depicted Ezo and Kamchatka between Asia and America, European cartographers did not know the exact geographic location of these territories or anything else about them. A Dutchman named deVries saw some land north of Japan in 1643 but heavy fog kept him from determining its outlines. He also could not determine whether this land was an island or part of the continent. He did not know that this was part of the Kuril chain. Therefore, his voyage was of no significance in the discovery and exploration of the Kuril Islands.

It was in Russia's interest to gain access to the Eastern Ocean (as the Pacific Ocean was then called) and to control the islands in this region, adjacent to Russian possessions. In terms of their geographic location, the islands were the only continuation of Russian territory in the Pacific, and their possession would be necessary if Russia were to have access to the ocean and essential for communication with Chukotka and Kamchatka.

When the islands were discovered by the Russians, the Kurils and Sakhalin were inhabited by Ainus and by Siberian ethnic groups: Nivkhi (Gilyaki), Oroki, Evenki and Itel'meny. All of them combined made up the native population. The common origins of the inhabitants of the Kurils and Sakhalin and the inhabitants of the continent were corroborated by their similar languages, mores and customs and their common material culture and anthropological features. The Ainus had once inhabited what is now Japan but had been crowded to the north, to Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils, where they were crowding the Nivkhi.

The Siberian Department sent out a number of ukases in Peter I's name to Irkutsk, Tobol'sk, Anadyr' and Kamchatka, ordering "the exploration of the land and islands and the collection of tribute from foreigners." For example, a document sent to the office of the Yakutsk voivode by the Siberian Department in 1708 proposed that an official be sent to Kamchatka, accompanied by a person who would persuade the foreigners to accept "the protection of His Supreme Majesty" and "pay tribute."<sup>10</sup> The document ended with an order to "zealously seek out other rich people living

on the islands and where the rivers meet the Eastern Ocean-Sea and learn about them, treating them with affection and cultivating friendship and trade with them."<sup>11</sup>

The development of Kamchatka, and then the Kurils, began after Atlasov's cruise. In 1700 Timofey Kobelev was appointed the first Russian official in Kamchatka. In 1704-1708 this office was filled by Commander V. Kolesov. In 1705 he sent a detachment headed by the Cossack Lamayev to the Kurils to collect tribute from the inhabitants of the closest islands.<sup>12</sup>

In 1710 Cossack troop leader V. Savost'yanov was ordered to build ships and to investigate the lands "beyond the inlets" and persuade the inhabitants of these lands to become Russian subjects.<sup>13</sup> The order was carried out in 1711 by Cossack Ataman Danilo Antsiferov and Esaul Ivan Kozyrevskiy, who visited the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir and the Avos' reef. When they returned they compiled a map and description of these islands, stressing that all of the Kurils had never belonged to anyone before the Russians arrived.

Through an interpreter, Antsiferov and Kozyrevskiy offered Russian citizenship to the local inhabitants. "The foreigners told us...we have lived here without paying tribute to anyone and, up to now, no one has asked us for tribute."<sup>14</sup> Antsiferov and Kozyrevskiy collected tribute from these inhabitants, made them Russian subjects and, in this way, made the islands part of the Russian Empire. They also compiled a map of the other Kuril Islands, which they learned of through interrogation.

Later, in 1726, I. Kozyrevskiy reported to Bering that the "Nifonets people" (the Japanese--authors) "do not go beyond Matsmay to other islands in the north. And there is a guard at the end of the island,"<sup>15</sup> that is, the Japanese were not allowed to sail north of Matsmay (Hokkaido). There is no question about the validity of Kozyrevskiy's report: The Tokugawa laws were in effect in Japan at that time, prohibiting the Japanese, on pain of death, from leaving their country and building ships suitable for long voyages. This is why only Japanese pirates sailed north of Japan, with the exception of the occasional merchant or fishing vessel carried out into the open sea by a storm, at which time the vessel would be surrounded by boats and the crew would be taken prisoner by the inhabitants of the Kurils.

In the same report to Bering, Kozyrevskiy said that he had "set foot on the closest islands, seen others and met autocratic people."<sup>16</sup> According to Kozyrevskiy, the inhabitants of the southern Kurils also called themselves "autocratic," or independent: "The inhabitants of Iturup and Urup govern themselves and are subject to no one."<sup>17</sup> The Kuril Islands were not occupied by Japanese, and the Russians were not only the first to discover them and put them on the map, but also the first to actually establish the right of ownership to them. This is the reason for the great historical significance of Kozyrevskiy's cruises.

The map compiled by Kozyrevskiy after he had visited the Kurils in 1713 served as the basis for the map S. U. Remezov compiled in 1719 and sent to Moscow. On this map the entire chain of the Kurils, Matsmay and a large island (showing no southern boundary) inscribed "Nifon Island" are represented.<sup>18</sup> Kozyrevskiy's map became quite famous and was also used by Swedish prisoner of war I. F. Tabbert (Stralenberg) when he compiled his map of Siberia in 1725.<sup>19</sup>

In 1719 Peter I sent an expedition, consisting of land-surveyors Ivan Yevreinov and Fedor Luzhin, on an official mission to "sail to Kamchatka and parts beyond, describe those territories and learn whether America is connected to Asia," but the main purpose of the expedition was to "learn about the Kuril Islands and the route to Japan."<sup>20</sup>

In 1945 I. Yevreinov's original map of Siberia, Kamchatka and the Kurils was discovered in the TsGADA [Central State Archives of Ancient Documents, USSR]. The report of the expedition indicates the tremendous amount of work performed by the surveyors. They conducted the astronomical measurement of the coordinates of many points in Siberia and the Kurils and marked them on a map. The Kuril Islands were explored "to the 16th island" (Ketoy Island).

This was a study of great scientific and political importance. It reaffirmed that the Kuril Islands were inhabited by natives, that there were no Japanese on the islands and that the Japanese and the Kamchadals only traded with the inhabitants of these islands.

In 1722 I. Yevreinov submitted a personal report to Peter I on the results of his trip and showed him the map of the Kuril Islands he had explored. Peter I was satisfied with the results of the expedition. The 1721 expedition was of great importance in the exploration and development of the Kuril Islands.

Yevreinov's map, just as Kozyrevskiy's, was known to his contemporaries and was published in Russia (in the 1721 and 1734 works by I. K. Kirillov) and Western Europe (a 1732 work by N. D. deLisle and d'Anville).

At the beginning of 1727 Empress Catherine I was informed of the Senate's opinion, based on reports from Siberia, that there were islands near Kamchatka that should be taken as Russian possessions. The Senate stated that "these lands are adjacent to Russian possessions and belong to no one and it would therefore not be difficult for the Russian Empire to maintain and possess them."<sup>21</sup>

In connection with this, the Senate suggested that a group be sent there to collect tribute, with Yakutsk "Cossack head" Afanasiy Shestakov as its leader. The main purpose of Shestakov's expedition was to explore and acquire new lands in the Eastern Ocean. One detachment of the expedition (which was headed by Captain Pavlutskiy after Shestakov's death in 1730), led by assistant navigator Ivan Fedorov and land-surveyor Mikhail Gvozdev, received orders in 1732 to sail the vessel "Gavril" from Bol'sheretsk to Cape Anadyrsk "to learn how many islands there are and who their inhabitants are and collect tribute from those who have not paid it in the past."<sup>22</sup> This expedition reached North America (Alaska).<sup>23</sup> The navigator of the expedition, Ya. Ya. Gens, compiled a map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands between Kamchatka and Japan in 1733.<sup>24</sup>

On the basis of the results of this expedition, official Russian government documents referred to the Kuril Islands as part of the Russian Empire. For example, when G. Pisarev was appointed "director of Okhotsk," he was instructed by the government of Anna Ioanovna on 30 July 1731 to regularly collect "as much tribute as possible" from the inhabitants of the Kuril Islands, who had "already paid tribute for several years for Kamchatka." The government informed Pisarev that "the messengers sent to



collect the tribute must be firmly instructed to treat the natives as kindly as possible and to encourage them to engage in voluntary and free trade."<sup>25</sup>

In the second quarter of the 18th century the regular Russian explorations of the Kuril Islands began to stretch all the way to Hokkaido. In 1738 and 1739 M. Shpanberg, a member of Bering's northern expedition, studied and charted all of the Kuril Islands, giving them Russian names. In 1739 a member of this expedition, the "ore expert" Gardebol, conducted geological prospecting on the island of Shikotan.<sup>26</sup> This attested to the economic assimilation of the new possessions.

In his report to the office of the admiralty, Shpanberg wrote: "I followed that route from the 32 islands described in the company journal and charted heretofore."<sup>27</sup> He provided detailed descriptions of several southern islands, their natural resources and their flora and fauna. Shpanberg named the largest of them Figurnyy, Tri Sestry and Tsitronnyy. He reported that the southern islands were inhabited by the same people as the northern islands and Kamchatka.

Through an interpreter, they informed him that "only Matsmay (Hokkaido--Authors) is governed by the Japanese khan, but the other islands are independent."<sup>28</sup> Shpanberg's reports provide further evidence that the Kuril Islands, including the islands of the Lesser Kurils, did not belong to Japan. Another member of Bering's expedition, Val'ton, also charted the Kuril Islands when he visited them in 1739.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, Russian sea-farers made major geographic discoveries. They charted the Kuril Islands and part of Japan and proved that States Island and Company Lands, as they were called by the Dutchman deVries, were nothing other than two of the Kuril Islands.<sup>30</sup> The maps of Shpanberg and Val'ton served as the basis for the general map of the Russian Empire, depicting the mouth of the Amur, Sakhalin, parts of Japan, the Kuril Islands and southern Kamchatka, printed in an academic Russian atlas in 1745.

In 1755 N. Storozhev reported to Bol'sheretsk that some of the inhabitants of Kunashir, the southernmost island in the Greater Kurils, had "been persuaded to pay tribute," or, in other words, to accept their status as Russian subjects. This meant that the inhabitants of all of the Kuril Islands were subjects of Russia.<sup>31</sup> The Irkutsk governor's instructions, based on a government ukase of 1772, said that "in the sea south of the Kuril ridge there are Kuril islands inhabited by faithful subjects of His Imperial Majesty...and these islands stretch all the way to Japanese cities."<sup>32</sup>

In the last quarter of the 18th century the Siberian authorities resolved to consolidate Russia's claim to the Kurils and guard them against any type of Japanese encroachment by building a fort on the island of Urup and founding a Russian settlement there. A semi-investigative, semi-industrial expedition was equipped in 1775 to carry out this plan for the southern Kurils. The expedition was headed by nobleman Ivan Antipin. He was later assisted by "pathfinder" Dmitriy Shabalin. Antipin was instructed to sail from Petropavlovsk to the island of Urup, then to Iturup and then, accompanied by natives, to the next Kuril islands. In the event of a meeting with Japanese, he was instructed to treat them with "courtesy, kindness and decorum" and to persuade them to conclude a written agreement. The new inhabitants of these islands should be "encouraged, with kindness and benevolence, to



accept (Russian) citizenship and to pay a certain amount of tribute voluntarily... and a census should be taken."<sup>33</sup>

The tsarist government was striving not only for the assimilation of the island inhabitants, many of whom were nomads, moving from one island to another, but also to commence the economic assimilation of the islands in earnest.

When D. Shabalin and I. Antipin sailed to the islands of Iturup and Kunashir in spring 1778, 1,500 natives agreed to become Russian subjects. In 1778 and 1779 they returned to three southern islands (Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan), collected tribute from the natives and submitted daily reports on the acceptance of citizenship status by several hundred more natives. These daily reports, which are now part of the central state archives, testify that the Kuril natives became Russian subjects voluntarily.<sup>34</sup> Antipin planted various cereal grains on the islands to determine the suitability of this land for grain farming and livestock breeding; rye, wheat and barley matured and produced a good harvest on the island of Urup. The TsGADA documents about the trips made by Shabalin and Antipin are of considerable value in the study of the history of the assimilation of the southern Kurils by the Russians.

The regular collection of tribute from the natives on all of the Kuril Islands, which went on for several decades, attested that these inhabitants were Russian subjects.

In 1779 Catherine II decided to abolish the collection of tribute to win the affection of the local population. Besides, the tribute was of no great economic importance to the tsarist government. An ukase published by Catherine II on 30 April 1779 stipulated that "the shaggy naturalized inhabitants of the distant Kuril Islands should not be disturbed and not be required to pay any tribute, and any future inhabitants should not be required to do this either."<sup>35</sup>

The rich fur resources of the North American colonies and Pacific Islands belonging to Russia offered the country extensive opportunities to establish itself in Asian markets after the fur trade had been organized properly. Russian merchants and sailors regularly visited the Kuril Islands. A group of Russian sailors (S. Yezhov and others) spent the winter on Iturup in 1785-1786.<sup>36</sup>

On 22 December 1786 Catherine II agreed to measures proposed by President V. R. Vorontsov of the commerce board and steward A. A. Bezborodko "in the event of encroachments by English traders on commerce and the fur trade in the Eastern Ocean."<sup>37</sup> The proposals were based on the assumption that the following were "indisputable possessions of Russia: 1) the American shoreline north of 55°21' latitude, traveled by Captain Bering, Chirikov and other Russian navigators; 2) all of the islands near the mainland and the Alaskan peninsula; 3) the Lis'i and Aleutian islands; 4) the Kuril chain."<sup>38</sup> Catherine II's agreement with the views expressed by Vorontsov and Bezborodko represented legal confirmation of Russia's actual ownership of the Kuril, Aleutian and other islands in the Pacific, as well as Alaska.

The war with Turkey, and then with Sweden, forced Catherine II to give up the idea of a military expedition. The decisive measures the government could have taken

would have seriously complicated diplomatic relations with England, and this certainly did not enter into the plans of the Russian government.

The Northern Company, founded by G. Shelekhov, which later became part of the Russian-American Company, established a permanent Russian settlement with 40 inhabitants on Urup. Its appointed leader was "pathfinder" Zvezdochetov, who had visited the Kuril Islands several times and knew them well. The settlement remained in existence until Zvezdochetov's death (in 1805). Zvezdochetov set up experimental plots of rye, wheat, oats and flax on the island.<sup>39</sup> In 1799 the Russian government transferred all commercial and mineral rights on the Kuril Islands to the Russian-American Company, offering it the privilege of "making use of all of the resources of the Kurils and other islands in the northeastern ocean."<sup>40</sup>

The company charter, ratified by Paul I, stated in the first paragraph that the lands of Northeast America and the Aleutian and Kuril islands belonged to Russia "by right of discovery."<sup>41</sup> Therefore, in 1799 a legislative act reaffirmed Russia's ownership of all the Kuril Islands.<sup>42</sup>

After the southern Kurils had become part of the Russian Empire, the Japanese began to explore them. This fact has been acknowledged several times in Japan. The previously mentioned Japanese historian, Choken Matsunaga, wrote that "the Russians occupied the 21 closest islands and sailed several times to the islands of Urup and Etorofu (Iturup) in the last years of the 18th century."<sup>43</sup>

Japanese historian Ryunosuke Okamoto took a chauvinistic approach and wrote the following in a book published in 1898, "Nichiro kosho Hokkaido shiko" [The History of Hokkaido in Connection with Japan's Relations with Russia]: "When the disturbing news of Russia's southward progression arrived, a talented and wise bakufu (government--Authors) minister, Sadanobu Matsudaira, responded to the news with intelligence and foresight: In the last years of the Temmei government (1787-1788) he ordered...an investigation into the matter."<sup>44</sup>

A study by Kagoshima University Professor Yoshimitsu Koriyama ascertained that the Japanese authorities of the second half of the 18th century still did not have any precise knowledge of the Kuril Islands in general or even of the exact location of Japan's northern border. He remarks, for example, that one of the bureaucrats of the central Japanese government who was a member of the investigative expedition to the southern Kurils in 1785-1786 described the island of Iturup as foreign territory in his report to the government and stated that no representative of the Japanese authorities had ever visited this island.<sup>45</sup> At that time, in the 18th century, the Japanese Government did not regard the Kuril Islands or the northern half of Hokkaido as Japanese territory. Koriyama's study testifies that in 1772, when Sadanobu Matsudaira, head of the central Japanese government, issued instructions to his subordinates in connection with the upcoming Japanese-Russian talks, he unequivocally declared that the region of Nemuro (Hokkaido) was not Japanese land.<sup>46</sup>

In 1799, several decades after the southern Kurils had become part of the Russian Empire and 12 years after all of the inhabitants of Kunashir Island had become Russian subjects, the Japanese government, according to the testimony of Japanese bureaucrat Mogami Tokunami (in the book "A Preliminary Study of the Ezo Region"), sent bureaucrats to Kunashir "for the purpose of discovering this island."<sup>47</sup> Not

long before this, in 1798, a Japanese detachment had toppled the Russian crosses in the southern half of the Kurils, on Urup.<sup>48</sup>

In 1800 the Japanese bureaucrats reached Iturup, where they set up an office on one of its bays, knocked down all of the Russian crosses and put up a column to signify Japan's possession of the island. Soon the Japanese had a military garrison here. In this way, Iturup, which had been Russian for a long time, was seized by force.

In 1802 the Japanese opened a special office in the city of Hakodate to work out the principles of the colonization of the Kuril Islands and the "enlightenment" of their population. These aggressive actions were not recognized by the Russian Government. In 1805 Ryazanov, the head of a Russian legation sent to Japan to establish trade relations, "directly informed" the Japanese "that all of the lands and water north of Matsmai (Hokkaido) belonged to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese must not extend their property any farther."<sup>49</sup>

In 1805 famous Russian navigator I. F. Kruzenshtern completed the astronomical charting, surveying and listing of all the Kuril Islands, including the southern ones.

The period during which the Kuril Islands were part of Russia left a deep impression on the history of their population. The inhabitants of these islands were constantly in contact with the Russians for more than 160 years. The Russians provided them with new means of production: nets, firearms, instruments, etc. They learned farming and livestock breeding and developed their fishing trade. They began to quickly adopt the Russian culture. In 1747 the first school was opened on the island of Shumshu.<sup>50</sup> Later many Kuril natives were educated on Kamchatka.

Most of the Kuril natives spoke Russian and had Russian names. Christianity also spread through the islands quickly. In the 1780's the entire population of the islands was already Orthodox. In 1840 the synod founded a special bishopric here. The bishop of this zone was given the title "bishop of Kamchatka, the Kurils and the Aleutian Islands."<sup>51</sup>

The Kuril natives regarded the Russians as their defenders against the Japanese. For this reason, their friendly feelings for the Russians, which were noted by all of the explorers who visited the islands, are completely understandable. Knowing that they were under the protection of Russia, when the Kuril natives met sea-farers they did not know, they showed them a document marked with the coat of arms of the Russian Empire and testifying to the patronage of the Russian Government.<sup>52</sup>

Taking advantage of Russia's weakness in the Far East in connection with the Crimean war, the Japanese forced Russia to accept the disadvantageous point about the boundary between Russia and Japan on the Kuril Islands at the time of the 1854-1855 talks. Article II of the trade agreement concluded in Shimodo on 26 January 1855 said "the boundary between Russia and Japan will henceforth lie between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The entire island of Iturup will belong to Japan and the entire island of Urup and all other Kuril islands to the north will be Russian possessions."<sup>53</sup>

Preoccupied with the war with England, France and Turkey, Russia was unable to protect its possessions in the Pacific Ocean and had to give Japan the southern



Kurils, which had belonged to Russia for a long time and made up a single entity along with all of the other islands. The weakness of tsarist autocracy, which was reflected most clearly by the defeat suffered by tsarism in the Crimean War, the related threat to Russia's territorial integrity and Russia's loss of influence in the West and Middle East, led to a situation in which the tsarist government had to give up the southern Kurils, which had been part of Russia for almost a century. Tsarism consented to this disadvantageous agreement in the hope of developing trade and friendly relations with Japan. Article I of the Shimodo treaty stated: "Henceforth may there always be peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan. May the Russians and the Japanese in the possessions of the two states enjoy protection and defense, with regard to their personal safety and the inviolability of their property."<sup>54</sup>

Taking advantage of Russia's weak position in the Far East, Japan also made demands in regard to Sakhalin, which also belonged to Russia by right of discovery and exploration. The tsarist government had to make concessions in this area as well: it consented that Sakhalin should "remain undivided between Russia and Japan."<sup>55</sup>

Tsarism's hope of stronger relations with Japan turned out to be groundless, however. Japan tried to take advantage of Russia's weakness in the Far East in connection with the need to concentrate on Europe. In 1875 Japan took advantage of Russia's difficult position to force a disadvantageous treaty on it and seize the Kuril Islands.

On 25 April (7 May) 1875 Russia and Japan signed the St. Petersburg Treaty, in accordance with which Japan gave up all of its claims to Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands.<sup>56</sup> Russia had to agree to this because the tsarist government had to concentrate on events in Europe and the Middle East. The friction between France and Germany resulting from Germany's aggressive behavior meant that tsarism had to pay close attention to events in Western Europe. The budding crisis in the Balkans also demanded the close attention of the tsarist government. Foreseeing conflicts in Western Europe and the Balkans, the tsarist government was not strong enough for the armed defense of its possessions in the Far East, and it had to give in to Japanese pressure. The intrigues of England and France, which were urging Japan to seize Russian possessions, seriously disturbed Russia. By giving up the Kuril Islands, the tsarist government wanted to stabilize its relations with Japan, which were threatening Russia's territorial integrity in the Far East. Russian diplomacy wanted the preamble to the treaty to stipulate its purpose: to put an end to friction between the states and consolidate the "current accord."<sup>57</sup>

When Japan took possession of the Kuril Islands, its rulers decided in the 1880's to evict natives in the border regions who had adopted the Russian culture and had hostile feelings for the Japanese. They moved all of the Kuril natives from the northern islands to Shikotan, an isolated and previously uninhabited island. The natives' firearms were confiscated and unauthorized fishing was prohibited.

The Kuril population dwindled as a result of poverty and hunger. The Ainus inhabiting the southern islands of Iturup and Kunashir were also deprived of their customary means of livelihood. They were forced to work at Japanese fish enterprises, to gather seaweed and to chop wood. All of this led to the gradual extinction of the race. On Iturup, for example, there were around 1,500 people at the beginning of the 19th century, but in 1913, according to Japanese data, there were only 620 people on all three islands in the Lesser Kurils and Shikotan.<sup>58</sup>



In 1904 Japan launched a treacherous attack on Russia. The Kuril Islands were used as a base for military operations against Russia. A Japanese force from Shikotan was landed on Kamchatka. By taking these actions, Japan broke the treaties of 1855 and 1875 and lost the right to refer to these treaties.

Japan took advantage of tsarist Russia's defeat to force the piratical Portsmouth Treaty on it and to take the southern half of Sakhalin away from Russia.

The Japanese Government also made legal announcements regarding the abrogation of all previous treaties with Russia, in Article 9 of the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 and in Supplement 10 to the peace treaty.<sup>59</sup>

Japan turned the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin into a powerful bridgehead for attacks on the Asian continent and in the Pacific Ocean. On 26 November 1941 the Japanese fleet set off from bases on the Kuril Islands for the invasion of Pearl Harbor. The Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin served as a base for Japanese naval ships attacking Soviet merchant vessels in Far Eastern waters during the Great Patriotic War. The Kuril Islands became the stronghold which closed off our country's access to the ocean and to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and Soviet Chukotka.

Japan lost all of its moral rights to make references to the 1855 and 1875 treaties, which were cancelled by Japan itself, when it took its unilateral aggressive actions during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, joined intervention forces in Soviet Russia in 1918 and invaded Soviet territory at the end of the 1930's.

When Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek met in Cairo in November 1943, it was announced that Japan would lose all of the territories the Japanese militarists had seized as a result of aggressive wars. The declaration of the three powers stated that the United States, England and China wished to "deprive Japan of all of the Pacific islands it had seized or occupied after the beginning of World War I in 1914 and to return all of the territories Japan had taken away from the Chinese...to the Chinese Republic" as well as to drive Japan "out of all other territories it seized by force as a result of its greed."<sup>60</sup>

At the Yalta conference in February 1945 the leaders of three powers, the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, affirmed the USSR's right to the Kuril Islands. The Yalta agreement stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the allies 2 or 3 months after Germany's surrender and the end of the war in Europe on the condition of the "reinstatement of Russia's rights which were violated by Japan's treacherous attack in 1904." The third point of the agreement envisaged the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.<sup>61</sup>

The Yalta conference was of great international significance. It aided in considerably reducing the length of World War II and in working out a program for the postwar construction of peace and the creation of conditions ensuring lasting peace and security in the Far East. When Japan surrendered it accepted the terms defined in Yalta by the allied powers.

The important acts regulating the postwar world order include the Potsdam Declaration of the United States, Great Britain and China, published on 26 July 1945, to which the Soviet Union became party on 8 August 1945. The Allies ordered Japan to surrender and warned it that continued resistance would lead to the rapid and total defeat of Japan, the unavoidable devastation of the country and the absolute destruction of its armed forces. The Potsdam Declaration set forth the basic principles which would apply to Japan after its surrender. One of them was directly related to the territorial question. The declaration states that "Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and the smaller islands we will name."<sup>62</sup>

In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta agreement, a special directive was issued by the headquarters of the American occupation troops to the Japanese Government--No 677 of 29 January 1946. It stated that the Kuril Islands would be excluded from the Japanese Government's jurisdiction.<sup>63</sup>

On 2 February 1946 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued an ukase which established that all of the land, minerals and water on the territory of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were the state property of the USSR. The return of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin to the Soviet Government was recorded in the Constitution of the USSR. In 1947 the Kuril Islands became part of Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya Oblast in the RSFSR.

In July 1951 the Soviet Government received the American-English draft of the peace treaty with Japan and an invitation to attend the peace conference scheduled for 4 September 1951 in San Francisco. The Soviet Government accepted the invitation in order to explain the position of the Soviet Union and aid in the conclusion of a truly democratic peace treaty. The San Francisco conference was actually a forum for the formal procedure of the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, represented by the United States and England. Article 2 of the peace treaty, which was signed in San Francisco not only by the USSR's former allies in World War II but also by Japan, unequivocally stipulated: "Japan will renounce all rights and claims to the Kuril Islands and the part of Sakhalin Island and adjacent islands over which Japan acquired sovereignty by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty of 5 September 1905."<sup>64</sup>

The USSR, which was firmly guided in its relations with Japan by the principles of friendship and peaceful cooperation, tried to achieve an equitable settlement of the postwar problems between our countries. Proceeding from these considerations, the Soviet Government issued a declaration on 12 October 1954 to express its willingness to take steps to normalize relations with Japan.

Japan's desire to resume normal diplomatic relations with the USSR was also confirmed in an official announcement by the Hatoyama government on 11 December 1954.

The talks between the Soviet and Japanese delegations began in London on 3 June 1955. The Soviet delegation submitted a draft peace treaty envisaging the eradication of the state of war and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Japan, however, rejected the Soviet proposals and submitted its own draft treaty, in which it demanded part of Soviet territory: South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

A fierce struggle within Japanese ruling circles and the open intervention of the United States in the talks complicated the signing of a peace treaty. Under these conditions, members of the business community, politicians and the general public began to believe that it would be necessary to first resume diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The talks held in Moscow from 13 to 19 October 1956 resulted in the signing of a joint declaration by the USSR and Japan, which envisaged the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The USSR viewed the joint declaration as an important step toward the settlement of many problems in Japanese-Soviet relations. To this end, representatives of the USSR and Japan agreed to negotiate trade treaties or agreements as quickly as possible and to continue the peace talks after normal diplomatic relations had been re-established.

Japan then suggested that the islands of the Lesser Kurils, Iturup and Kunashir were supposedly not part of the "Kuril Islands" transferred to the USSR in accordance with the Yalta agreement of 1945 and given up by Japan in accordance with the San Francisco treaty of 1951.

For almost three centuries, however, the Kuril Islands had been regarded as a single entity. Pre-war Japanese historical and geographic literature also regarded the Kuril Islands as a single entity. For example, the "Official Guide to Japan," published in 1933 by the Japan Tourist Board, says that "the Kuril Islands, 32 islands in all, stretch 710 miles from Nemuro (Hokkaido) to the Kuril Strait, which separates the island group from the southern tip of Kamchatka.... The main islands are Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup, Urup, Shumshu, Alaïd and Paramushir."<sup>65</sup> Later editions of the guide (for example, the 1941 edition) say the same thing.<sup>66</sup>

There were no differences of opinion about the Soviet Union's ownership of all the Kuril Islands in the correspondence between the government of the USSR and the American Government, which unconditionally recognized the Yalta agreement for several years. For example, on 18 August 1945 the U.S. President wrote to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers: "I agree with your request that 'General Order No 1' be changed to include all of the Kuril Islands in the zone which must surrender to the supreme commander of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East."<sup>67</sup> Therefore, both the Soviet and the American governments regarded the Kuril Islands, which were supposed to be turned over to the Soviet State, as a single entity.

When the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged notes in preparation for the peace settlement with Japan, the single term "Kuril Islands" was used everywhere in various languages and it referred to the entire Kuril chain. The southern Kurils were never designated as a separate group. For example, in a memorandum on the peace treaty with Japan which J. F. Dulles delivered to Soviet representative Ya. A. Malik on 26 October 1950, the question of the Kuril Islands was raised as a single matter, without dividing the Kuril chain into northern and southern island groups.<sup>68</sup> The Soviet government memo sent to the U.S. Government on 20 November 1950 was also in reference to all of the Kuril Islands.<sup>69</sup>



This was also the case when the USSR and the United States exchanged notes and statements during the discussion of the draft peace treaty. Later, at the conference in San Francisco in September 1951, and then when the San Francisco treaty was discussed in the American Senate and the Japanese parliament, a single term was used everywhere, in all of the different texts and different languages--the Kuril Islands--without any mention of the Lesser Kurils or the southern Kuril group.

In an article in CHUO KORON, political correspondent T. Hayashi cited remarks by former U.S. Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, former Prime Minister Yoshida and treaty department chief Nishimura which corroborated that in 1952, when the Japanese parliament ratified the San Francisco treaty, it was aware that the Kuril Islands Japan gave up by the terms of this treaty included "not only the northern Kurils but also the islands of Kunashir and Iturup."<sup>70</sup>

The treaty on mutual cooperation and security safeguards signed by Japan and the United States in January 1960 complicated Soviet-Japanese relations considerably. The political content of the treaty and its militaristic nature seriously exacerbated the situation in the Far East and the Pacific and affected the interests of many states located in this vast region, especially Japan's next-door neighbor, the Soviet Union.

The meetings and talks of General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee and other Soviet leaders with the prime minister of Japan in Moscow in October 1973 played an important part in strengthening mutual understanding and developing Soviet-Japanese relations. A joint Soviet-Japanese statement of 10 October says that Soviet-Japanese relations began to develop propitiously, with particularly significant advances in the political, economic and cultural spheres, as soon as diplomatic relations were re-established on the basis of the joint Soviet-Japanese declaration of 1956. The two sides acknowledged, this statement goes on to say, that the reinforcement of neighborly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan, based on the principles of non-intervention in domestic affairs, mutual advantage and equality, is not only in the common interest of both countries but will also contribute greatly to the cause of peace and stability in the Far East and the rest of the world. In this connection, the two sides expressed their determination to strive for the further development of Soviet-Japanese relations.

The statement also noted that the settlement of unresolved matters left over from World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty would aid in the establishment of peaceful neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries.

The USSR has made reference to many unresolved problems which should be negotiated for the establishment of more favorable conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty. In response to the questions of ASAHI editor-in-chief S. Hata, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee said that "the Soviet Union is willing--provided, of course, that the Japanese side does not stipulate obviously unacceptable terms--to complete this process of such great importance to our countries." He then remarked that "peace treaties usually cover a broad range of questions, including the question of boundaries. This also applies to the Soviet-Japanese peace treaty. But the idea that there is some kind of 'unresolved



territorial problem' in the relations between our two countries is a onesided and false interpretation."<sup>71</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

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27. "Russkiye otkrytiya," p 81.
28. Ibid., p 93.
29. Ibid., pp 98-99.
30. It is interesting that Russian researchers regarded Matsmai as the last Kuril island for a long time. The "Timetable of Russian Voyages and Discoveries in the Northeastern Sea" for 1790 says, for example, that after Captain Shpanberg had sailed past all of the Kuril Islands, he visited the last one--Matsmai (A. V. Yefimov, Op. cit., p 269). The grounds for this assumption was the fact that Hokkaido was inhabited by the same Ainus as the Kuril Islands.
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32. A. V. Yefimov, Op. cit., Appendix, p 304.
33. TsGADA, State Archives File, VII, c 2539, shs 107-108.
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36. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 4, p 129.
37. In the 1770's and 1780's the shores of North America were visited by Cook, Mirez, Dixon and Portlock.
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56. "Sbornik pogranichnykh dogovorov zaklyuchennykh Rossiyei s sosednimi gosudarstvami" [Collected Border Treaties Concluded by Russia with Neighboring States], St. Petersburg, 1891, pp 292-297.
57. Ibid.
58. V. I. Solov'yev, "Kuril'skiye ostrova," Moscow, 1947, p 39.
59. "Russkaya tikhookeanskaya epopeya. Sb. dokumentov" [Russia's Pacific Era. Collected Documents], Khabarovsk, 1979, p 580.
60. IZVESTIYA, 3 December 1943.
61. PRAVDA, 13 February 1946.
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64. "Sbornik dokumentov i materialov po Yaponii. 1951-1954" [Collected Documents and Materials Pertaining to Japan, 1951-1954], p 90.
65. "An Official Guide to Japan," Tokyo, 1933, p 272.
66. "Russkaya tikhookeanskaya epopeya," p 380.
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CSO: 1805/1



THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING THE EXACT STAGES OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 136-143

[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences, based on a speech presented at an international conference organized by the Far East Institute in April 1981 on the 60th anniversary of the CCP]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805/1

## THE CCP LEADERSHIP'S NEW MANUEVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 144-154

[Article by R. M. Aslanov, candidate of historical sciences, and B. A. Bolotin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, permeated with the spirit of communist optimism, have been heartily approved by communists and workers in various countries. All people of goodwill have responded to these decisions with interest, satisfaction and hope.

Delegations from 123 communist, workers, national democratic and other parties and organizations from 109 countries on all continents were guests of the congress. All of them applauded the undeniable successes of the USSR and the part it has played in augmenting the strength of world socialism and international detente and all of them expressed solidarity with the Leninist domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet State.

Statements by the more reactionary press organs in the West and Beijing propaganda were in sharp contrast to this. Beijing's crude attacks on the CPSU, following the example of the worst Maoist models, can only be interpreted as evidence of the Chinese leadership's hostile feelings for the communist movement, the entire revolutionary movement and all progressive and peaceful forces, whose representatives attended the congress of the Soviet communists.

The Chinese are alleging that the Soviet Union is experiencing "serious internal difficulties" and that it supposedly represents the "main source of military danger." They have even gone so far as to make the extremely ridiculous statement that "despondency was the prevailing emotion" at the 26th CPSU Congress and that "nothing new" was proposed at the congress. Beijing propaganda organs have portrayed the CPSU line in the international communist movement in a distorted light and are even questioning the very existence of this movement. It is indicative that when the international communist movement was referred to in the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY report on Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the congress, the phrase was enclosed in quotation marks.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, it is obvious that the CCP leadership still feels hostility for the communist movement. The strategy of undermining the communist movement and fighting against it, which Beijing has been trying to implement since the beginning of

the 1960's, has not changed. There have only been changes in the tactics, forms and methods of behavior toward individual communist parties and the communist movement in general, and these changes have been dictated by the repeated failures of the Beijing leaders' anticommunist policy.

The Soviet press has already directed attention to the change in the tactics of Beijing's subversive activity against the international communist movement.<sup>2</sup> Now we would like to present a general description of the post-Mao leadership's approach to the communist movement in comparison to the stand taken by Mao and his associates, and to trace the evolution of the ideological and political aims that Beijing has been trying to impose on communist parties for its own unscrupulous purposes.

Soon after the People's Republic of China was founded, the CCP leadership announced that the Chinese revolution should serve as the standard for the revolutionary movement in Asia and Oceania.<sup>3</sup> It advised the communist parties of India, Indonesia, Japan and other countries to take the "Chinese road"--the road of armed struggle, the creation of liberated zones in rural areas, the encirclement of the cities, etc. It completely ignored the geographic, historical, socioeconomic and political conditions that differed considerably from conditions in China and displayed a condescending attitude toward the distinctive features and traditions of the revolutionary movement and toward the experience and opinions of the communist parties in these countries.

This Chinese "advice" had only harmful results and only complicated the activities of communist parties by diverting them from the correct path. Communist parties can only make correct decisions and attain success in their activity if they overcome the pernicious Maoist influence and work out their own strategy and tactics, based on the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the world communist movement, with a view to the peculiarities of each country and the specific situation.

At the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's Mao Zedong began to insist that the "Chinese line" be accepted by the entire communist movement, and not just by individual communist parties. At the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow in 1957, he made an appeal, unprecedented in terms of its adventurism and monstrous in essence, for an immediate thermonuclear world war, so that imperialism could be ended "at one strike."<sup>4</sup>

The idea of the "instantaneous" defeat of imperialism was earnestly reiterated in a series of propaganda articles in central Chinese press organs in 1960 and subsequent years. It lay at the basis of Beijing's 1963 "Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement," which demanded "decisive revolutionary struggle and the completion of the world proletarian revolution."<sup>5</sup>

The Maoist sermons about the world war as the only means of winning the "world revolution" were amazingly reminiscent of Trotsky's ideas about the "stimulation" of the revolutionary process. The Maoists, just as the Trotskyists, believed that war was justifiable if it contributed to the "happiness" of workers in foreign countries, and took it upon themselves to decide the fate of other peoples. The great-power chauvinism of the Maoists was concealed under a proletarian internationalist disguise.

Some CCP leaders were already trying to exploit proletarian internationalism for their own nationalist and egotistical purposes even before the victory of the Chinese revolution. At the beginning of the 1930's the party leader of that time, Li Lisan, and his followers stubbornly tried to place all world revolutionary forces, especially the military and economic potential of the USSR, "on the altar" of the Chinese revolution. Li Lisan and his followers asserted that the Chinese revolution had become the "main seat" of world revolution. They emphasized the need for a world war, with the aid of which they hoped to "stimulate" the world revolution and thereby "simplify" the successful development of the revolution in China. These views were shared and supported by Mao Zedong. The Comintern, however, censured and rejected Li Lisan's ultra-leftist line.<sup>6</sup>

The proposal on the general line of the international communist movement, which was set forth as an alternative to the platform of the communist movement that had been worked out in documents of the 1957 and 1960 international conferences of communist and workers parties, was the latest attempt to put the world revolutionary movement at China's service. The source of the spurious "revolutionary attitudes" of Mao and the Maoists at that time was the hegemonistic plans and ambitions which were based on the hope that the largest powers in the world, the USSR and the United States, would destroy, or at least considerably weaken, one another in a war, after which China could take the leading position in the world.

The communist and workers parties naturally could not agree with Mao Zedong's incendiary appeals, which threatened all mankind with extinction, or with Beijing's claims to the leading position in the revolutionary movement and a dominant role in world affairs. After its hegemonistic plans had been resolutely rebuffed by communists in various countries, the Maoist leadership resolved to fight against the international communist movement. Furthermore, although the Maoists expressed petty bourgeois, nationalist views, they did not cease to portray themselves as Marxist-Leninists and internationalists. The refusal of the communist parties to support Beijing's plans to start a world war and to establish China as the dominant power in the world was depicted by the Maoists as a "betrayal of the revolution" and a "departure from proletarian internationalism."

Mao Zedong's group essentially refuted the internationalist nature of communist party activity. The statements of this group implied that neither the construction of socialism and communism in the socialist countries nor the struggle against monopolies, reaction and the threat of war in the capitalist countries had anything to do with internationalism. They used the term "internationalism" only in reference to whatever might serve their great-power interests. This is why the Maoists declared that the communist parties in the capitalist countries had "lost their revolutionary zeal," had "become bourgeois," had locked themselves within their national boundaries and had become "social reformist" parties. Beijing was particularly irritated by the communist movement's attempts to achieve peaceful coexistence and to preserve and strengthen peace.

Beijing called many communist parties "revisionist cliques" in retaliation for their disagreement with the Maoist "general line." It severed ties with the overwhelming majority of communist and workers parties. In the first half of the 1960's the Chinese leadership began to form Maoist groups in foreign countries. They were supposed to make up an ideological and political current of international



scale to oppose the communist movement. The plans for the organization of an international Maoist movement failed, however. Maoism, which turned out to be unsuitable even in China, certainly did not gain much popularity in other countries. Those who were delighted at first with the pompous and ultra-revolutionary slogans coming from Beijing gradually realized that they were false and became disillusioned with Maoism in a relatively short time.

The dissatisfaction, unrest and confusion among Mao's former supporters led to the splintering, disintegration and dissolution of many Maoist "parties" and organizations and to the abandonment of Beijing by many of them. After Mao's death, there were only one-fourth or one-fifth as many pro-Beijing groups. The Maoist "movement" fell apart almost before it had time to make its presence known.

As we know, the communist and workers movement is based on the unity of international and national objectives, and the international content of the working class struggle is reflected in specific national forms and features. In contrast to the Marxist-Leninist position, the petty bourgeois ideology offers only narrow nationalism, only cosmopolitanism "without boundaries," as an alternative to proletarian internationalism.

By the beginning of the 1970's Beijing realized that its attempts to use ultra-leftist demagogy to break up the communist movement or create any kind of sizeable current capable of opposing this movement had been futile. The Maoist policy of subordinating contemporary revolutionary forces to the interests of Chinese world hegemony was completely discredited. The failure of this policy was a result of the Beijing leaders' attempts to impose a Trotskyist cosmopolitan and Maoist speculative interpretation of proletarian internationalism, which ignored the significance of the national factor in revolution, on revolutionary forces.

The great-Han chauvinism which was the most salient feature of Maoist ultra-leftist tactics in the 1960's was fundamentally hostile to the principles of proletarian internationalism and was already objectively aiding imperialism in its anticommunist intrigues and was already becoming imperialism's reserve and ally even then. This is why the main result of Beijing's schismatic activity within the world revolutionary process was the recognition the Chinese leaders won from imperialism, even during Mao Zedong's lifetime. Imperialism justifiably regarded them as a force opposing the socialist community, the communist, workers and national liberation movements and the world revolutionary process in general.

China's present leaders want to make use of imperialism's assistance to quickly turn China into a strong militaristic power. In an alliance with imperialism, Beijing plans to fight against the revolutionary forces standing in the way of its hegemonistic ambitions.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time, the Chinese leaders' policy of alliance with imperialism is rubbing them of their previous "revolutionary" aura, is repugnant to progressive circles and the peace-loving world public and is isolating Beijing from the progressive segment of mankind. In order to make its behavior in the world arena more appealing, Beijing has recently begun playing up more to leftist forces. But this is certainly not simply a matter of giving Chinese policy surface appeal. The main purpose is once again to break up leftist forces and attract some of them over to China's side.

This has also been the purpose of the CCP's resumption of contacts with some communist parties. In order to establish contact with communist parties, which possess indisputable influence in their countries and in the entire world, the Chinese leaders are prepared to renounce the ideology of "leftist" extremism which Beijing once tried to promote outside of China and which has been rejected by communists.

Beijing first criticized the "new left" at the beginning of 1981. It was blamed for all of the unrest and terrorism in the West, apparently in conjunction with the U.S. administration's hysterical campaign of "combating international terrorism." BEIJING RIBAO called the views of the "new left" a "hybrid theory, combining the features of individualism, anarchism and eclecticism."<sup>8</sup> The newspaper failed to mention that the "new left" had been strongly influenced by Maoism from the very beginning. In some cases, Beijing has even condemned Maoist groups of its own making.

Now Beijing is heaping all the blame for the instigation of the "leftist" extremist movement in the West, with its Maoist slogans, and for its failure on Kang Sheng, Chen Boda and the "gang of four," who were in direct contact with overseas Maoists. In this way the present Chinese leadership is trying to dissociate itself from Mao's former associates, who have been discredited. It is true that Beijing is still using Maoist groups in some countries in its own interest but it no longer relies primarily on them for the struggle against the world communist movement.

The activities of the communist movement were ignored in China for a long time, and there was the implication that this movement did not even exist. Now the Chinese are discussing the communist movement once again, and are actually stressing the CCP's traditional historic ties with the international communist movement (!). The works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin were republished in the PRC after the Cultural Revolution. In summer 1979 a "plan for research in the area of Marxist theory" was adopted at an all-China conference of ideological personnel in Luda and plans were made for an exhibit of books by the founders of Marxism-Leninism in Beijing.<sup>9</sup> In 1980 the 160th anniversary of Engels' birth was celebrated in China. Preparations for the 100th anniversary of Marx' death have already been announced.

More works are being written about the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Last year the first volume of a 50-volume set of biographies of "historical figures from the CCP" was published. This year a book entitled "Conversations About the History of the Chinese Communist Party" will be published. Furthermore, the Comintern's assistance in the establishment of the CCP is now being mentioned in works about party history.<sup>10</sup> The Chinese plan to publish a three-volume edition of "Comintern Documents and Materials Pertaining to the Chinese Revolution." According to RENMIN RIBAO, this publication should clear up the misunderstandings about the relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese revolution. The newspaper also commented: "The period of the Comintern's existence is distinguished by the many important events with which it was closely connected in the Chinese revolution."<sup>11</sup>

In 1980 a society was founded in Beijing for the study of the history of the international communist movement. It "will study the history and the present status of the international workers movement."<sup>12</sup> Recently, Chinese publishers

issued the first volume of the "Brief History of the International Communist Movement" (up to 1924) and "The History of the International Communist Movement" covering the period from the birth of Marxism to the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 (!). Articles about prominent figures in the world communist movement are printed from time to time in the Chinese press. They include A. Gramsci, G. Dimitrov, E. Thalmann, L. Longo and others. In spite of the fact that these works and articles appear "new" and "objective," they suffer from an obviously tendentious and onesided approach, they alter the history of the communist movement to fit the Maoist, anti-Soviet pattern and they are intended to justify the policy line of Mao Zedong and his followers.

The present CCP leaders have not only demonstrated their interest in the history of the communist movement and are discussing their participation in it, but, using the tactics of Mao Zedong and his associates, are not concealing their claims to a special role in this movement. In an article setting forth the fundamentals of party construction, RENMIN RIBAO remarked: "We must not be guided only by the need to accomplish the four modernizations in our country, we must also feel a great responsibility for the world communist movement."<sup>13</sup>

Another newspaper, GUANGMING RIBAO, interpreted the changes in the Chinese leadership as something just short of a reflection of the best proletarian traditions and stressed their importance to the future of the communist and workers movement. "The recent measures taken to reorganize the system of party and state leadership represent an important reform, based on the generalization of the historical experience of proletarian dictatorship abroad and within the country since the time of the Paris Commune," the newspaper stated. "We can expect the consistent implementation of this reform to have a broad and far-reaching effect on the international communist and workers movement."<sup>14</sup>

Depicting China as the only contemporary force continuing the cause of the Paris Commune, RENMIN RIBAO commented: "Now we are the ones who are taking the grand initiative to create a new world for the laboring public."<sup>15</sup>

Implying that China is taking the same responsibilities as the world communist movement, a RENMIN RIBAO editorial on party style stated that this question reflects the generalization of the CCP's more than 30 years of historical experience and is simultaneously a "serious theoretical and practical problem posed by the historical experience of the international communist movement and various socialist countries."<sup>16</sup>

It is odd to say the least that Beijing is making statements about its "responsibility" for the communist movement and its "broad and far-reaching effect" on this movement while essentially remaining outside the movement and continuing its attacks on it. What is the purpose of all this talk about the communist movement? Apparently, Beijing officials again want to persuade the communist movement or some part of it to accept a policy line which will benefit the Chinese leadership. This is why the history of the communist movement is being falsified in Beijing, its present status is being flagrantly distorted and continuous attempts are made to revise Marxism-Leninism and replace the principles of proletarian internationalism with extreme nationalism.



The game Beijing is playing with some communist parties is dictated by the hope of weakening the opposition to the present Chinese leaders' hegemonistic policy. The main thing, however, is that the Beijing ruling clique hopes to establish broader contacts with the communist parties in order to take advantage of its communist affiliations in a pragmatic game with imperialist and reactionary forces, a game which is of primary significance to the CCP leadership. This will ultimately cause Beijing to involve some communist parties in the alliance with imperialism against their actual interests.

Although the present CCP leaders have stopped making use of some of the more odious, ultra-leftist postulates and premises of Maoism, its nationalist essence has remained inviolable. Although they are still feeding parasitically on Marxism-Leninism, they are no longer engaged in the indiscriminate spread of Chinese standards of behavior and patterns of "revolutionary struggle" or appeals for the "international unification" of all people in the world under the Maoist banner. Now they are trying (imitating, to some degree, imperialist tactics) to cultivate the revolutionary movement in "national quarters" and break up the movement in order to simplify struggle against it and the imposition of opportunistic concepts on the movement, concepts which will, in turn, simplify the attainment of the Beijing hegemonists' objectives.

Beijing's behavior is obviously calculated to break up the ranks of the communist movement, dilute its militant, revolutionary spirit, sow hesitation, confusion and separatist and neutralist tendencies in some communist parties and urge them to renounce international proletarian solidarity and renounce the collective struggle for the common goals of all communists in the world. This is one of the main reasons why people in Beijing have been alleging that "Marxism is too old," that it "is unsuitable for China" and that it should be revised. At a science conference commemorating the 60th anniversary of the "May Fourth Movement" of 1919, Vice President Zhou Yang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences praised the CCP for "freeing itself" from the "Marxist-Leninist dogma engineered by the Third Internationale."<sup>17</sup> The question of "modernizing" Marxism to make it "more consistent with the present conditions and distinctive features of China" was raised at a conference of the Chinese Society for the Study of Marxist-Leninist Works, in Guangzhou in December 1980.<sup>18</sup> The researchers at the conference were advised to concentrate on the study of "theories of socialist models."

In an attempt to justify the CCP leadership's tendency to ignore the general laws governing socialist construction and to denigrate the international significance of the experience of the CPSU and the Soviet people, who first paved the way to socialism, contemporary Beijing ideologists have turned to the anti-Leninist writings of Bukharin. Deputy Director Su Shaozhi of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong wrote an article in which he resurrected Bukharin's strange ideas about the "unavoidably backward" and "far from exemplary" nature of "Russian socialism," which supposedly "cannot serve progressive states as a strict model." Su Shaozhi spoke of Bukharin as virtually the founder of the theory of "socialist models" so dear to his heart.<sup>19</sup> In general, Chinese propaganda is eulogizing Bukharin, asserting that his "theories are still viable and appealing."<sup>20</sup>

Someone named Hu Ping advocated the creation of a "pluralistic" and "market" type of socialism in a RENMIN RIBAO article entitled "Development Along the Path of



Diversity." For example, he said that "planned development often turns into planned chaos and the subversion of society's productive forces, the planned suppression and suffocation of the labor enthusiasm and labor strength of the popular masses. This is why we must not ever absolutize planning. There must be some flexibility. 'If there is no light in the East, it is probably light in the West.'"21

In spite of the vague statements and euphemisms resorted to by Beijing's current policymakers, their aim is absolutely clear: The Chinese "model of socialism" must be acceptable to the West. But what kind of "socialism" can be acceptable to the enemies of socialism?

The "modification" of Maoism is accompanying the revision and vulgarization of Marxism in China. The "modification" of Maoism represents an attempt to adapt Maoism to new conditions by condemning only the most glaring errors made by Mao in theory and practice, the errors which led to obvious failures. "We will always adhere to the Thought of Mao Zedong," Deng Xiaoping said when he met with French Journalists this February.

The questions of defending the "Thought of Mao" and of its further development have been raised in special articles in the press organs of the CCP Central Committee and provincial party committees. Mao Zedong's statements are again being used systematically to reinforce certain aspects of the Chinese leadership's policy. An extremely indicative description of the role and place of Mao and his "Thought" was printed in HONGQI. He was called "a great Marxist, the great leader of the entire party, the entire army and the entire population." The article stated that "his services are of primary importance and his errors are only secondary." "We," the article went on, "must carry on Comrade Mao Zedong's many excellent ideas, the accuracy of which has been corroborated by practice and experience, and develop them in the course of our work."22

When Permanent Secretary Huang Kecheng of the CCP Central Commission for the Investigation of Discipline spoke at a discussion of "Some Fundamental Aspects of Intra-Party Life," the proceedings of which were printed in RENMIN RIBAO, he condemned those who believe it is "enough to rely only on Marxism-Leninism." Furthermore, he took every opportunity to stress the "distinctive" and "specific" features of China.

The need to "develop the Thought of Mao Zedong under new historical conditions" was discussed in an article in QUNZHONG, the organ of the CCP committee of Jiangsu Province. "Practice has proved the accuracy of the Thought of Mao Zedong," the magazine stated. "Whenever practice has revealed something wrong, it has not been connected with the scientific theory of the Thought of Mao Zedong." QUNZHONG (the new beliefs of the Chinese leadership are often tested in such provincial publications) gave Mao the credit for "Sinizing Marxism-Leninism" during the course of a lengthy struggle: against the Comintern in the international arena and against various "deviations" within the party. The authors of this article argued that Marxism-Leninism was unsuitable for China, reasoning that "Marxism-Leninism was born in Europe and is European in form and content." They asserted that "Mao Zedong and his associates raised national ideology to unprecedented heights." The QUNZHONG article includes Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and some present Chinese

leaders among the authors of Maoist "principles and conclusions." The magazine praises them for "not only daring to discard some Marxist-Leninist principles and conclusions which did not apply to Chinese realities," but also creating "new principles and conclusions" which "were not borrowed from Marx and Lenin." Among these innovations, QUNZHONG includes the theory and practice of the new democratic revolution, the theory of armed struggle, the policy of self-reliance, the line of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend," etc. Only one of the principles of Beijing's international activity is singled out: the "creation of a united front against hegemonism," by which the Chinese mean the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

This approach must be viewed as another attempt at the "theoretical" substantiation of the present Chinese leadership's nationalist position, which denies the all-encompassing nature of Marxism-Leninism and declares that "Sinized Marxism" in the form of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is the unshakeable ideological and political foundation of the CCP. By announcing that the "quintessence of the Thought of Mao Zedong" will always be the "spiritual weapon of the people," Beijing has reaffirmed its old claims about the worldwide significance of Mao's ideological legacy.

Although the "Decisions on Some Questions About CCP History Since the Time of the Founding of the PRC," adopted by the Sixth CCP Central Committee Plenum in June 1981, admit the failures of the Maoist economic and political line, criticize many aspects of Mao's activity and condemn his cult of personality, they state that Mao's "services outweigh his errors, despite the serious mistakes he made" and stress that his "Thought" will continue to guide CCP activity.<sup>23</sup>

The Decisions take every opportunity to praise the specific "Chinese road" of societal development and falsify the history of the CCP, which is examined in isolation from the world revolutionary process and is portrayed as a series of victories by the "Thought of Mao Zedong."

The Decisions frankly state that the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism "cannot provide ready solutions to problems arising during the course of socialist construction in China." Furthermore, they say nothing about the international experience in the construction of socialism and they denigrate and falsify the international assistance offered to the Chinese revolution by the Comintern and the USSR. The Decisions suggest that the adherence to Comintern beliefs and the reliance on Soviet experience "almost led the Chinese revolution into a blind alley." The denial of Marxism-Leninism as the theoretical basis of socialism, just as the denial of the significance of the international experience in socialist revolution and socialist construction, is intended to establish Maoism as the only ideological doctrine of the CCP. The Chinese leadership proposed to seek "solutions to problems," which were supposedly not mentioned in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, in certain works by Mao Zedong, which were listed by the plenum. This list includes the "great helmsman's works" on the search for, and substantiation of, a unique "socialist path suitable for China," as opposed to the theory and practice of scientific communism.

The struggle against the CPSU and the communist and workers parties which have taken a firm Marxist-Leninist stand, against the Soviet Union and against the countries of the socialist community is still regarded by the post-Mao leadership

as its main objective. Although the Chinese leaders have had to criticize Mao Zedong, they are still Maoists, chauvinists, anti-Soviets and, in essence, anti-communists. Their references to Marxism-Leninism should not mislead anyone.

The Chinese leaders, who once insisted on the need to create an anti-Soviet, antisocialist "united front" consisting of the PRC, the United States, the Western European NATO countries and Japan, are now trying to broaden this front by including the extreme right and certain segments of the left. They are advocating united struggle against world socialism by political parties as well as states. The thesis regarding the "united front" is now being supplemented by a catchy new phrase in Beijing propaganda: "the creation of a structure of collective opposition to Soviet hegemonism,"<sup>24</sup> signifying the unification of all those that Beijing can unite for the purpose of "restraining and repulsing" the Soviet Union.

Beijing would like to include some national democratic, socialist, bourgeois nationalist and other parties in the Third World countries, with which the CCP has eagerly sought inter-party ties in the last 2 years, in its projected "collective structure." Delegations representing the CCP have traveled to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, mainly for the purpose of foisting anti-Soviet views on their partners in the parties in power in these countries. In spite of all these efforts, however, not one of the developing countries has taken Beijing's side.

The CCP leaders are taking a noticeable interest in the Western European social democrats. Such leading figures from the "Euroleftist" parties as W. Brandt, F. Gonzalez, M. Suarez, B. Craxi and F. Mitterand have been invited to the PRC. The Chinese leadership's desire to impose an anti-Soviet line on the Socialist Internationale is clearly evident. The Chinese leaders have put their socialist guests in an awkward position with their excessively persistent anti-Sovietism and their hostility toward detente. When C. Estier, who accompanied F. Mitterand on his trip to Beijing, was interviewed by the French Socialist Party weekly L'UNITE, he said that "the FSP delegation could not agree with Chinese views on the international situation."<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the French Socialist Party's belief in the need for continued dialogue with the USSR to preserve peace in Europe was reaffirmed. Beijing officials responded with unconcealed irritation to Mitterand's remark that "France should not arm China."

The Beijing leaders have encountered even greater difficulties in their attempts to include the communist parties in their "collective structure." Not one communist party shares the Chinese leaders' hostile feelings for the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, approves of the Chinese hegemonists' need to fraternize with imperialism and reaction or agrees with Beijing's appeals for war. Beijing officials are pretending that they do not notice this disagreement, however, and they are trying to convince their own people and the world public that the policy of the PRC is supported by several communist parties.

The CCP leaders are now advocating, at least verbally, the "self-sufficiency and independence" of communist parties and are denying that the communist movement has any kind of "center." But after all, it was Mao Zedong and his group who called China the "center of world revolution" and tried to insult certain communist parties by dictating Maoist beliefs and by flouting their elementary right to act separately and independently. It was precisely the Maoist leadership of the CCP who gave it the title of the "leading party."

Beijing's new approach to the communist movement can only be regarded as an admission of the failure of its previous policy, which was supposed to place the CCP above all other communist parties and give it the authority to command the communist movement. After failing to win the allegiance of the communist parties and witnessing their extremely negative reaction to the Maoist attempts to turn the communist movement into an instrument of the great-China policy, the CCP leaders are now trying to win the confidence of certain communist parties with different means but for the same end.

Complex and contradictory processes are going on within the Chinese Communist Party. It is the arena of fierce battles over the ideological and political legacy of Mao Zedong and the country's future course of development. The reversals in these battles are naturally affecting Beijing's behavior toward the international communist movement.

Beijing's present line could continue for some time, but it could also change in one way or another, depending on the outcome of the struggle within the party or as a result of changes in the balance of power and the latest compromises made by the Chinese leadership. The prevailing tendency now is the alliance of the Beijing leaders with the most spiteful enemies of socialism and peace--imperialists and reactionaries of all types--in the struggle against revolutionary and peaceful forces.

Under these conditions, the CCP leadership's attempts to include itself in the communist movement seem ridiculous and hypocritical. Far-reaching plans and calculations lie behind the so-called "normalization" of relations with some communist parties. Above all, there is the hope of breaking up the communist movement and undermining the world anti-imperialist front. It is not surprising that the imperialists regard Beijing as the Trojan horse of the revolutionary movement.

The 26th CPSU Congress, the congresses of the fraternal parties, prominent figures in the international communist movement and articles in the communist press have directed attention to the serious threat posed by the fraternization of Mao's political heirs with the imperialists and Beijing's attempts to take action with its new allies to stop and reverse the world revolutionary process and to endanger international detente and world peace.

Communists are responding to the imperialist-hegemonist attempts to escalate international tension by closing their ranks and putting up stronger resistance to the CCP leadership's subversive and schismatic activities. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, in the fundamental differences between revolutionaries and reformists, between creative Marxism and dogmatic sectarianism or ultra-leftist adventurism, "there can be no compromises. This is just as true today as it was in Lenin's time."<sup>26</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 25 February 1981.
2. KOMMUNIST, 1981, No 12, pp 73-82; 1980, No 11, pp 106-107; NOVOYE VREMYA, 1980, No 20, pp 10-11; No 51, pp 10-11.



3. RENMIN RIBAO, 22 November 1949.
4. "Maoizm bez prikras" [Maoism Unadorned], Moscow, 1980, p 237.
5. "Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement," Beijing, 1963, p 5.
6. For more detail, see "Komintern i Vostok" [The Comintern and the East], Moscow, 1969, pp 313-349.
7. For more detail, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1980, Nos 2, 4.
8. BEIJING RIBAO, 30 March 1981.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 July 1979.
10. See, for example, the DANGSHI YANJIU article (1980, No 1) reprinted in RENMIN RIBAO on 6 October 1980.
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 September 1980.
12. GUANGMING RIBAO, 19 February 1980.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 17 March 1980.
14. GUANGMING RIBAO, 17 October 1980.
15. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 March 1981.
16. Ibid., 9 March 1981.
17. GUANGMING RIBAO, 8 April 1979.
18. Ibid., 29 December 1980.
19. JINGJI DONGTAI, 1980, No 11, pp 40-41.
20. SIXIANG ZHANGXIAN, 1980, No 6, p 18.
21. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 August 1980.
22. HONGQI, 1981, No 4, p 9.
23. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 July 1981.
24. Ibid., 20 February 1981.
25. L'UNITE, 20 February 1981.
26. L. I. Brezhnev, "The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Objectives in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Moscow, 1981, p 23.

PROBLEMS IN CHINESE PHILOLOGY: THE ETERNAL AND THE CONTEMPORARY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 155-166

[Article by N. T. Fedorenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE ARTIST (COMMEMORATING THE CENTENNIAL OF LU XIN'S BIRTH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 167-174

[Article by V. F. Sorokin, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

NEW PROBLEMS IN THE SIMPLIFICATION OF CHINESE WRITING

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 175-181

[Article by M. V. Sofronov, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## FAR EAST INSTITUTE'S FOREIGN CONTACTS IN THE LAST 15 YEARS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 182-187

[Text] In 1981 the Far East Institute (IDV) of the USSR Academy of Sciences was 15 years old. The development of the institute's foreign contacts during this period and their purpose, forms and scales are indissolubly connected with the basic scientific work of the institute and its researchers. This applies to any research institute or center because as the number of the institute's published scientific works increases, the research becomes more thorough and comprehensive, the subject matter of the research becomes broader and more pertinent, the center or institute acquires more prestige, it attracts the attention of more scientists, specialists and public spokesmen in other countries and it acquires the objective potential for the broad development of foreign contacts.

The IDV was founded as the USSR Academy of Sciences' head institute for the study of international political and economic relations in the Far East and current events in this region, particularly in China and Japan. The core of the institute research staff consisted of scientists who had transferred from other academy institutes (of oriental studies, the economics of the world socialist system, the workers movement and others), who were then joined by researchers employed by various government agencies and the young graduates of the Orientology departments and schools of higher academic institutions. Most of the IDV researchers are Sinologists. The specific functions of the institute and the composition of its research staff have naturally also affected its foreign contacts and their purpose: The first contacts were established with foreign Sinologists and Sinology centers. It should be stressed that the institute did not emerge from a vacuum: From the very beginning the core of the research staff was made up of prominent Sinologists who had inherited the best traditions of Russian and Soviet Sinology and already had some contact with their colleagues abroad.

European Sinology congresses have played an important role in the establishment and development of contacts and relations between Sinologists in various European countries during the postwar period. These congresses have been held once a year in Europe since 1948. At first they were called congresses of young Sinologists and were mainly attended by students, young practicing Sinologists who were just beginning their careers and young instructors of Sinological subjects, usually philology and linguistics. Gradually the more venerable Sinologists and university professors acquired more interest in attending the congresses. This was accompanied by a natural aging process: Yesterday's talented students became instructors, scientists

and professors. Soviet scientists have attended the European congresses since 1956. After the Far East Institute was founded, its research associates were active participants in all of the European congresses on Sinology, held in various European countries: in Italy (Senigallia) in 1969, in Sweden (Stockholm) in 1970, in Great Britain (Oxford) in 1971, in the Netherlands (Levenhorst) in 1972 and in France (Paris) in 1973 and 1976.

At the Sinologists' congress in Paris in 1976 the European Sinology Association (ESA) was officially formed. Since that time the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been a group member of the association and a number of institute researchers (Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Professor M. I. Sladkovskiy, Doctor of Juridical Sciences L. M. Gudoshnikov, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. A. Krivtsov, Doctor of Philological Sciences V. F. Sorokin and Candidate of Historical Sciences L. S. Sukhanov) have been individual members. Institute researchers took an active part in subsequent ESA congresses: in Italy (Ortisei) in 1978 and in Switzerland (Zurich) in 1980, as well as in ESA projects: in literature (Doctor of Philological Sciences V. F. Sorokin was the head of the Soviet group of participants and a member of the international editorial board for the project) and the project entitled "The State in China" (Doctor of Juridical Sciences L. M. Gudoshnikov). Professor M. I. Sladkovskiy, IDV director, was a member of the board and the vice president of the ESA from 1976 to 1980. In 1980 he was chosen one of the three outstanding European Sinologists and was made an honorary member of the ESA. Professor V. A. Krivtsov was a member of the association board in 1978-1980, and Doctor of Philological Sciences V. F. Sorokin was one in 1976-1978 and was re-elected a member of the board and elected vice president of the ESA in 1980. The next ESA congress will be held in 1982, in England (Cambridge), and the one after that will be held in 1984. The board has asked Soviet Sinologists to hold it in Moscow.

The development and reinforcement of the institute's foreign contacts were also promoted by the participation of its researchers in various international science forums on the regional affairs of the Far East, held in various countries--Japan, the United States, Belgium and others--and in such major international gatherings as congresses of political scientists, philosophers, historians and economists. Some of these congresses were held in the USSR in the last few years.

The growing repute of the IDV abroad has naturally promoted the publication of works by its researchers as well as the publication of the institute's quarterly journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA since 1972. The journal later began to be published in English and Japanese as well as Russian, and a Spanish edition became available in 1980. The increasing number of copies of all editions of the journal and the growing number of foreign subscribers are the best evidence of the heightened prestige of the journal and the institute which publishes it.

When we discuss the different factors which have contributed to the expansion of institute foreign contacts, we should stress that the institute's international scientific contacts were established and developed at a time of detente in international relations. This process reflected the wishes and desires of people in all countries for strong and lasting peace and led to the unprecedented growth of exchanges in all areas of public life by peoples and countries with differing socio-economic systems. During this period the USSR concluded cultural and scientific



exchange agreements with the governments of the main Western countries; these laid a solid foundation for the establishment and development of regular contacts by scientific institutions. For example, an intergovernmental Soviet-U.S. agreement served as the basis for an agreement (which is constantly being updated and expanded) between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS).\*

In the last 10 years around 20 IDV researchers have gone to the United States to work on scientific projects for periods ranging from 1 to 9 months just in accordance with this agreement. They have visited American universities and scientific centers, scientific libraries and archives, have met with their American colleagues, have attended science symposiums and conferences held during their stay in the country, have presented lectures and reports on their own area of interest and on IDV projects, and so forth.

In accordance with scientific exchange agreements, IDV researchers have worked on projects in such countries as Great Britain, the FRG, France, Italy, Finland, Japan, India and Singapore. In turn, the IDV has welcomed Western scientists who have come to the USSR on scientific exchange programs and who have included contacts with the IDV in their scientific programs. There is no question that such exchanges are important and useful. Scientists receive an opportunity to learn about the latest projects of their foreign colleagues, exchange views on research topics and collect additional information for their work which is not available in their own country; and they do not collect this information only for their own work, but also for their comrades and for the institute library. As a result, new facts are made known to the scientific community, research becomes more thorough and meaningful, arguments become more sound, etc. In a number of cases overseas assignments have resulted directly in the publication of new scientific works. Some examples are the books "Kitay i Angliya" [China and England] and "Kitay i Yaponiya" [China and Japan], published by Professor M. I. Sladkovskiy, director of the IDV and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, after his assignments in Japan and Great Britain; another example is "Kitayevedeniye Anglii" [English Sinology], written by Doctor of Historical Sciences V. N. Nikiforov after his work in that country.

As a rule, institute researchers who return from overseas assignments report on the results of these projects at meetings of their sector or department or the institute Academic Council. The results are thereby made known to other institute researchers who are studying the same or related topics, and this heightens the impact of overseas assignments.

The persons who go overseas to work on projects are mainly the institute's leading scholars: heads of departments and sectors and senior research associates. This is true of all scientific establishments in all countries. Young scientists begin their "international" activity by participating in various international forums.

Institute researchers are not only traveling abroad on USSR Academy of Sciences exchange programs with foreign scientific centers. Soviet scholars are active

\* The USSR Academy of Sciences also has an agreement with the U.S. Academy of Sciences, but the social sciences (the humanities) do not enter into its jurisdiction, but into that of the ACLS. This is why the USSR Academy of Sciences has two agreements with the American side.

participants in the societal life of our people, and the IDV scholars are no exception: They are members or activists in many Soviet public organizations, such as the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, the All-Union Society for Knowledge and others. As members of delegations representing these organizations, they often travel abroad and use these trips to develop scientific contacts whenever possible.

Many Western scholars have visited the Far East Institute in recent years to exchange views with their Soviet colleagues, present lectures and learn about the organization of research work. They have included such prominent scientists as G. Malmquist (Sweden), S. Egerode (Denmark), G. Franke, D. Heinzig, K. Kaiser (FRG), L. Lanciotti, P. Corradini (Italy), S. Hiroshi, I. Sankichi, I. Fujita, M. Nakajima, I. Kinichi, M. Takeuchi, K. Mori (Japan), G. Sigour, M. Whiting, A. Feuerwerker, W. Kintner, G. Pauker, A. Gorelik, M. Halperin, M. Kay, T. Robinson, Wu Yuan-li, M. Pillsbury, S. Spector, G. Ginsburgs, P. Chang, D. Griffiths, P. K. Yu, Kim Yang (United States), K. Schipper, G. Gidkoff (France), Mukerjee, the Datts (India) and many others. It would be difficult to list all of the scholars who have visited the IDV. Many of them came to Moscow at the invitation of the IDV as its guests. In these cases, the institute organized meetings for them with Soviet scientists from other academy institutes and from universities in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities of interest to the visiting scholars and familiarized the guests with various aspects of Soviet life.

Of course, the talks and lectures of Western scientists in the IDV have not always taken place in an atmosphere of complete unanimity. Representatives of different ideologies and of countries with a different social structure have naturally expressed diametrically opposed views and judgments in regard to certain problems in international relations and have held differing views of processes occurring in the Far East and the rest of the world. Debates and arguments have arisen. Sometimes one side has been able to convince the other that its opinion is the correct one. In other cases this has not happened and the two sides have retained their previous divergent views. Nevertheless, there have been no cases in which participants in debates have not commented on the value and importance of a sincere exchange of opinions, because this provides a better understanding of the position and arguments of both sides and, what is most important, aids in determining ways of solving the main problems of the present day, those which affect the fundamental and vital interests of all countries.

As many participants in debates have remarked, a sincere exchange of opinions has a positive effect on scientific work and on research because it reveals weak spots and unsound arguments, makes previously unknown facts and data available to the scientific community, etc.

The IDV has established its strongest, broadest and most comprehensive relations with associated scientific centers in the European socialist countries, Mongolia, the Republic of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Sinologists of these countries and the IDV are engaged in the highest form of scientific cooperation: joint research and the publication of joint or collective works. In 1980, for example, a collective work by scholars from eight socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR) was published in

the USSR: "KNR: klatkiy istoricheskiy ocherk (1949-1979)" [The PRC: A Brief Historical Survey (1949-1979)]. The authors of this work examine the fundamental political and socioeconomic changes in the development of the PRC, from the considerable social progress during the first decade after the PRC was founded to the stagnation and social regression of the next 20 years, as well as the evolution of the country's foreign policy from anti-imperialism to alliance with imperialist reaction. The authors present logical arguments to prove that the policy and practice of Maoism are contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and all of their true friends in the world. The work has already been published or will be published in 1981 in all of the countries participating in the project.

Joint studies were conducted by IDV researchers and their Mongolian colleagues (on Maoist policy on the question of nationality), Bulgarian scientists (on the continuous crisis of Maoism) and Sinologists in the GDR (on classes and the class structure in the PRC). Joint studies were also conducted with Polish and Hungarian scientists.

Sinologists from the fraternal countries always attend science symposiums and conferences held in these countries. Some examples are the "China and Socialism" symposium held in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, in October 1976; the symposium on "The Internal Political Situation and the Foreign Policy of the PRC After Mao Zedong's Death: An Analysis of the Main Aspects" in Tihany (Hungary) in January 1978; a conference on the schismatic activity of pro-Maoist groups in Western Europe, held in Berlin (GDR) in November 1977; a symposium on "Maoism and the Question of Nationality" in Ulaanbaatar (MPR) in May 1979; a conference on "China and Asia" in Berlin (GDR) in March 1979; a conference on "The Socioeconomic Problems of the PRC" in Berlin (GDR) in October 1979; a conference on "China's Role and Place in the Global Strategy of Imperialism" in Prague (CSSR) in November 1980; and a symposium on "China in the 1980's" in Berlin (GDR) in April 1981. The last symposium was attended by prominent scholars and specialists from the Western countries in addition to scientists from the socialist countries.

Our colleagues from the fraternal countries also take an active part in the science forums organized by the Far East Institute in Moscow. This particularly applies to the regular science conferences on the contemporary history of China, held each year in spring (April-May). They were held in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979. In March 1979 a science conference was held in Moscow on "Countering Maoist Lies About History"; in March 1980 the topic was "PRC Policy in the Developing Countries"; in April 1981 the topic was "The Past History of the Chinese Communist Party (in Connection with the 60th Anniversary of the CCP)." As a rule, symposium and conference materials (reports and speeches) are published in the organizing country and in other socialist countries.

The persons who were most often and most actively involved in the work of the science forums listed above included such prominent scholars as Academician D. Kosev, D. Mitev (Bulgaria), Academician F. Tyokan, B. Talas (Hungary), Dhao Dui Tung, Ngo Than Dieun (SRV), H. Peters, R. Felber (GDR), E. Rey (Cuba), Academician Sh. Bira, N. Izjams (MPR), W. Nametkiewicz, R. Slawinski (Poland), K. Kurka, J. Cesar, M. Matus, V. Oplustil (CSSR) and others.

The IDV helps science centers in the socialist countries train scientific personnel by organizing IDV work-study programs for specialists from these countries and



post-graduate studies. For example, four research associates from Bulgaria and one apiece from Poland and Hungary have successfully completed their post-graduate work and defended candidates' dissertations in the IDV. Representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, the CSSR and the MPR are now doing post-graduate work at the institute.

The countries of the socialist community are engaged in the mutual exchange of scientists and research associates for the presentation of lectures and the exchange of opinions and experience in accordance with IDV programs. They are also engaging in the regular exchange of scientific publications and reciprocal critiques of scientific works. The works published in various countries of the socialist community are translated into the languages of the other socialist countries.

Scientific centers and scientists in the socialist countries exchange not only published works but also plans for research projects.

It is hardly necessary to prove the importance and value of the close and comprehensive scientific cooperation established by Sinologists from the socialist countries within a relatively short time. Their rapid familiarization with all of the published works of their colleagues abroad and with their research plans, their frequent personal meetings and discussions and the direct exchange of opinions and materials on complex matters enrich all of the participants in these exchanges, heighten the quality and scientific value of their research and publications, make new facts and documents available to the scientific community and broaden the outlook of scholars and scientific personnel. This kind of exchange is particularly important and useful to creative young scientists. Their constant communication with prominent specialists from various countries and their participation in debates with them considerably reduce the time required for scientific training and accelerate the scientific growth of the young specialist and his establishment as a scholar. The coordinated training of the most highly qualified personnel and the possibility of enlisting the services of scientists from other countries in this work also have a tremendous economic impact, save effort and funds and ensure the more efficient use of the creative potential of scientific personnel. As a result, an entire galaxy of young and capable scholars, whose works speak for themselves, has emerged in a number of countries where Sinology was poorly developed or was virtually non-existent.

The development and diversification of the international scientific contacts of the IDV led to the establishment of a department of foreign relations and international scientific cooperation at the institute in 1974.

The department coordinates the institute's foreign contacts with its scientific plans, drafts the agreements with science centers abroad and monitors their fulfillment, studies the activities of overseas scientific centers engaged in the same kind of research as the IDV, establishes contact with them, makes all arrangements for foreign scholars and specialists who come to the institute, organizes the institute's international science symposiums and conferences, supervises institute training programs for foreign associate researchers and post-graduate students and conducts the exchange of scientific publications between the IDV and overseas scientific centers. Each year the department sends out hundreds of copies of books, published in the USSR and written by IDV researchers, and copies of the institute



journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in four languages to various addresses abroad. The department sends the publications it receives from abroad to the science library or the appropriate institute departments and sectors. Entire scientific libraries of works published by IDV researches in recent years are sometimes collected and sent abroad. In 1980, for example, when the magnificent Palace of Knowledge was built in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK, the IDV presented it with a gift consisting of 120 books on institute subject matter and complete sets of past issues of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA.

Our description of IDV foreign contacts will not be complete unless we include at least a brief discussion of the institute's many foreign visitors who are not scientists. Between 1976 and 1980 alone, 854 people from 30 countries visited the IDV and spoke with its researchers on matters of interest to them. More than half of them visited the institute in the last 2 years. The main reason is that the IDV moved in May 1979 to a new 15-story building, which considerably improved conditions for the reception of foreign guests and visitors. A high percentage have been journalists. The correspondents and editors of the central news agencies, press organs and radio and television stations in the fraternal socialist countries are constant visitors. They not only meet with institute researchers and interview them, but also invite them to write reports and articles about IDV projects. Their Western colleagues, representing major newspapers and agencies in their countries, constitute an equally impressive percentage of our visitors. They include J. McCarthy (UPI), G. Brandon (WASHINGTON STAR), M. Parks and K. Piper (BALTIMORE SUN), N. Parker (NEWSWEEK), G. Andreas (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU), A. Kass (FINANCIAL TIMES), O. Bryan (OBSERVER), O. Johannsen (DAGBLADET), E. Corby (ESPRESSO), R. Ubaldi (EPOCA), S. Viola (REPUBBLICA), A. Kumar (UNI, India), K. Chandra (TIMES OF INDIA), C. S. Pandit (FREE PRESS JOURNAL), L. Grace (ROS EL-YUSUF), El Holi (AL-TALIYA), Hans Salehi (Lebanon), M. Garcia (EXCELSIOR, Mexico), many representatives of major Japanese newspapers and agencies and others.

Statesmen, politicians and public spokesmen from various countries, mainly Western states, including U.S. congressmen, White House staff members, the heads of communist and workers parties in several European and Asian countries and others, make up a large group of IDV visitors. Representatives of various parties and public organizations in Japan are frequent guests of the institute. The institute has been visited by leaders of the Socialist Party, Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Socialist Party, Komeito, Gensuikyo, Society for Political Renewal, Soka Gakkai and the Society for Japanese-Soviet Trade, parliamentary deputies from various parties, representatives of Japanese youth organizations and others. The institute is also visited frequently by the personnel of foreign embassies in Moscow.

The great number of institute visitors, representing various social strata in many countries and various political views, provides irrefutable and eloquent testimony to the importance and pertinence of the problems studied by the institute and the prestige of its researchers.

It would certainly be difficult to overestimate the role and significance of the Far East in the international community. The people inhabiting this region and adjacent countries represent more than half of the world's population. The region was one of the originating sites of World War II, which took millions of human lives, and it is probably the only place in the world where human blood has been shed

almost constantly ever since World War II. The Vietnamese people's many years of heroic struggle for their freedom and independence, the Korean War, numerous minor armed conflicts, tremendous social changes, the growing role of the region's major countries, China and Japan, in the system of international relations, the peace-endangering foreign policy of the Maoist CCP leadership, the variety and complexity of economic and social problems in the region and many other factors naturally arouse the interest and emotions of people who want a strong and lasting peace, regardless of where they may live.

The prestige of the IDV and its research staff stems from a comprehensive, objective scientific approach to problems, the breadth and depth of institute research and its thoroughly logical conclusions. The main reason, however, is that history itself is corroborating the accuracy of IDV researchers' conclusions and predictions. This is the principal reason for the authority of institute scientists.

Another important factor deserves at least a brief mention. For many years Westerners have spoken and written incessantly about "freedom of speech" and "true democracy." This has been accompanied by statements about the "absence of freedom" in the USSR and the socialist countries.

The many Western journalists who have visited the IDV and have virtually never been refused entry (in the future the number of visitors will have to be reduced because the excessive number of them, especially journalists, is taking researchers away from their work too often) cannot complain that they were not given enough attention or that representatives of some press organs were given preferential treatment. Furthermore, almost all of them have expressed appreciation for their meaningful and profound discussions with IDV staff members and have commented on the frankness of these discussions and on the cordiality and kindness of the Soviet scholars. Many journalists have not concealed their amazement that Soviet scholars do not avoid pointed questions, even when these questions go beyond the bounds of institute subject matter, and are willing to discuss any issue frankly. Some representatives of major bourgeois newspapers, however, have completely agreed with the Soviet scientists' views on certain problems in international relations but have had to admit that they cannot print these views in their newspapers and journals because the editors of these publications often order "radical re-writes" which completely change the original content of articles. Western journalists have repeatedly remarked that they cannot print news in their press about meetings and talks with Soviet people or about Soviet life if this information has no negative content. In view of this, how can there be any serious discussion of "democracy" or "freedom"!

The research associates of the IDV of the USSR Academy of Sciences, just as all other Soviet scientists, are firmly convinced that broader scientific exchange will promote mutual understanding, strengthen mutual trust and, consequently, aid in the further expansion and reinforcement of detente and the consolidation of world peace. Proceeding from this assumption, they regard their personal participation in scientific exchanges as the performance of their duty as scientists, citizens and human beings and are always willing to contribute as much as they can to the general cause of strong and lasting peace throughout the world.

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH KAMPUCHEA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 187-191

[Article by V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### MILITARIZATION AND MILITARY ALLIANCES ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH JAPANESE SECURITY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 192-199

[Reviews by V. N. Bunin of book "Ima koso hibuso churitsu" edited by T. Takazawa, Tokyo, Zugatsusha Publishing House, 1980, 224 pages; and by I. A. Tsvetova of book "Hibuso churitsu ron" by Masashi Ishibashi, Tokyo, 1980, 209 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE PRC

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 199-202

[Review by G. F. Kim, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, of book "Pervyye kitayskiye revolyutsionery" [The First Chinese Revolutionaries], Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979, 254 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

### CHINA AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 202-204

[Review by Ye. A. Konovalov, doctor of economic sciences, of book "Ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya s NR so stranami Yugo-Vostochnoy Azii" [The PRC's Economic Relations with the Southeast Asian Countries] by S. A. Manezhev, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 192 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]



## RUSSIA'S PACIFIC ERA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 204-208

[Review by N. M. Sobolev, candidate of naval sciences, of book "Russkaya tikhookeanskaya epopeya" Khabarovsk, 1979, 607 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

## FIRST EDITION OF COLLECTED CI VERSE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 208-211

[Review by Ye. A. Serebryakov, doctor of philological sciences (Leningrad), of book "Meihua in Bloom. Classical Chinese Ci Poetry" translated, prefaced and annotated by M. Basmanov, Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1979, 425 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

## THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 211-213

[Review by Ye. A. Bragina of book "Aktual'nyye problemy sotsialisticheskoy industrializatsii MNR" [Current Problems in the Socialist Industrialization of the MPR] by Ts. Gurbadam, Moscow, Ekonomika, 1980, 128 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

## PROBLEMS IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 213-215

[Review by Yu. M. Ryakin of book "V'yetnam na puti stroitel'stva sotsializma" [Vietnam is Building Socialism], Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979, 226 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

## PARTY CONSTRUCTION IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 215-218

Review by V. I. Titkov of book "Napravleniya, formy i metody rukovodyashchey deyatel'nosti kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy" [Aims, Forms and Methods of Communist and Workers Party Guidance], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, 585 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

HONORING M. S. KAPITSA ON HIS 60th BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 219-221

[Not translated by JPRS]

HONORING P. A MIF ON HIS 80th BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 81 pp 222-224

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